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Résumé 
Cette thèse démontre l'utilité de l'expérimentation en science politique à 
l'aide de six articles. Bien que disparates quant à leurs questions et sujets, 
ils sont tous liés au comportement et à la psychologie politique. 
Le premier article examine le rôle des considérations qui ne sont pas 
de l'ordre de l'intérêt personnel dans la formation des préférences pour les 
dépenses publiques. Je mesure l'altruisme des répondants par un jeu du 
dictateur. Je démontre qu'un niveau d'altruisme élevé prédit un plus fort 
appui pour des dépenses publiques, malgré le coût pour le répondant . 
. 
Le deuxième article s'intéresse à un paradoxe central de la participation 
politique: s'il est peu probable que le vote d'un simple citoyen décide du 
résultat d'une élection, pourquoi y a-t-il autant d'électeurs? Je démontre à 
l'aide d~un modèle formel que certàins votent pour le bénéfice des autres. À 
l'aide d'une série de jeux du dictateur, je montre ensuite que les préférences 
variées pour certains partisans prédisent la décision de voter ou non. 
Le troisième article présente les résultats d'une expérience de terrain sur 
les capacités de persuasion du courrier publicitaire. Durant la campagne 
de Michael Ignatieff pour la direction du Parti libéral du Canada en 2006, 
nous avons assigné de façon aléatoire du courrier aux délégués qui s'étaient 
engagés auprès d'autres candidats, puis nous les avons sondés. Ceux ayant 
reçu du courrier ont ajusté leur évaluation des autres candidats à la hausse 
et ont moins bien classé M. Ignatieff. 
Il' 
Le quatrième article montre comment le modèle de Bradley-Terry peut 
être utilisé pour analyser le pouvoir persuasif de l'argumentation. Au cours 
du référendum d'octobre 2007 sur la réforme électorale en Ontario, nous 
avons assigné à chacun des 520 répondants de notre sondage un argument en 
faveur et un argument contre la réforme, avant de leur demander leur opinion. 
Les arguments pour le système existant profitent d'un avantage général, tout 
comme les arguments qui font appel à la justice et à la représentation locale. 
Les arguments qui mentionnent les partis politiques sont moins persuasifs. 
Le cinquième article pose la question des divers niveaux d'altruisme chez 
ceUx qui s'identifient à un parti politique au Canada. Nous observons les 
différences entre les partisans dans leur allocation aux co-partisans, à d'autres 
partisans, et à des individus anonymes dans quatre jeux du dictateur lors 
d'un sondage en ligne. Tous donnent plus aux co-partisans et moins aux 
autres partisans. Les Néo-démocrates sont plus altruistes en moyenne que 
les Conservateurs et les Libéraux. 
Dans le sixième article, nous nous demandons si le vote obligatoire mène 
aux effets de second ordre d'augmentation des connaissances et d'engagement 
des citoyens. Nous avons conduit une expérience de terrain avec des étudiants 
en âge de voter d'un cégep de Montréal. Certains étaient payés pour compléter 
deux sondages, d'autres étaient aussi payés pour voter lors de l'élection 
provinciale. Nous avons trouvé peu d'indications d'effets de second ordre. 
Mots clés: expérimentation; comportement politique; psychologie politique; 
vote; économie comportementale; campagnes électorales 
Summary 
This dissertation demonstrates the usefulness of experimentation in politi-
cal science through six articles. While eclectic in their questions and subjects, 
the articles aH faU under the rubric of political psychology and behaviour. 
The first article examines the role of non-self-interested considerations in 
the formation of preferences for public spending. l measure the altruism of 
respondents through the use of a dictator game experiment in a large online 
survey. l demonstrate that ",L'-,'-"V'~L levels of altruism predict greater support 
for public spending, even when it cornes at a cost to the respondent. 
The second article addresses the "paradox of participation": if the prob-
ability of a single vote deciding an election is so low, why do we still observe 
large numbers of vot ers? l demonstrate in a formaI model that sorne În-
dividuals will vote because of the benefits accrued to others. Empirically, 
preferences for partisans which differ in a dictator game significantly predict 
the decision to vote. 
The ~hird article presents the results from a field experiment into the 
persuasive capacities of direct maiL The experiment was conducted in 2006 
with the Michael Ignatieff campaign for the leadership of the Liberal Party 
of Canada. The experiment randomly assigned a direct mailing to delegates 
pledged to other candidates. We then surveyed these delegates. We find 
that those who received mail appeared to adjust their evaluations of other 
candidates upwards and to move Ignatieff down in their preference rankings. 
iv 
The fourth article uses a Bradley-Terry model to analyze the persuasive 
power of arguments in a survey experiment conducted during the October 
2007 Ontario referendum on electoral reform. We assigned each of 520 re-
spondents one of six arguments for and one of six arguments against electoral 
reform and then measured their preference for reform. We show that argu-
ments for the existing system enjoyed an advantage, arguments whieh appeal 
to fairness and local representation were significantly more persuasive, and 
arguments which mention political parties were less persuasive. 
The fifth article asks if partisan identifiers in Canada differ in their levels 
of altruism. We examine the behaviour of partisans in four dictator games 
in an online survey. We compare differences between partisans in their al-
locations to co-partisans, other partisans, and anonymous individuals. AU 
partisans consistently aUocate the most to co-partisans and the least to other 
partisans. Anonymous individuals are in the middle. We also find that New 
Democrats are more altruistic than Conservatives or Liberals. 
The sixth article asks whether compulsory voting leads to the "second-
order" effects of increased citizen knowledge and engagement. We conducted 
a field experiment among voting-aged students at a Montreal CEGEP. Our 
intervention involved paying sorne students to complete two surveys while 
paying another ùoup to also vote in a provincial election. We find little 
evidence of "second-order" effects. 
Keywords: Experimentation; Political Behaviour; Politieal Psychology; Vot-
ing; Behavioural Economies; Campaigns 
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Introduction 
2 
1.1 The Underside of Warren Miller's Cow-
boy Boots 
In 1962, Richard Niemi graduated from Lawrence College, in his home state 
of Wisconsin. He studied under William Riker who would depart for the 
University of Rochester the same year Niemi would leave for the University 
of Michigan. Those were heady days in Ann Arbor. The American Voter had 
been released just two years earlier, and Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, 
Warren Miller and Donald Stokes were still in the process of revolutionizing 
political science. (That Niemi would participate in a second revolution at the 
University of Rochester speaks either to his foresight or his luck, or both). 
At the end of his second year, Niemi faced his preliminary exams. He 
cannot now even remember whether they had a written component. But 
he remembers clear as day the oral component to be administered by Kent 
Jennings and Warren Miller. As the story goes, Niemi entered the examina-
tion room aU nervous and kinetic and filled to the brim with knowledge. But 
rather than test his knowledge of the literature, Miller, the laconic Westerner, 
reposed with his cowboy boots upon his desk and asked Niemi a single ques-
tion. "If we gave you $150,000 to mn an election study, " Miller inquired, 
"what would you do 7" 
This dissertation is my answer to that question .. Were lever to see the 
underside of Warren Miller's cowboy boots and have the question put to me, l 
know my answer. l would conduct as many experiments as l could imagine, as 
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creatively as l could muster, to better understand why individu aIs participate 
in poli tics and how they form their preferences. 
In the pages that follow, l give my definition of experimentation and pro-
vide examples of four types of experiments. l then make a theoretical case 
for why an experimental framework is superior to a strictly observational 
one. Experimentation, largue, gives us potentially unadulterated views into 
causal pro cesses and preferences in a way not possible from a strictly obser-
vational approach. After making this argument, l survey the frequency and 
nature of experimentation in political science. 
l find that while experimentation is slowly increasing in political science 
generally, it is experiencing a much more pronounced growth in political 
behaviour and political psychology. It does so, largue, with greater statistical 
clarity and with more collaboration. It is also having a greater intellectual 
impact than equivalent observational research. 
l then turn to questions of validity and argue that aIl types of experiments, 
given proper design, can possess high validity. Experimentation, then, does 
not require a retreat to the laboratory. l then conclude with a description 
i 
of my experiments. l outline the contributions they make to their respective 
questions while articulating why experimentation was fundamental to these 
contributions. 
4 
. 
1.2 Defining Experimentation and Experimen-
tal Types 
Any study of experimentation requires a definition of the concept. l adopt 
three conditions. An experiment is a research process with the following 
three conditions: 
1. Treatment. 
2. Assignment to treatment or controljcomparison groups is random and 
the process of randomization is known. 
3. Ex-post measurement of results. 
\ Each condition deserves sorne elaboration. Treatment refers to sorne inter-
vention by a researcher whereby the units of analysis receive sorne stimulus. 
This stimulus can then be identified and expressed in a single variable or in 
several variables of interest. Examples include school vouchers, information 
about a politician, water and sunlight, placement in a political system, or 
participation in one game or another. The substance of treatments is quite 
close to infinite. Moreover, they are not constrained to one variable; they 
can be quite complex (Morton and Williams, 2006). 
Random assignment to treatment or control groups requires that every 
unit have an equal probability of being assigned to a control or a treatment 
group (which is sometimes conditioned on sorne characteristic of the unit 
(Gibson, Caldeira and Spence, 2002)). The corollary of this claim is that 
\ 
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assignment to treatment must be independent of a subject's characteristics, 
unless specified by the treatment. An important and logical extension of 
this randomization requirement, especially as it relates to behavioural eco-
nomics games, is that if the experiment involves placing subjects into some 
institution or scenario in which they are observed, then placement must be 
independent of subject characteristics. 
It is important to note that an experiment will not always have a control 
group. Consider, for example, an experiment in which some survey respon-
dents are asked to respond to a question which gives response options in the 
order A, B, C, while other sur vey respondents are asked to respond in the 
order C, A, B. Which of these groups is the control group is really a matter 
of taste. Accordingly, control comes not from having respondents in some 
control group in which no treatment occurs. Rather, it comes from divid-
ing respondents into treatment groups randomly and with equal probability 
across subjects. In some cases, this will mean assigning some respondents 
no treatment (which corresponds to a more classical view of control groups), 
while in other instances, it will involve assigning subjects to different treat-
ments. It is for this reason that Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2000) use the 
phrase "comparison group" rather than "control group." 
Knowledge of the randomization procedure is the second half of the second 
condition. This is a logically necessary condition, because it is not possible 
to ensure that some inquiry involves random assignment to conditions with-
out knowing the assignment procedure. As such, a researcher could take 
\ 
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data from the assignment of criminal cases to judges (which is known to be 
random) and then analyze the data as an experiment. Or, knowing that 
lottery wins are random, a researcher could examine the effects of increases 
in affluence (through lottery wins) on attitudes towards redistribution (e.g .. 
Doherty, Gerber and Green, 2006). Because any effects would be a result 
of a random pro cess and not a result of the unobserved actions of or events 
related to a respondent, then changes in attitudes can be said to be caused 
by an increase in wealth. But, a researcher could not conduct an experiment 
in the case where the distribution of the treatment merely appears random 
ex-post unless the researcher can demonstrate that there is not an unknown 
confounding variable which affected the distribution of treatment. In most 
cases, this is theoretically impossible given that the variable is unknown. 
Finally, the insistence of ex-post measurement implies that an experiment 
is not complete until differences between treatments have been measured. An 
experiment is more than a research design; it is a complete inquiry which con-
cludes with ex-post measurement of difference. This draws out the distinction 
between an experimental design and an experiment. 
As a whole, this definition differs from Druckman et al. (2006)'s definition 
of an experiment by not insisting that the manipulation or application of the 
treatment under the control of a researcher. If we can be certain that a pro-
cess has been randomized, as in the assignment of judges to cases, th en this 
is theoretically identical to manipulation by a researcher. Accordingly, this 
insistence on randomization also differentiates it from Morton and Williams 
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(2006), who require only that a researcher intervene in a data generating 
process. My definition is thus close st to the definition of Gerber, Green and 
Kaplan (2004), though they do not make an explicit requirement for post-hoc 
measurement. 
1.2.1 Experimental Types 
There are many variants of experimentation present in our discipline. l iden-
tif Y four ideal types. In order of (estimated) frequency these are: survey-
embedded experiments, laboratory experiments, games-based experiments, 
and field experiments. In the case of each, l describe their general parame-
ters, and then outline a study which 1 think represents a particularly good 
application. In a later section, l draw out the comparative benefits and 
drawbacks of each type. 
My classification of experiments by type rather than subject contrasts 
with Bositis and Steinel (1987) and McDermott (2002). However, it does 
reflect a more recent survey of experimentation by Druckman et aL (2006) 
who identify three experimental types (laboratory, field, and survey). There 
are three compelling motivations for examining experimentation by type. 
First, types are easier to define than subjects. Second, we are far from 
exhausting the subjects of study, but we are close to exhausting types, so it 
is likely more efficient to examine types. Third, studying types lets us trace 
out the common and differing factors of the approaches, so we can better 
understand the trade-offs of each. By studying subjects, we maymistake the 
\ 
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theoretical imprecision of a subject for the shortcoming of an experimental 
type. 
l diverge from Druckman et al., howeyer, by separating laboratory and 
game-based experiments. My reasoning is entirely inductive. Games-based 
experiments have focussed almost exclusively on understanding basic eco-
nomic behaviour within different institution al set-ups. These games almost 
always featùre interaction between subjects. By contrast, laboratory exp er-
iments are more likely to deal with isolated subjects and are more likely to 
address a broader range of questions. Sufficient differences exist to su!Sgest 
that these are different types of experiments. 
The consideration of experiments by type also differs from Morton and 
Williams (2006). They classify experiments by location: laboratory, field, 
or internet. They fold game-based experiments into laboratory experiments, 
and classify survey experiments as either field experiments (if they are done 
on the phone) or internet experiments. Location seems more arbitrary than 
type, and certainly precise. Indeed, 'because of the way it collapses 
together experiment types which are quite different in their history and ap-
plications it invites more difficulty in exploring comparative merits. Accord-
ingly, l rest with a distinction based on type. l present below a prototypical 
experiment of each type. 
\ 
9 
Survey-embedded experiments 
Survey-embedded experiments feature random assignment of sorne subjects 
to sorne treatment within a survey, and they measure opinions ex-post. For 
example, the random rotation of party names on a vote preference ques-
tion is a survey experiment. Question-wording experiments are also survey-
embedded experiments. These experiments are of increasing importance in 
political science, especially .public opinion and voting research. They are 
part of a "new look in public opinion research" (Sniderman, 1992, 219). 
The rise of CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing) has allowed 
reseàrchers to randomize across populations, changing the content, order, 
nature, or form of questions (Bartels and Brady, 1992, 122-123). The ability 
to record response times has afforded scholars insight into the properties of 
many questions and responses (Gidengil, 2002). 
Burden and Klofstad (2005)'s study of partisan identification provides a 
clear example of a well-conducted survey-embedded experiment. There has 
been a longstanding incongruence between the theoretical description and 
the measurement of partisan identification. To wit, partisan identification is 
described as an affective attachment or commitment to a party (e.g. Miller 
and Shanks, 1996; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002), but has been mea-
sured as a cognitive construct. Burden and Klofstad thus want to "reconcile 
the standard conceptualization of party identification with its measurement" . 
To tackle this problem, they design a simple survey experiment where half 
of respondents are asked whether they Jeel they are Republican or Democrat. 
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The other half are asked the standard question of whether they think of them-
selves as Democrat or Republican. Assignment is random, demonstrated by 
a lack difference in their two subsamples across various baseline covariates. 
AlI other parts of the question are held constant. To ascertain whether the 
questions invoke different considerations (Zaller, 1992) among the subjects, 
they time responses. By their logic, subjects who are surveying a wider range 
of considerations will take longer to respond. 
Their results are striking. The Jeel responses suggest a measurably more 
Republican electorate than the think responses, which helps resolve a long-
standing empirical quandary in American voting literature. Namely, Repub-
lican identification seems consistently appears much lower in surveys than 
Republican vote totals would suggest. The increased incidence of Republican 
identifiers among those who received the Jeel prompt suggests that existing 
survey questions have been undercounting Republicans. Second, they find 
that respondents take longer to give Jeel responses, which they take to be 
evidence of a more affective basis for partisan identification. Since affective 
judgements are often unconscious, they may take longer for subjects to pro-
cess after they are invoked .. From these two findings, Burden and Klofstad 
draw the conclusion that a proper measure of partisan identification would 
ask subjects how they feel rather than how they think. By conducting a 
simplè survey experiment, they are able to provoke an important rethinking 
of a concept central to electoral studies. 
11 
Laboratory experiments 
Laboratory experiments are rare in political science. They are only slightly 
rare if one relaxes a laboratory to include classrooms and controlled 
environments (like a living room in the case of Ansolabehere and Iyengar 
(1997)). Nonetheless, laboratory experiments are playing a role in political 
science which rivaIs the importance of survey-embedded efforts. Lodge and 
Taber (2005) 's recent tests of the hot cognition theory of motivated reasoning 
(Lodge and Taber, 2000) provides a good example of a laboratory effort. 
The motivation of their experiment is to test the "hot cognition" hy-
pothesis, which contends that individuals' assessments of other individuals, 
groups, and issues are affectively-charged. As a result, present evaluations 
are coloured by past assessments, information seeking may be biased, and 
the integration of new, contradictory information may be difficult. Clearly, 
this important consequences for those who study opinion formation and 
political cognition. 
Lodge and Taber work from a clear theory which provides for both a 
hypothesis - hot cognition - and a testable mechanism - spreading activation 
where one affective node activates nearby connected or associated nodes. 
With this theory and mechanism they design an experimental set-up with 
clear manipulations of stimulus which are independent of the characteristics 
of the individuals. 
The experiment is quite simple. Seated in front of a computer screen, 
subjects are shown a randomly-selected word (the prime) for a short period 
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of time (200 ms). The prime is either a politician, a group/party, or an 
issue. The negativity or positivity of the word for each respective subject is 
determined in a survey following the experiment (this also gives them insight 
into the comparative valence of the target). There is a pause - which is 
manipulated within the exper~ment - and then another word (the target) is 
presented on the screen, and left there until subjects identify by keystroke 
that the target is positive or negative. Targets are words which are generally 
recognized as positive (like rainbow) or negative (like cockroach). This allows 
another treatment: the congruence of the target and the prime. Accordingly, 
Lodge and Taber put different subjects through three different versions of the 
experiment. Afterwards, they record the general political sophistication of 
the subjects, which allows them to derive and measure hypotheses about the 
interaction of sophistication with hot cognition. 
Their measurement is mean response times, and most comparison occurs 
within subjects. However, because of cross-sectional variation in sophistica-
tion, they can also measure between subjects. The amount of variance they 
have at hand - both naturally and by treatment - allows for greater inference. 
Moreover, assigning treatment for word-order randomly across sophistication 
allows for even more variance. 
In support of their contentions, Lodge and Taber find that individuals 
have a harder time evaluating words as positive or negative when they are 
incongruent with the prime. Perhaps most importantly, they find that re-
sponse times increase with sophistication. The implication is clear and im-
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portant: more sophisticated subjects are more likely to be biased information 
seekers and processors. While the comparative qualities of this approach are 
left to a later section, it is clear that experimental control and randomization 
undoubtedly allow for a large degree of insight into fundameI).tal cognitive 
exercises of interest to political scientists. 
Game-based experiments 
Games-based experiments are multi-subject experiments in which subjects 
interact with one another 1 , for mate.rial reward. As an example of an ex-
cellent game-based experiment, l take McKelvey and Palfrey (1992)'s "An 
Experimental Study of the Centipede Game". Roth (1995) has identified this 
as a hall mark in behavioural economics and Morton (2007) has argued for 
its importance to political science. 
The experiment is based on the centipede game, a two-player interaction 
in which Player 1 can chose to take a pot of money, ending the game, or pass 
her turn to Player 2, who can similarly take a sum of money or pass her turn 
back to Player 1. The catch is that the sum of money aplayer receives from 
each turn grows (but declines slightly if the other player chooses to take). The 
game has a set number of iterations, and as such has a backwards induction 
induced equilibrium in which the first player takes on the first m~)Ve. The 
problem, and the reason for the experiment, is that this action rarely holds 
in the laboratory. Rather, players often play well down the game tree, and 
lOt appear to interact with one another. 
14 
sorne play until the end of the game. As such, they violate fundamental 
assumptions of non-cooperative game theory and rationality. The purpose 
of McKelvey and Palfrey, then, is to explain this behaviour. 
This desire to explain observed behaviour is important for at least two 
reasons. First, it demonstrates the role of game-based experiments in getting 
the larger assumptions right. Whereas many economists are happy to con-
tinue using models of full rationality, behavioural economists want to refine 
their models to better reflect fundamental behavioural realities. Second, the 
"cause" they are seeking to explore is less direct than that of Lodge and 
Taber, for example. Whereas Lodge and Tabor want to test a theory about 
the way the mind works, McKelvey and Palfrey want to work backwards 
from an observed regularity, and see if they can explain its structure. 
To do so, they rethink the nature of the game, recasting it as one of in-
complete information where voters have uncertainty over the utility functions 
of other players. In other words, they think there is sorne smallchance that 
the person against whom they are playing is altruistic. From this conclusion 
they specify a new estimator of subject behaviour, and then apply it to their 
observed data. As it fits the data well, they come to the conclusion that they 
have better explained the process. It is a computationally intensive pro cess , 
but it represents an unrivalled integration of theory, estimators, and results 
(Morton, 2007). As Morton has also observed, the econometric estimation 
of quantal-responses has had significant payoff in the fields of legislative bar-
gaining (Morelli, 1999) and international conflict (Signorino, 1999). It was 
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derived from the observation of laboratory games aimed at understanding 
the structure of preferences and the nature of basic behaviour. 
Field Experiments 
Field experiments have experienced a marked growth in political science in 
recent years. Their infrequent use until now is not surprising. The require-
ments of a field experiment are significant: the researcher has to guarantee 
random assignment and completed treatment in a totally uncontrolled en-
vironment. Nonetheless, concerted institutional effort has been devoted to 
these experim~nts, and their growth indicates the effectiveness of these ef-
forts. 
It is fitting, perhaps, that the most notable early field experiment in 
political science was Gosnell (1930) 's study of voter turnout and mobiliza-
tion, and that the most notable reintroduction of field experimentation came 
with Gerber and Green (2000) 's study of the same question. l review their 
experiment as a good example of a well-executed field experiment and well-
measured results. 
Gerber and Green seek to measure the comparative effects of three differ-
ent voter mobilization techniques: canvassing, phone calls, and direct mail. 
In doing so, they put to test a hypothesis that declining turnout is not a 
function of declining levels of contact with political parties during elections, 
but with a shift in the methods parties use to contact voters. In the place 
of a field experiment, they could use a multivariate regression set-up where 
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voting is regressed on different forms of reported contact and sorne schedule 
of controls. Contact, however, is not random. Rather, it is a function of 
both the likelihood of receiving the contact, i.e. answering your phone or 
door or opening your mail, and the likelihood of a party mobilizing a given 
voter. This is the unobservable bias which Gerber, Green and Kaplan (2004) 
so strongly lament. 
To overcome this bias they conducted a field experiment with three dif-
ferent treatment types (canvass, phone, and direct mail). Wor king in a large 
city, they were able to vary the number and timing of mailers, and what the 
mailers said. After controlling for the likelihood of receiving the treatment (a 
subject of much debate between rmai (2005) and Gerber and Green (2005)), 
they calculated average treatment effects. Then, using data on whethei in-
dividuals were contacted and official voting records, they tested the compar-
ative effects of different treatments in a multivariate set-up. They find that 
face-to-face contact and mailings both increase turnout. Telephone contact 
has a slightly negative effect. These results leave them with strong evidence 
about the comparative efficacy of different treatment regimes. 
1.3 An Eye Out for Inferential Monsters: The 
Case for Experimentation in Political Sci-
ence 
Suppose two political scientists wish to properly answer an empirical ques-
tion and they choose to take two different approaches. The first conducts 
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an experiment in which she intervenes in a data-generating process, say by 
sending letters to vot ers informing them of candidates' positions. The sec-
ond decides to survey voters during and after the election and ask them, 
among other things, about their knowledge of the candidates' positions and 
for whom they intend to vote. Suppose further that the two approaches 
differ only in this regard. Prior to data collection, the political scientists 
would think up a research question, perhaps review prior work in the field, 
and adopt or develop theory. And subsequent to these approaches, the two 
political scientists would likely go through the same steps. They would ana-
lyze their data, compare them to expectations, draw conclusions, and write 
up their results. With so much shared between these two approaches, what 
makes them differ so fundamentally? Put differently, why would advocates 
of experimentation see the first as superior to the second? 
The difference, an experimentalist would reply, is that "Experiments facil-
itate causal inference through the transparency and content of experimental 
procedures, most notably the random assignment of observations to control 
and treatment groups (Druckman et al., 2006, 627)" This is an inference 
which is, in the majority of cases, probably unavailable to those who merely 
observe the world. 
The reason for this distinction is found in my definition of experimen-
tation. When a researcher lets a random process assign one subject to a 
treatment and another to control, then the researcher knows (with mea-
sured uncertainty) both the size of an effect and its cause. By contrast, the' 
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observational political scientist must go to much greater lengths to make 
sound inference, relying on modeling assumptions and statistics. And, aS 
Blalock (1979) puts it, "statistics is a poor person's substitute for contrived 
laboratory experiments in which aU important relevant variables have been 
controlled" (6). The problem for the observationalist is this: while she can 
know which respondents knew candidates positions and which did not, she 
will be hard-pressed to know why they know those positions, and to know 
that the same thing which caused them to know those positions is not the 
same thing which causes them to vote as they do. This problem of unobser-ved 
heteTOgeneity is fundamental. 
Edward Leamer (1983) thoroughly captures this distinction, and he is 
worth quoting at length: 
The truly sharp distinction between inference from experimen-
tal and inference from non-experimental data is that experimental 
inference sensibly admits a conventional horizon in a critical di-
mension, namely the choice of explanatory variables. If fertilizer 
is randomly assigned to plots of land, it is conventional to restrict 
attention to the relationship between yield and fertilizer, and to 
proceed as if the model were perfectly specified... In contrast, it 
would be foolhardy to adopt such a limited horizon with nonex-
periment al data. But if you decide to include light level in your 
horizon, then why not rainfall; and if rainfall, then why not tem-
perature; and if temperature, then why not soil depth, and if not 
soil depth, then why not the soil grade; ad infinitum. Though 
this list is never ending, it can be made so long that a nonex-
perimental researcher can feel as comfortable as an experimental 
researcher that the risk of having his findings upset by an exten-
sion of the horizon is very low ... Still, the horizon within which 
we all do our statistical analyses has to be ulUrnately tmublesorne, 
sinee there is no formaI way to know what inferential rnonsters 
lu'rk beyond our immediate field of vision (39). 
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Leamer, in this eloquent argument, explicitly resists going as far as say-
ing we can learn nothing from strictly observational research. Gerber, Green 
. and Kaplan (2004), who make a more forceful case, are not so willing. But 
their point is much the same: Statistical uncertainty is generated by model-
ing assumptions, such that it is extremely difficult to know which modeling 
assumptions are correct. Observational research is plagued by our inability 
to identify sources of bias, and thus estimate true causal effects. This dev-
astating shortcoming of observational as opposed to experimental research 
is not easily remedied, even with the addition of new cases. The principal 
solution, then, is not in larger samples or better estimators. Rather, it is in 
using true random assignment, or in the case of quasi-experiments choosing 
cases where other plausible explanations can be ruled out. Another manner 
is to identify "instances where the processes by which the independent vari-
able (is) generated have no plausible link to unobserved factors that affect 
the dependent variable" (Gerber, Green and Kaplan, 2004, 23-24). Clearly, 
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these cases are few. The limits of observational research are thus apparent. 
In theoretical terms, then, there can be litt le basis for the argument 
that experiments are inferior to observational research. And, to be fair, few 
political scientists would argue that they are. The reason for a dearth of 
experiments is probably thus a result of questions of practicality and taste. 
Experiments may be perceived as too costly or too impractical and difficult 
to implement (e.g. Green and Gerber, 2002). And in sorne cases, such as the 
effects of war, gender quotas, or material deprivation, it would be unethical 
(if not practically impossible) to conduct experiments. However, as l demon-
strate through my own examples, experiments can be easily implemented for 
manyquestions of interest. Moreover, this can be done at a cost which does 
not exceed that attached to observational approaches. Experiments may also 
be perceived as lacking in external validity, particularly if political scientists 
believe they necessitate a retreat to the laboratory. In a subsequent sec-
tion, however, l show that this is not the case. We can conduct experiments 
in a number of non-laboratory venues without fundamentally jeopardizing 
validity. 
1.4 The Quantity of Experimentation in Po-
litical Science 
To measure the quantity of experimentation in political science, l use data 
collected by Krueger and Lewis-Beck (2008, hereafter KLB) . Theyanalyzed 
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aU 1756 "scientific research papers" 2 published in the A merican' Political Sci~ 
ence Review, the A merica Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of 
Poli tics in the years 1990-2005. These journals may not be a representative 
sample of aIl political science indeed, on measures of quality they certainly 
are not. However, they do represent the three flagship journals of the disci-
pline, and thus seem a reasonable choice. What is the quantity and nature 
of experimentation within these journals? l first consider the overall quan-
tity and growth of experimentation, and then turn tomore precise questions 
about how experimental articles appear to differ from their non-experimental 
counterparts. 
Considering aIl articles published in the three leading journals of the dis-
cipline between 1990 and 2005, just 5.5% (97) are classified as experimental. 
Moreover, using KLB's classification of 17 subjects, we find this is heavily 
concentrated in three subjects: political behaviour (51.5% of experimental ar-
ticles), political psychology (17.5%), and minority poli tics (16.5%). By these 
lights, experimentation is neither common overall or widespread. What of 
its growth? 
Figure 1.1 suggests that the use of experimentation in political science 
has increased modestly overall but much less modestly within the subfields 
of political behaviour and political psychology. Considering the mean share 
of experimental articles before and after 1999, we find that 4.8% articles are 
2KLB exclude "articles dealing with methods, theOI'Y, up-dates, exchanges, communi-
cations, workshops, or symposia," 
" ,
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classified as experimental including and before 1999. This rises to 6.8% after 
1999 (t = 1.87,p = .04 (one-taîled)). The growth is more apparent if we 
consider the subfields of this dissertation, political behaviour and political 
psychology: while 11. 7% of articles were experimental prior to and including 
1999, this share almost doubles to 21.6% after 1999. This is a clear increase 
(t = 3.10, p = .00 (one-tailed)). By the numbers, then, the reclamation of an 
experimental tradition in political science is happening, if slowly and within 
sorne subfields more than others. 
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1.4.1 The Nature of Experimentation ln Political Sci-
ence 
Not only is experimentation growing generally, and within political behaviour 
and psychology specifically, but it is doing so with a different approach and 
influence than observational approaches. This difference accords to statistical 
approach and collaboration. First, experimental articles require less complex 
statistical analysis than observational articles. This is as we would expect, 
as the random assignment of treatment necessitates less statistical control 
and correction than observational research. 
KLB identify a number of different statistical approaches for the 
sis of data. Moving from less to more advanced, they are: tests of differ-
ences, correlations, analysis of variance (ANOVA), ordinary least squares, 
logit/probit, time series, maximum likelihood estimation, scaling techniques, 
and latent variables. Table 1.1 demonstrates the frequency of these tech-
niques for observational and experimental papers3 
On average, experimental articles appear to use less complex statistical 
methods than their observational counterparts. lndeed, experimental articles 
are more likely to use tests of difference, analysis of variance, and ordinary 
least squares. By contrast, they use logit and probit and other maximum 
likelihood techniques less frequently, and never use time-series or latent vari-
able techniques. If we assume that the requirement of peer-review ensures 
3 As a single paper can have multiple techniques, these frequencies do not sum to 100% 
in any column. 
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that appropriate techniques are used in each article, then we can conclude 
that experimental articles require less complex statistical techniques to draw 
their conclusions. This arguably recomrnends experirnentation, as neither the 
reader nor the analyst relies on complicated statistical techniques to draw 
conclusions. Whatever validity concerns are presented by statistical inference 
theoreticaIly, in practice experimentation appears statistically simpler than 
observational research. 
Table 1.1: Frequency of Statistical Techniques in Observational and Experi-
mental Articles 
Technique 
Tests of Difference 
Correlations 
ANOVA 
OLS 
Logit\Probit 
Time-series 
MLE 
Scaling techniques 
Latent variables 
Observational (%) 
5.1 
13.8 
1.0 
41.4 
32.5 
5.2 
4.7 
1.8 
0.5 
Experimental (%) 
15.5 
7.2 
24.7 
46.4 
21.6 
0.0 
3.1 
2.1 
0.0 
Difference (%) 
10.4 
-6.6 
23.8 
5.0 
-10.8 
-5.2 
-1.6 
0.3 
-0.5 
Second, experimentation appears more collaborative than observational 
research. Considering aIl the articles in KLB's dataset, the average number 
of authors per observational article is 1.86. The corresponding average for 
experimental articles is 2.30, a significant difI'erence (t = 5.12, p = .00 (one-
tailed)). Within political science, at least, experimentation appears to be 
a more collaborative approach than observational research. This could be 
a result of the increased operational requirements of running an experiment 
(e.g. using students as supervisors during an experiment and then including 
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. them as co-authors). Alternately, it could be a result of experimental work 
requiring collaboration across disciplines and thus increasing the number of 
authors. Or, more likely, it could be a combination of both. Discerning the 
cause is beyond the scope of this introduction, but it should be said that 
those who enjoy the pro cess and camaraderie of collaboration would be well-
served to en,gage in experimentation. Indeed, the works that follow suggest 
that such was the case for me. 
Third, experimentation appears more infiuential than observational re-
search. While KLB do not include citation counts for each article, Druckman 
et al. (2006) find that experimental articles in the Arner'ican Political Sci-
ence Review are more frequently cited than their observational counterparts. 
Depending on the unit of comparison, they find an increase in the likelihood 
of an article being cited if it is experimental between 26% and 74%. What 
generates this advantage is unclear, but we can tentatively conclude that 
experimental articles are, all else equal, given more weight than their obser-
vational equivalents. As l argued in the previous section, this is just as it 
ought to be. 
Taken together, these facts lead to the conclusion that experimental po-
litical science is appreciably different than the observational research. Ex-
perimentation is likely to be clustered within a smaller number of subfields, 
particularly political behaviour and political psychology; it is likely to be col-
laborative and statistically straightforward; and it is likely to have a greater 
scholarly impact. The fundamental values whichguide research in politi-
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cal science are not easily agreed upon, and far be it from me to suggest 
what another should esteem. As a question of taste, then, 1 believe these 
differences recommend experimentation to researchers in political behaviour 
and political psychology, particularly those who prize clear causal inference 
and who shun toiling alone. As will be seen in the papers that follow, my 
work generally conforms to these standards. (I should hope it also has a 
disproportionate scholarly impact). 
1.5 The Qualities of Experimentation in Po-
litical Science 
Thus far, 1 have demonstrated that experiments of several types are put 
to use in political science; and 1 have argued that experiments of aIl types 
have generated valuable empirical insights. But two questions remain. 
how exactly do we evaluate the quality of experiments? Second, are these 
qualities equally shared across experimental types, or is it the case that labo-
ratory experiments are theoretically superior to other types of experiments? 
The implication of this second question is important for the argument of 
increased experimentation in political science: if laboratory experiments are 
the gold standard (as McDermott, 2002, would argue) and other types are 
theoretically inferior, then there is less of an argument for their increased use. 
However, if it can be demonstrated that there is no theoretical reason why 
other types of experiments are inferior, then an argument for their increased 
use remains. 
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It seems uncontroversial that the best criteria on which to evaluaté in-
dividual experiments is their validity or their ability to make claims which 
other scientists as true or correct. It stands to reason, then, that 
we should evaluate experimental types with sorne measure of average valid-
ity. This is impossible short of doing a representative survey of experiments 
within types. However, it is possible to consider comparative validity between 
stylized versions of each experimental type. l do this using the four-fold con-
ception of experimental validity put forward by Shadish, Cook and Campbell 
(2000). As MaçCoun (2003) has argued, this work represents the definitive 
statement of a Campbell's account of validity. For the generations of social 
scientists who have looked to his wisdom, this posthumous work represents 
its pinnacle. 
PoHtical scientists tend to think of.validity in terms of internaI and exter-
nal validity, both in the context of experiments, but also in the context of po-
litical science generally (Ferejohn, 2004). However, as Morton and Williams 
(2006) argue, this is not a view which has kept pace with theoretical and 
conceptual developments. Au contrm:r:e, Campbell set aside his own account 
of internaI and external validity (Campbell and Stanley, 1966) for the refine-
ment of Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2000). 
Shadish et al's conception of validity takes four parts: 
1. Statistical conclusion validity, which they define as "the validity of 
inferences about the correlation (covariation) between treatment and 
outcome." 
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2. InternaI validity, which they take to be the "validity of inferences about 
whether observed covariation between A (the presumed treatment) and 
( 
B (the presumed outcome) reflect a causal relationship from A ta B as 
those variables were manipulated or measured." 
3. Construct validity, described as "the validity of inferences about the 
higher arder constructs that represent the sampling particulars"; and, 
4. External validity, set out as the "validity of inferences about whether 
the se-emecT. relationship holds over variation in persans, settings, 
treatment variables, and measurement variables." (38). 
These definitions represent a substantial clarification of the internaI and 
external validity approach, and allow for a more fulsome consideration of 
not only experimental designs, but also e.xperimental types. For each of 
these validity concepts, they propose a series of threats to validity. In what 
follows, l briefly exp and on each concept and make an argument about why 
each experimental type is beset by each set of considerations. On balance, it 
is not cIear that one experimental type is consistently superior to others. The 
consequence of this is that political scientists are left with a variety of types 
when choosing ta answer an empirical question through experimentation. 
They are not constrained to the laboratory or forced into the field. Rather, 
the importance of a particular result in any experiment will be a function of 
the skill of the researcher in assessing the various types of experimentation 
and choosing appropriately. 
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1.5.1 Statistical conclusion validity 
While Shadish, Cook and Campbell articulate ni ne different threats to statis-
tical conclusion validity, these can be categorized into two broad sets. First, 
those concerned with the proper application of statistical techniques. Second, 
those concerned with statistical po~er. On the criteria of proper statistical 
technique, it is not clear to me that any experimental type is free of the 
threat of a researcher choosing the wrong tests, engaging in a "star search" , 
or not fully accounting for the properties of her estimator. As such, these 
concerns do not help us adjudicate between experimental types. 
The problem of statistical power is one of research design, and can be 
guarded against by carefully measuring outcomes, by controlling for hetero-
geneity in a sample, and by considering the balance between the proportions 
of control and treatment (Nickerson, 2005). For the purposes of considering 
experimental types, what matters is whether a type is flexible to adjustment. 
This, in turn, is a function of two things: the number of iterations of the study 
(i.e. how many times will the researcher repeat the experiment, with suffi-
dent Ume in between to make adjustments); and the ability of the researcher 
to adjust the treatmentj control balance midstream. On the first considera-
tion, laboratory and games-based examples seem to have an advantage, as 
an experiment typically involves several iterations. Conversely, a survey ex-
périment has more difficulty (especially if it is in the form of a poIl), as it 
is often prohibitively costly to rerun a polI on a proper general population 
sample. Field experiments are more likely to involve one large-scale iteration. 
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Accordingly, they can do little to guard against the post-hoc discovery of low 
statistical power. However, careful planning in the implementation stage can 
avoid this problem. 
On the second measure - the ability to change treatmentjcontrol bal-
ance midstream survey experiments probably have an advantage, given the 
large number of respondents on average. The ability of games-based and 
laboratory experiments to change the balance is more a function of the com-
plexity and the temporal administration of the treatment. Depending on 
the design of the experiment, the treatmentjcontrol balance could be ad-
justed midstream. Field experiments, on the other hand, probably more 
difficulty of mid-stream adjustment, as they typically rely on large physical 
undertakings (such as canvassing in the case of the Gerber and Green field 
experiment) or the use of confederates (such as cooperation with political 
parties in Wantchekon (2003) 's field experiments in Benin). As such, timely 
adjustment of treatmentjcontrol may be, on average, beyond tqe abilities of 
the researcher. 
None of the preceding threats to statistical validity are impossible to 
overcome in any experimental type, especially given a good research design. 
However, sorne types are more likely to face problems than others, specifically 
field experiments. This does not confine them to the dustbin, but it does 
highlight the potential challenges they face. 
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1.5.2 InternaI validity 
To begin, it should be noted that Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2000) do not 
see internaI validity on the whole being any more or Iess likely in different 
. 
types of studies. As they argue, 
enough experience (with the list of threats) has accumulated to 
suggest that it applies to any descriptiye molar causal inference, 
whether generated from experiments, correlational studies, obser-
vational studies or case studies. After all, validity is not a prop-
erty of a method, it is a characteristic about knowledge claims ... 
about causal knowledge (54). 
The challenge of internaI validity is to ensure that the experiment at hand 
pro duces causal effects as a result of the treatment, and not as a result of its 
administration or its measurement. It should be plain that this is a threat 
to each experimental type. That said, we can probably identify special cases 
where sorne experiment type will have a better average ability to avoid a given 
threat. It is unclear that any experimental type would have an advantage 
over another in avoiding ambiguous temporal precedence, as this plagues all 
research which is not carefully designed. It is possible, however, to believe 
that field experiments could have a higher probability of facing selection ef-
fects than other types, but only to the degree that randomization procedures 
are not followed and to the degree that treatment may coincide with different 
population groups under study. However, when properly implemented, "ran-
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dom assignment definitionally eliminates selection bias" (Shadish, Cook and 
Campbell, 2000, 56). Field experiments face similar problems with history, 
as they cannot isolate respondents from outside events, as can be done in a 
laboratory, agames experiment, or a survey. 
Conversely, all experiment types can suffer from maturation or attrition 
as long as they undertake measurement over sorne extended period of Ume 
(with the definition of extended depending on the question and instrument 
at hand). ~ Similarly, every experiment type can be threatened by regression 
artefacts if selection is conditioned on sorne extreme characteristics of re-
spondents. It is no more or less likely in any experimental type. Likewise 
with instrumentation, which can apply to all experimental types. In sum, as 
internaI validity demands equal precision in each experimental type, each is 
susceptible to its threats, thoughfield experiments may experience a slight 
disadvantage. 
1.5.3 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is defined as the "validity of inferences about the higher 
order constructs that represent the sampling particulars" (Shadish, Cook and 
Campbell, 2000, 64). Put slightly differently, construct validity is about the 
concurrence between the theoretical properties which we wish to assess and 
the operationalization of these measures. The authors provide an example of 
highly valid constructs: in measuring childhood health, growth in height and 
lung capacity are clearly valid constructs, because they are direct measures 
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of health. However, developing constructs for psychological development is 
more difficult, because there are no natural units of measurement, as with 
inches in measuring height. Rather, the researcher has to rely on constructs 
such as vocabulary or quantitative reasoning, which are subject to debate 
(Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2000, 64-65). 
There are three points of particular interest to be made. First, construct 
validity is important not only for questions of measurement, but even more 
so for questions of causal generalization, particularly for the representation 
of a causal process. Thus, construct validity answers the question of whether 
we can "generalize from a sample of instances and the data patterns associ-
ated with them to the particular target constructs they represent" (Shadish, 
Cook and Campbell, 2000, 21). Second, we are interested not only in the 
constructs of our treatments, but also of our units, settings, and outcomes. 
For example, if we want to study the effects of sorne job training program on 
the unemployed, then we need a construct for the unemployed. This could 
be anyone who is out of work, or it could be those who have been out of work 
for a period of time. The quality of this construct is determined by the kind 
of unemployed we are seeking to study. Similarly, while we are theoretically 
interested in what "helps" the unemployed, there are several measurable out-
cornes which could stand in for this. Defining which are best is the challenge 
of construct validity. Third, overarching aIl discussion of construct validity is 
the strong daim that research cannot be conducted without constructs. The 
periodic table is a construct, as is an atom (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 
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2000, 65). Because there is rarely if ever a direct translation from theory"to 
sorne empirical unit, then we have to be constantly concerned with construct 
validity. 
The degree of difficulty in establishing construct validity is not the same 
for each experimental type. In each case, researchers have to justify their 
constructs given their theory and their experiment, and then have to guard 
against no less than thirteen threats to construct validity. The degree to 
which they can be guarded against varies by experimental type. 
Shadish et al. identify two different types of threats. The first relates to 
the definition of constructs. It should be obvious that this applies with equal 
felicity to each type of experimentation. The second set of threats relates 
to reactions to treatments, by both experimenters and subjects. In this 
regard, threats are most likely when subjects are aware of their participation 
in an experiment specifically or a scientific study more broadly. In this 
regard, field experiments hold a clear advantage as they are' the only type 
of experimentation in which subjects can be made completely unaware that 
they are participating in study. 
As a whole, these threats to construct validity potentially plague aIl types 
of experiments, but perhaps they threaten field experimentation marginally 
less. Most importantly, these problems threaten pure observational research 
at least as much, as the ability to address them through design and control is 
often absent. As such, observational research faces these threats as or more 
directly than any type of experiment. 
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1.5.4 External Validity 
Shadish et al's definition of external validity is the least revised of the original 
Campbell and Stanley (1966) concepts. They describe external validity as 
"the extent to which a causal relationship holds over variations in persons, 
settings, treatments, and outcomes" (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2000, 
83). There are two important clarifications to be made to this definition. 
First, external validity do es not refer exclusively to whether an experiment 
applies in the "real world". Rather, it also refers to the degree to which a 
causal claim made in an experiment will hold in another experiment, given 
sorne change in subjects or setting. Externality, then, is to the experiment, 
not the laboratory. Second, the questions of generalization inherent in es-
tablishing external validity are not only about to how broad a population an 
inference can be applied. As they note, generalization can occur in at least 
five directions: 
1. N arrow to broad. By their example, using an experiment ln income 
maintenance in one state to guide national policy. 
2. Broad to narrow. For example, an individual who wishes to lose weight 
may ask if successful diet results from a study would apply to him 
individually, given his body type and exercise habits. 
3. At a similar level. Applying the income maintenance experiment in a 
state of the same size as the experimental state would be an example. 
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4. To a similar or different kind. Applications to a different kind would 
occur if the experimental income maintenance subjects were males, and 
the program was adopted for females. 
5. Random sample to population members. This is inference from an ex-
periment with a random sample selection procedure to other members 
of the sampled population (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2000, 83-84). 
Taking these two observations together gives us a much more fulsome view 
of external validity; one which draws it closely to concerns with fecundity. 
External validity thus becomes a question of how robustly a caus~l conclusion 
can take root and bear fruit in other eontextual soils and environments. 
"Vhereas threats to other validity types are quite diverse, the tlueats to 
external validity are eommon in their foeus on the conditionality of results. 
Given that an experimental finding is the resuIt of a proper statistical esti-
mation, a good construct mapping, and an internally valid research design, . 
external validity then asks if the findings are conditioned on the subjects 
and objects of the study, as weIl as other confounding factors. As such, these 
threats can apply equally to each type of experiment. The solution, they sug-
gest, is random selection of subjects from the population of interest. Though 
they argue that this is rarely feasible in experiments, they do recommend it 
on the basis that "random sampling eliminates possible interactions between 
the causal relationship and the class of persons who are studied versus the 
class of persons who are not studied within the same population" (Shadish, 
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Cook and Campbell, 2000, 91). Given this admonishment, the superiority of 
survey experiments becomes apparent, provided they are performed on ran-
domly drawn samples. Similarly, the ability of field experiments to randomly 
&'isign treatments over a randomly drawn population (or an entire popula-
tion) similarly sets them apart from the typical laboratory or games-based 
experiment, which most typically occurs on self-selected populations. It is on 
these grounds, and not on the grounds that they occur "in the real world" , 
.that survey and field experiments are superior to their counterparts on the 
metric of external validity. 
1.5.5 Comparing the types 
As the above survey of validity threats shows, laboratory experiments are 
by no means a clear front-runner in the race for experimental supremacy. 
While they are probably best for ensuring internaI validity and statistical 
validity, they are probably not better than survey and field experiments at 
ensuring external validity (and not just for the conventional reason that these 
experiments occur in the "real world".) Moreover, each can be equally beset 
by poor construct validity. The conclusion to be drawn is that the various 
types of proper experimentation are probably on equal footing overall in the 
face of validity concerns. Which is best for answering a causal question is 
then a function of the question, the research design possibilities at hand, and 
prior approaches. In the next section, l review the works which follow as 
individual articles. In the case of each, l articulate the question which they 
\ 
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seek to answer, and briefly justify the use of an experiment. 
1.6 The Articles 
The six articles that foUow aU faU into the braad categories of political be-
haviour and political psychology. That is, each asks questions about why 
and how individuals participate in politics and how they form their prefer-
ences. Perhaps the product of eclecticism, the papers otherwise vary widely 
in their content. l ask, for example, what raie altruism plays in preferences 
for greater public spending. l fashion a model of voter turnout which relies 
on other-regarding preferences and social identification with political parties 
and then test this model empiricaUy. In both the first and second paper, 
games-based experiments are used to reveal the preferences of actors. These 
revealed preferences are then shown to drive their opinions and actions . .In 
a third paper, a field experiment examines whether direct mail is effective 
in changing the opinions of elite voters. In my fourth paper, l demonstrate 
a statistical model for measuring the power of arguments in a survey ex-
periment. l next ask whether partisans in Canada differ in their levels of 
altruism, as revealed in a games-based experiment. And in a final paper, l 
use a field experiment to examine whether compulsory voting increases voter 
knowledge and engagement. This is a diverse lot. But good inference cornes 
from variance, and the inference which is (hopefully) drawn from these pa-
pers is that a wide variety of experiments can be applied to a diverse range 
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of questions. 
1.6.1 Dictators and Purses: Altruism and Support for 
Public Spending 
How do individuals determine their support for new public spending pro-
grams? Is it purely a matter of self-interest, or do sorne citizens prefer greater 
public spending because they are concerned for others and wish to see their 
hardship relieved? In other words, is there an element of altruism in support 
for greater public spending? Previous studies have demonstrated a connec-
tion between non-self-interested measures and preferences on spending and 
taxation (e.g. Rasinski and Rosenbaum, 1987; Shiell and Seymour, 2002; 
Hudson and Jones, 1994; Fong, 2001). However, these studies have aIl relied 
either on verbal expressions of concern for others or an inferred degree of 
altruism through a series of equations. 
My own contribution is to measure an individual's inclination towards 
altruism through their behaviour in a "dictator game" (Camerer, 2003). In 
this game, individuals in a large online survey were given a chance to win 
money and were asked how much, were they to win, they would share with 
a completely anonymous individual. 1 argue that those who give more can 
be said to be more altruistic. 1 then ask subjects about their preferences 
for a number of new public spending programs, in each case increasing or 
decreasing the cost of the program to the respondent. 1 find a strong and 
robust connection between a subject's revealed altruism and their willingness 
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to support a new public spending program, even at a cost to themselves. 
1.6.2 Antipathy, Affinity, and Political Participation: 
How Our Concern for Other Partisans Makes Us 
Vote 
Political scientists have expended significant effort to explain the paradox 
of voting (for the definitive review, see Blais, 2000). Why, they ask, if the 
probability of a single citizen's vote deciding an election is so low do we 
still observe such large numbers of voters? This paper proffers an answer at 
this question by combining two arguments. First, citizens view elections as 
a contest between different groups of people in which scarce resources are 
divided after the election. Second, sorne citizens care about sorne groups of 
citizens more than others, that is, they have affinity and antipathy towards 
various partisans. Considered together, these two arguments furnish a logic 
for why sorne citizens vote. 
l demonstrate this logic through a formaI, decision theoretic model. Then, 
using a series of dictator game experiments embedded in a large online sur-
vey, l indu ce respondents to reveal their preferences for sorne partisans over 
others. l then show that these revealed preferences significantly predict the 
decision to vote and do so independently of other well-known predictors, 
including partisan identification, education, age, gender, and media usage. 
As with the previous paper, this study employs games-based experiments 
as a measurement tool to assess the preferences of individuals. By observing 
behaviour in a controlled environment where assignment to each condition is 
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under my control, l am able to directly observe individuals' preferences for 
some partisans over others in a more valid and reliable manner than with 
traditional survey questions. 
1.6.3 For Want of a Nail: Direct Mail and Negative 
Persuasion in a Leadership Race (with Daniel 
Rubenson) 
Direct mail is a pervasive feature of modern political campaigns. This is 
perhaps especiaUy true in leadership races in which candidates for the head of 
a party compete to win the support of the a party's elites and active members. 
In this paper, Rubenson and l ask two questions. First, does direct mail work 
at persuading these voters to increase their evaluations of and preferences for 
the candidate sen ding the mail? Second, can a leadership candidate who is 
outside the mainstream of his party persuade voters to come to his side by 
highlighting the policies which place him outside the mainstream. 
To answer these two questions, we conducted a field experiment in the 
faU of 2006 with the Michael Ignatieff campaign for the leadership of the 
Liberal Party of Canada. Our experiment consisted of randomly assigning 
a direct mailing to delegates who were pledged to other candidates. We 
then surveyed these delegates using a survey instrument under the coyer 
of a university. Our findings are rather remarkable. Not only was Ignatieff 
unable to persuade delegates to increase their positive evaluations of him and 
to move him up in their preference rankings. Quite to the contrary, those 
who received mail appeared to adjust their evaluations of other candidates 
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upwards and to move Ignatieff down in their preference rankings. 
The use of a field experiment to answer this question marks two important 
innovations. To the best of my knowledge, this was the first field experiment 
conducted in cooperation with a political campaign in Canadian political 
science. Second, it allowed for much clearer inference than if we had only 
conducted a survey. Indeed, we find that survey recall of mail reception is 
remarkably pOOf. Fifteen percent of those who did not receivemail from the 
campaign claimed that they had, while only two-thirds of those who received 
mail recalled this correctly. Inferences based on survey estimates alone would 
be grossly incorrect. By randomly aSsigning mail, we can, in Leamer's terms, 
effectively limit the horizon of possible explanations for the negative effect 
we observe. 
1.6.4 Testing the Power of Arguments with a Bradley-
Terry Madel (with Daniel Rubenson and Arthur 
Spirling) 
Public opinion scholars and practitioners are often interested in knowing 
which arguments individu aIs find convincing and which they find unpersua-
sive. This is especially true in trying to explain why citizens take the posi-
tions they do on referendum questions. In this paper, we demonstrate how 
a statistical model typically used in biology and other sciences, the Bradley-
Terry model, can be used to analyze the persuasive power of arguments in a 
survey experiment. The benefits of the Bradley-Terry model are that it can 
tell us not only whether one argument is more convincing than another, but 
\ 
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what components or features of an argument make it more compelling than 
another. 
To demonstrate this, we conducted a survey experiment during the Octo-
ber 2007 referendum on electoral reform in the province of Ontario. Using a 
subject group of 520 individuals, we assigned each individual one of six argu-
ments for electoral reform and one of six arguments against. We then asked 
them whether or not they supported electoral reform. Using the model, 
we show that arguments for the existing system enjoyed a general advan-
tage. V!e then measure which components made arguments more or less 
persuasive. We find that arguments which appeal to fairness and local repre-
sentation are significantly more persuasive, while arguments which mention 
political parties are less persuasive. FinaIly, we find a constant advantage for 
aIl arguments in favour of the status quo. We use these results to interpret 
the outcome of the Ontario referendum. We conclude by highlighting further 
possible applications of the Bradley-Terry model. 
The principal contribution of this paper is not insight into electoral re-
form,· but the introduction of a model which makes survey experimentation 
potentially much more efficient. With just 520 respondents and thirty-six 
treatment groups, we are still able to uncover information about the persua-
sive power of arguments. The Bradley-Terry set-up, then, has a unique value 
proposition. It allows survey researchers to learn mu ch with a small number 
of subjects and/or large number of treatment groups. 
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1.6.5 Partisanship and Altruism: Results from a Dic-
tator Game Experiment (with Angelo Elias) 
Partisan identifiers differ from non-identifiers across several dimensions. We 
know, for example, that they are more likely to vote, to pay attention to 
politics, and to hold consistent positions and opinions. We also know that 
differences exist between partisans, for example, in their issue positions. Elias 
and 1 ask if partisans differ in a more fundamental and basie way. To wit: 
do partisans in Canada differ in their levels of altruism? 
To test this proposition, we examine the behaviour of partisans in the 
four dictator game experiments described in my first two papers. We com-
pare the differences between partisans in their allocations to co-partisans, 
other partisans, and anonymous individuals. We find that an partisans con-
sistently allocate the most to co-partisans and the least to other partisans. 
Allocations to anonymous individuals are in the middle. We also find that 
New Democratic partisans are more altruistic on average than Conservative 
or Liberal partisans. 
Our findings give us an important insight into a basic difference between 
Canada's partisans. In doing so, it raises a very interesting question about 
whether Kew Democratie partisanship leads individuals to be more altruistic, 
or whether the reverse is true. These findings were made possible by having 
subjects play a dictator games in a controlled environment in which they 
were induced to reveal their preferences. Arguably, there is no observational 
equivalent to this experiment, because partisans are never asked to demon-
J, 
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strate (and to pay to demonstrate) their preferences for sorne partisans over 
others in the real world. Only through a games-based experiment are we able 
to reveal this important and fundamental difference in Canadian partisans. 
1.6.6 Does Compulsory Voting Lead to More Informed 
and Engaged Citizens: An experimental test (with 
Henry Milner and Bruce M. Hicks) 
The "first-order effects" of compulsory voting laws are clear. From both 
cross-section al (Jackman, 1987; Blais and Cart y, 1990; Blais and Dobrzyn-
ska, 1998; Franklin, 1996, 2004) and quasi-experimental (Hirczy, 1994) ac-
counts, political scientists conclude that compulsory voting laws increase 
voter tùrnout. However, whether they generate "second-order effects" such 
as greater citizen knowledge and engagement in politics remains unanswered, 
despite the claims of advocates. 
In this paper, we argue that we cannot definitively identify second-order 
effects of compulsory voting using existing cross-national surveys. To address 
this gap in our knowledge, we conducted a field experiment among voting-
aged students at a Montreal CEGEP (or junior college). Our intervention 
involved paying sorne students to complete two surveys while paying another 
group of students to complete two surveys and vote in a provincial election. 
The key difference between the two groups, then, is that one faces a financial 
incentive to vote. Any differences in knowledge, news consumption, and 
political discussion are thus the result of the compulsory voting treatment. 
We find little evidence of such effects. 
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As in prior papers, the value of experimentation is the isolation of the 
effects of compulsory voting with measured uncertainty. Had we taken the 
approach of measuring differences in political knowledge and engagement 
between countries with and without compulsory voting we would come up 
against two fundamental challenges. First, we would have the thorny task of 
establishing the equivalence between knowledge measures in the countries. 
Second, we would need to account for any other differences between the 
countries which may explain both the decision to adopt compulsory voting 
and increased levels of knowledge. As we are without strong theory and as 
these differences are largely unknown, then we could make little progress 
with an observational approach. In the face of this, we take an experimental 
approach and draw mu ch clearer inferences. 
1.7 A Closing Word 
l turn now to the presentation of these articles. After this, l conclude the dis-
sertation with a discussion of the results presented and their implications for 
political behaviour and political psychology. l also discuss their implications 
for my own research in the future. 
Chapitre 2 
Dictators al1.d Purses: Altruism 
and Support for Public 
Spending 
Under 'f'eview at Journal of Politics. 
2.1 Introduction 
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
pr'inciples in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of 
others, and render their' happiness necessary to him, though he 
der'ives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it, Of this 
kind is pUy or compassion, the emotion we feel for the misery of 
others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very 
lively manner, That we often derive sorrow from the sorrows of 
others, is a matter of fact too obvious to r'equire any instances 
to prvve it; for' this sentiment, like aU the other original passions 
of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous or the 
humane, though they pedwps may feel it with the most exquisite 
sensibility. The gr'eatest ruffian, the most hardened 1Jiolator of the 
laws of society, is not altogether without it. - Adam Smith, The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments (1790 4) 
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Modern human society is characterized by a level of cooperation and coordi-
nation unmatched in history and in the rest of the animal world (e.g. Stevens 
and Hauser, 2004), We live within social units which, in a long view of his-
tory, are unimaginable for their size and peacefulness (e.g. Pinker, 2007). 
Undertakings which require an immense degree of coordination go on unno-
ticed for their complexity and difficulty, For scholars of many disciplines, the 
question of how such complexity and cooperation is initiated and maintained 
is central. 
The provision of government services and the creation of new programs 
is one such example of complexity and coordination. Such programs see the 
monetary contributions of millions of individuals entrusted into the hands of 
government officiaIs who th en disburse money as instructed by politicians, 
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themselves elected and accountable to individual citizens in another act of 
great coordination. Millions of individuals rely on such programs for their 
sustenance and comfort, either regularly or in times of need. Indeed, gov-
ernment expenditures regularly make up a third or more of aIl economic 
activity in modern democracies (OECD, 2007). These programs, at least 
initially, rely on the support and willingness of individuals to pay for them 
(Pierson, 1996). 
Despite the importance of these programs, we do not know enough about 
why citizens lend them the support so critical to their initiation and sus-
tenance (Fong, 2001, 225). We know, for example, that spending policy 
responds to the preferences of citizens, moving up and down as citizens indi-
cate a taste for more or less spending (e.g. Miller et al., 1999; McCrone and 
Kuklinski, 1979; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). We also know that spending has 
a path-dependency such that once a program is in place it becomes difficult 
to abolish (e.g. Pierson, 1996). But what we do not much about is why sorne 
citizens prefer more public spending and others prefer less, especially wh en 
it relates to new public spending. Is it purely a matter of self-interest, or 
do sorne citizens support greater public spending because they are concerned 
for others and wish to see their pain and hardship alleviated through gov-
ernment action? In other words, does support for public spending depend 
on the benevolence of the butcher and the baker (Smith, 2007)? 
largue that there is a non-self-interested element which is crucial to sup-
port for greater public spending. In specific terms, largue that there is a 
50 
clear altruistic motivation for supporting greater public spending on public 
programs. Sorne citizens have a greater regard for other individuals and this 
regard motivates them to do good for other people even when this choice 
cornes at a cost to themselves. In the case of public policy programs, this 
means that individuals are willing to pay higher taxes for (new) programs 
even when they may not be expected to benefit, and they are willing to im-
pose these taxes on other individuals. Accordingly, anexplanation which 
relies solely on egoism is insufficient. Rather, a more fulsome explanation re-
lies on the notion of strong recipr'Ocity (Bowles and Gintis 2002). To demon-
strate this, l show that individuals' underlying inclinations towards altruism 
- measured through a dictator game (Camerer, 2003) - are linked to their 
stated willingness to pay greater taxes for the provision of new public spend-
ing programs. While the importance of non-self-interested factors has been 
demonstrated in previous studies, this is the first study to rely on a behav-
ioral measure of altruism rather than a stated preference or attitude. l thus 
establish a more conclusive link between altruism and support for greater 
public spending. 
My demonstration proceeds in five stages. First, l give a definition and 
description of altruism and explain why we should expect it to be related 
to support for greater public spending. Second, l describe and justify the 
dictator game as a measure of altruism. Third, l describe the survey and 
subjects which are used to demonstrate the link between altruism and sup-
port for greater public spending. Fourth, l present my results. l then discuss 
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the implications of these findings and conclude. 
2.2 Altruism and Public Spending 
The importance of other-regarding orientations for the explanation of so-
cial and political behavior is becoming increasingly clear (e.g. Piliavin and 
Charng, 1990; Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007). Contra Mueller, it is 
not clear that "the only assumption essential to a descriptive and predictive 
science of human behavior is egoism" (Mueller (1986, 4) in Mansbridge (1990, 
254)). Instead, economists, political scientists and sociologists alike are reè-
ognizing the analytical gains to be made from incorporating other-regarding 
orientations into our theoretical (e.g. Margolis, 1990) and empirical models 
(e.g. Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1990; Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; 
Fong, 2001). In this. section, l define altruism. l then out li ne a theoretical 
argument as to why altruism should be related to support for greater public 
spending. Then, by reviewing previous work on the importance of other-
regarding orientations in the formation of pr~ferences over public spending 
and taxation, l identify my contribution, namely the linking of a behavioml 
measure of altruism to stated support for greater public spending. 
2.2.1 Defining Altruism 
In their review of altruism' theory and research, Piliavin and Charng (1990) 
note that although definitions of altruism generally differ by discipline, this 
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substantial debate can be broken down into two divisions: sociobiological and 
psychological. The minimalist or sociobiological position (Rushton, 1982; 
Ridley and Dawkins, 2003; Aronfreed, 1980) defines altruism according to a 
behavior. As Sorrentino (1991) puts it "insofar as an act to benefit another 
organism is at the expense of a donor, it is altruism" (147). Or, as put by 
Margolis (1983) "what defines altruistic behavior is that the actor could have 
done better for himself had he chosen to ignore the effect of his choice on 
others" (quoted in Piliavin and Charng, 1990, 28). Or, as put by Piliavin 
and Charng (1990), we can "caU behavior altruistic if it benefits the actor 
less than the recipient" (35). By these definitions, observing altruism requires 
only observing the costs and benefits of an action to an actor and a recipient. 
A more strict definition, favoured by psychologists, involves intention. An 
altruistic act is one which the actor believes to be to the benefit of another 
and which do es not confer extrinsic or intrinsic benefit to herself (Batson 
et al., 1978, 1979). The act requires a recognition of another's suffering 
or need and an intentional act to reduce that suffering or fulfill that need. 
There is an immense amount of evidence for this psychological definition of 
altruism (Piliavin and Charng, 1990, 36-37), and thus my objective is not 
to contest this conception. Rather, my goal is to choose a conception of 
altruism which can be observed behavioraUy and to then demonstrate its 
relationship to support for greater public spending. Accordingly, throughout 
this article l rest with a minimalist definition in which altruism occurs when 
an individual undertakes an action which is to the material benefit of another 
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at a mate1'ial cast ta herself. Such a definition has the benefit of not relying 
on the inference of intent. Rather, it relies only on observing an individual's 
actions at a given point in time. If we can dernonstrate that this action did 
benefit someone else and that this came at a cost and could not be expected 
to incur a later net benefit, then we can say that the action is altruistic. 
Later, 1 show that sueh altruism can be rneasured in a "dietator game" from 
experimental economics. 
2.2.2 Theoretical Link 
Why should altruists support greater public spending? A convincing expla-
nation relies on a theory of st1'Ong reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Fong, 
Bowles and Gintis, 2006). Following Fong, Bowles and Gintis (2006), strong 
reciprocators D01,Sei'lS 
a propensity to eooperate and share with others similarly dis-
posed, even at a personal cost, and a willingness to punish those 
who violate cooperative and other social norms, even when pun-
ishing is personally costly and cannot be expected to entail net 
personal in the future (1439). 
Supporting greater public spending, even when it involves higher personal 
taxes, is directly analogous to strong reciprocity. First, strong reciprocators 
are willing to cooperate (through the paying of taxes) with those similarly 
disposed (other taxpayers). Moreover, they are willing to punish those who 
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do not contribute to the common pool resources (Le. public goods and gov-
ernment spending) by imposing taxes on these individuals. They are willing 
to paya cost to impose this punishment, namely a greater personal tax bur-
den. As a preview of my results, l find exactly that. Those who display more 
altruistic behavior in dictator games are more willing to support new public 
spending programs, even wh en these programs impose a cost on others and 
themselves. 
In arguing that strong reciprocity is fundamental for the provision of 
government spending, l add to the work of Bowles and Gintis (2002) and 
Fong, Bowles and Gintis (2006). Bowles and Gintis argue and demonstrate 
that such reciprocators are fundamental to the development of cooperation 
in non-kin based societies such as our own. Fong et. al. present evidence 
from behavioral economics experiments and survey research to show that 
behaviors and opinions are consistent with their theory. l go a step farther 
and link these two findings by embedding an economics game in a survey and 
using behavior in this game to predict preferences. And l do so with a clear 
theoretical prediction: individuals who display greater altruistic orientations 
in a dictator game should be willing to pay 'greater costs for the provision of 
public spending programs than those with less altruistic orientations. Even 
after recognizing that they may not benefit from a public policy and/or that 
their own benefit may be outstripped by the cost, altruists are still inclined 
to consider the benefits of public policies in terms of others. They are more 
likely to recognize how the needs of others will be served by a new policy and 
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to respond to those needs, even when it imposes a net cost on themselves. 
Accordingly, those with more altruistic orientations should be more likely to 
support new public spending, even when the cost of the policy increases for 
themselves and others. 
2.2.3 Previous Findings 
This is not the first study to demonstrate link between altruism or a concern 
for others and support for public spending, but it is the first to explicitly 
link game behavior with stated preferences. A review of previous studies on 
the role of non-self-interest factors makes this contribution more clear. For 
example, Shiell and Seymour (2002) examine preferences for public health 
insurance reform in Australia. Following Hudson and Jones (1994), they 
distinguish between self-interested and altruistic determinants of opinion by 
asking respondents which health care reforms they think would be best for 
them, and then which would be best for the whole population. Through a 
series of equations, they then estimate a coefficient for altruism. However, 
this requires using age, education level, and gender as proxies for altruism. 
They finally estimate that concern for others is about twice as infiuential as 
self-interest indetermining opinion on health reform (Shiell and Seymour, 
2002, 364). 
Fong (2001) examines the role of self-interest and "social preferences" in 
generating demands for redistribution in the 1998 Gallup PoIl Social Audit. 
She argùes that sorne individuals have beliefs about justice and that they 
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care deeply about how other people are affected by redistributive policies. 
To test for the effects of self-interest, she uses a number of objective controls 
(income, education, marital status, etc) and subjective measures, such as 
concern over meeting family expenses and perceptions of future mobility. 
She then measures respondents' perceptions about whether individuals are 
in need as a result of their own actions or for sorne other reason. She finds 
that wh en people believe that poverty is not an individual's fault they are 
more likely to support redistributive programs. As with Shiell and Seymour, 
the marginal effects of self-interest do not outweigh those of redistributive 
preferences. 
Rasinski and Rosenbaum (1987) examine the determinants of opinion on 
an increase in property taxes for public education in Illinois. They find that 
non-self-interest measures provide better explanations of citizens' opinions 
than self-interest measures. However, as with previous studies they rely on 
proxies both for self-interest (i.e. home ownership) and non-self-interest, such 
as views of teachers and the school board. 
Also in an American context, Feldman and Steenbergen (2001) show that 
the prosocial orieritation of humanitarianism is better than egalitarianism as 
an explanation of support for public spending in the US (659). Following 
(Staub, 1989, 50), they define prosocial orientations as consisting of "(a) a 
positive evaluation of human beings, (b) concern about their welfare and (c) 
feelings of personal responsibility for people's welfare." Like the previous 
studies, they use subjects' agreement or disagreement with various state-
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ments to ascertain their prosocial orientations (663-666). However, contrary 
to Fong (2001), they do not find that the effects of humanitarianism are de-
pendent on feelings about the deservingness of the poor. The larger point is 
that they show that prosocial orientations, of which altruism is clearly one, 
are effective for explaining support for public spending. 
Corneo and Grüner (2002) examine preferences for government redistri-
but ion in twelve middle- and high-income countries. While they find that a 
self-interested explanation does explain significant variance in preferences for 
redistribution, "public values" which is closest to my conception of altru-
ism - and a "social rivalry effect" also explain significant variance. Moreover, 
these effects are consistently significant across all twelve countries, des pite 
their different histories (post-communist and non-communist) and economic 
conjectures. 
Finally, Sears and Funk (1990) review a large amount of evidence for the 
power of self-interest explanations over symbolic explanations, such as party 
identification, ideology, and racial tolerance for policy preferences, candidate 
choice, and opinions on matters of race. They cannot find a dominant place 
for self-interest: it plays little role in the assessment of racial issues, has a 
generally minimal and exceptional impact on economic issues and there is 
at best a modest relationship between vote choice and personal economic 
considerations1 While Sears and Funk are not emphasizing altruism, their 
IThis is, of course, in contrast to the more common phenomenon of sociotropic voting 
(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981; Kiewiet, 1983; Lewis-Beek, 1988). 
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explanation for the dominance of symbolic politics is instructive for a more 
general account of why other-regarding behavior will matter in public opin-
ion: "people may be socialized to respond to public issues in a principled 
and public-regarding manneL Perhaps political socialization teaches people 
to weigh most heavily the collective good when they don their political hats." 
l agree entirely, except that l do not assume that other-regarding behavior 
is necessarily socialized. Rather, it could have much deeper roots (Rushton, 
2004; Scourfield et al., 2004; de Quervain et al., 2004; Knafo et al., 2008; 
Cesarini et al., 2008). 
2.2.4 Innovation 
While these examples are not exhaustive of the literature on the role of non-
self-interest factors in the formation of preferences for public spending, they 
are an informative survey for two reasons. First, they consistently demon-
strate that non-self-interest factors matter for public opinion formation. Self-
interest is never the whole or even the principal story. Second, they all rely 
on either proxies or verbal responses to questions as indicators of individuals' 
altruism or concern for others. l take both of these observations to heart: 
first, l present below models of support for public spending which include a 
measure of altruism. Second, this measure does not rely on indirect measures 
or verbal responses. Rather, we infer a respondent's level of altruism based 
on her behavior in a dictator game. In the next section, l describe these 
games and justify their use as an indicator of altruism. Ih the following sec-
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tions l describe my data and then test a model of public spending preferences 
which includes this behavioral measure of altruism. 
2.3 Altruism and Dictator Games 
The use of dictator games (Forsythe et al., 1994; Camerer, 2003) is growing 
in p'olitical science. After first appearing in economics in the early 1980s, 
dictator ,.,~ .. ,,~~ have been recently utilized in political science to measure 
such concepts as altruism, fairness, and social identification. Their results 
have been used ta explain the decision ta vote (Fowler, 2006), ta participate 
in politics (Fowler and Kam, 2007), and ta measure inter-ethnie trust (Whitt 
and Wilson, 2007). 
The basic dictator game is as follows: Player 1 is given a sum of money 
or an opportunity to win money in a lottery. Player 1 is then given the 
opportunity to share none, some, or aU of that rnoney with Player 2. Player 
2 has no opportunity ta accept or reject the offer. In other words, Player 1 
dictates the arnount Playei 2 receives. The game thus differs fundamentally 
from the more well-known "ultimatum game" in which Player 2 can accept 
or reject the offer (leading ta a payout of zero for both players). 2 
Dictator game allocations ta anonymous individuals provide a valid and 
reliable indicator of a subject's level of altruisrn for at least two reasons. 
First, dictator games measure a subject's willingness to irnprove the mate-
2In fact, in the strictest terms the dictator game is not agame at all, as it involves only 
one player's choice and outcomes are not interdependent on the choices of other players. 
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rial welfare of another individual at a cost to self. Results thus conform 
to the definition of altruism specified above. Second, they measure revealed 
rather than stated altruism. Rather than attempting to infer the altruistic or 
pro-social orientations of a respondent through a series of survey questions 
about their behavior and invite the threat of costless deception and social 
desirability bias, the dictator allows for an actual observation of their 
behavior. 
As these measures are unconventional in political science and in public 
opinion research, one can anticipate several reasonable objections (see, e.g. 
Benz and Meier, 2008). For example, one could argue that subjects do not 
understand the game and are making allocations randomly. Or, one could 
argue that as subjects typically are playing for small stakes the y are not 
making the decisions they would make were the stakes more substantial. Or, 
even if subjects are taking the game seriously, a laboratory environment does 
not replicate reallife sufficiently to produce results which are consistent with 
a subject's day-to-day behavior and orientations. 
Experimental economists have addressed these concerns. First, through 
a manipulation of the translation of allocations into payoffs, Andreoni and 
Miller (2002) have tested whether allocations are consistent with subjects' 
preferences. Their own research suggests that nearly aIl subjects (98%) be-
haye consistently. In a similar manipulation across five different dictator 
games, Dawes and Fowler (2007) found 94% of their subjects behaved con-
sistently. Subjects thus appear to understand the dictator game and respond 
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consistently and rationally when playing. 
Second, while there has been sorne research (Cherry, Frykblom and Shogren, 
2002) suggesting that subject behavior is different when playing with earned 
wealth rather than wealth granted by the experimenter, much research shows 
that as long as the stakes are real and not fictional, there is little difference 
in the distribution of allocations as stakes increase. In other words, subjects 
tend to give away the same share of a prize, regardless of its size (Camerer 
and Hogarth, 1999; C arpenter , Verhoogen and Burks, 2005). More impor-
tantly, the share of respondents which give away any money does not change 
markedly as stakes increase (Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks, 2005). Ac-
cordingly, the degree to which a dictator garne captures "other-regarding" 
behavior is not dependent on the size of the stakes. 
Third, Benz and Meier (2008) have shown a correlation between behav-
. ior in a dictator game and altruistic behavior in real life, namely past and 
future giving to a university charity. Benz and Meier also highlight other 
noteworthy examples of the correlation between behavior in experimental 
settings and real world environments. For example, Karlan (2005) finds a 
positive relationship between trusting behavior in a trust game and repay-
ment of microcredit Ioans among Peruvian subjects. In Annexe A, l provide 
further evidence of the criterion validity of dictator game behavior. As with 
any instrument in a survey, dictator games are neither perfect nor a cure-aIl. 
However, they are a more direct and robust measure of an individual's aIt ru-
istic orientation than a conventional battery of costiess reports of behavior 
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or opinion. 
My results section presents dictator game allocations and. then estimates 
a relationship between these results and support for public spending. To 
anticipate rhy findings, 1 find that the dictator game allocations are similar 
in their distribution to earlier studies. And while 1 find a strong relationship 
between gender and allocations and a weak relationship between age and 
allocations, 1 find that allocations are independent of partisan identification, 
wealth, education, and other sociodemographics. This is in keeping with 
a view of altruism as prior to social demographics and is in keeping with a 
broader review of the dictator game literature (Camerer, 2003). Finally, wh en 
1 move to model the relationship between behavior in the dictator game and 
support for public spending, 1 find a consistently robust relationship which 
suggests that more altruistic individuals support more public spending than 
their less altruistic counterparts. 
2.4 Survey Design and Participants 
The survey was conducted online. Subjects were required to login to the 
survey using a unique identification. This allows us to call up demographic 
information for those who have previously completed surveys. Those com-
pleting the survey for the first time were first asked a series of screening 
questions, including whether they voted in the most recent federal election 
and their partisan identification. Subjects then answered several questions 
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about recent news exposure, their attention to federal and provincial pol-
itics, and their views on federal and provincial politicians. Subjects then 
completed an unrelated eight-item module on empathy. They were then pre-
sented with the dictator game. Following this, they were presented with 
questions on their support for public spending. They survey concluded with 
questions related to charitable giving, the public service, and recent political 
events. 
Altruism 
Altruism was measured through a series of dictator games. Respondents were 
told that they were eligible to win up to four prizes of $100 at the end of 
the survey in addition to a regular $500 draw for survey participants. In the 
case of the first prize, they would be asked how much of it they would like 
to share with an anonymous individual, about whom they knew nothing. 3 
Complete instructions for the game are found in Annexe B. 
The measùre of altruism used in this paper is the amount of money which 
a respondent indicated she would give away to an entirely anonymous individ-
ual should she win the prize. This amount can range from 0 to 100, though it 
is rescaled for interpretive ease. In order to ensure that my results are robust 
to the specification of this independent variable, l operationalize altruism in 
3For the other three prizes, they were similarly asked how mu ch they would be willing 
to share with an anonymous individual about whom they knew nothing except which 
political party the respondent typically supported (Conservative, Liberal or NDP; in the 
case of Quebec residents, Conservative, Liberal or Bloc Quebecois). The presentation 
or der of the anonymous recipients was randomized. 
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three ways. First, as a continuous variable from 0 to 1 ($0 to $100). Second, 
as a categorical variable reading 0 for those who give away nothing, 1 for 
those who give away an amount less than or equal to the median (~20), and 
2 for those who give away something greater than the median. Third, as a 
dummy variable which reads 1 for aH individuals who give away any money 
in the dictator game and 0 for those who gave away nothing. 
Willingness to pay for public goods 
R~spondents were also asked four questions about their willingness to pay 
for public services. In the case of each question, respondents were presented 
with a public policy proposaI which was to the benefit of others but imposed 
a direct cost on the respondent. For two questions, the initial cost was high. 
If a respondent indicated an unwillingness to pay, they were th en presented 
with lower costs. The question continued until they agreed to pay or the last 
category was reached. For the other two questions, the costs began low but 
increased with each indication of a willingness to pay. The questions were as 
follows: 
• One proposed solution to fight climate change and decrease air pollution 
is to impose carbon taxes. Supporters of these environmental policies 
say such taxes would result in cleaner air and better health for everyone. 
Would you support carbon taxes if you knew it would cost you $2000 
($1500, $1000, $500, $100) more per year to heat your home, ride the 
bus, and drive a car? 
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• Sorne politicians and policy groups propose making the first four years 
of university free for aU qualified students, just like high school. This 
will result in greater accessibility to university education. Would you 
support the elimination of tuition fees if it cost you $100 ($250, $500, 
$1000, $2000) more per year in taxes? 
• Provincial health care programs often do not cover the cost of drugs 
for those with cancer. This can make fighting cancer financiaUy taxing 
for cancer sufferers and their families. Would you support covering the 
cost of cancer drugs if you knew it would increase average emergency 
wait times for non-cri tic al injuries (such as ear infections, the flu, or 
smaU cuts) by one hour (90 minutes, two hours, three hours, five hours, 
ten hours)? 
• Wait times for many medical procedures (such as cataract surgery and 
hip and knee replacements) are currently longer than recommended by 
doctors. If tax doUars were guaranteed to go to these priority areas 
and to reduce wait times, would you be willing to pay $2000 ($1500, 
$1000, $500, $100) more per year in taxes? 
Other variables 
Other standard survey variables were used to capture respondent demograph-
ics as weU as party identification. Question wording for aU variables is avail-
able in Annexe C. 
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2.4.1 Participants 
Participants were drawn from a commercial online survey administered monthly 
by a national public opinion research firm in Canada. The firm uses a panel 
comprised of respondents recruited by the firm through email solicitations 
and respondents who self-select into the panel at the firm's website. Partic-
ipants are invited by email to participate in one of four survey waves. The 
study was conducted in the final two weeks of May 2007. The effective sample 
size is 2648 respondents. 
Compared to a university-based convenience sample, the online survey 
rnethods affords a large number of respondents and a relatively representative 
sarnple, particularly in regards to age, education and incorne. Table 2.1 shows 
the characteristics of the sam pie and their bivariate relationship to dictator 
game allocations, measured from 0-1. The average age of the panel was 50 
years (s.d. 19.6, range = 18,87). Males were slightly overrepresented in 
the panel (52.4%). The sarnple was also diverse on rneasures of income and 
education. Finally, the sarnple included a rneasurable nurnber of partisans 
from each of Canada's four political parties. l address objections to my non-
random sarnple in end of the results section, while noting that respondents 
in online samples have been demonstrated to mirnic the behavior of those 
,in more conventional telephone surveys (Best et aL, 2005) while being less 
susceptible to social desirability biases (Taylor and Thomas, 2005), 
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Table 2.1: Sarnple dernographic and political characteristics 
regression p 
on Altruisrn 
French 15.3% -0.0329 .01 
Fernale 47.6% 0.0278 .04 
Ernployed 62.1% 0.0110 .27 
U nernployed 3.5% 0.0102 .70 
Student jHornernaker jRetired 34.4% -0.0129 .20 
Household Incorne <$40000 21.9% -0.0136 .30 
$40000 to $60000 21.1% 
$60000 to $80000 18.7% 
>$80000 38.2% 
Education High School or less 13.1% -0.0189 .16 
Sorne College 26.4% 
Sorne University 60.5% 
Conservative ID Weak 11.3% 0.0096 .57 
Strong 6.6% 
Liberal ID Weak 16.9% 0.01084 .31 
Strong 4.7% 
NDPID Weak 7.1% 0.0242 .39 
Strong 2.9% 
BQ ID Weak 2.5% -0.0212 .43 
2.8% 
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2.5 Results 
Dictator game allocations in this survey resemble those in previous stud-
ies with "pay" (versus "non-pay") conditions (see Fowler, 2006, 677). As 
Figure 1 shows, the distribution is tri-modal, with a plurality of respondents 
(approximately 40%) giving away no money, 30% giving away half of their po-
tential winnings, and the next highest frequency (10%) giving away a quarter 
of their winnings. In comparison to findings in smaller university-based con-
venience samples, 1 do find sorne significant bivariate relationships between 
demographic variables and altruism, though not many (Table 2.1). Respon-
dents who completed the survey in French give three dollars less on average 
to the anonymous respondent. Females give three dollars (or about 15.5%) 
more on average. This is consistent with a repeated findings that females 
give more in dictator games (see e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1996). As impor-
tant as these differences is the lack of differences on other sociodemographic 
measures. While most previous studies have used smaller samples (see e.g. 
Camerer, 2003), even with a large sample 1 cannot find significant differences 
according to employment status, household income, education, or partisan 
identification. This has important implications for the study of altruism. If 
dictator games are an analogue to altruism and if previous empirical studies 
have used sociodemographic variables as proxies for altruism (e.g. Hudson 
and Jones, 1994; Shiell and Seymour, 2002), then this suggests that they 
may have been off the mark. If altruism is a deeply-ingrained, prosocial ori-
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entation, then it should correlate with them weakly, at best. Indeed, this is 
just as it appears, even with a large sample. 
<::> 
(l 20 40 60 HO 100 
Allocation, $0-100 
Figure 2.1: Dictator Game Allocations 
2.5.1 Support for Public Spending 
The results suggest that individuals with more altruistic orientations are 
more likely to support higher public spending. l begin by estimating 
mand curves for four public services in question according to dictator game 
allocations (Figure 2.2). In each case, l divide the sample into those who 
allocated nothing in the dictator game, those who allocated something less 
than orequal to the median (820), and those who allocated more than the 
median. Each graph then plots the percentage of individuals willing to pay 
for a public service at each price. Taking the top left panel in Figure 2 as an 
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example, we see that the percentage of respondents supporting a carbon tax 
policy decr'eases as the price of the policy increases. But, as importantly, a 
consistent difference between those who allocate nothing in the dictator game 
and those who allocate something remains. This difference ranges from about 
10 percentage points at a cost of $100 to 3 percentage points at the highest 
cost ($2000). At the same time, the differences between those who allocate 
below and above the median are not apparent. This suggests that the most 
important difference is between those who allocate something and those who 
allocate nothing in the dictator game. 
The top right and bottom left graphs in Figure 2 also demonstrate clear 
differences between those who allocate nothing and those who allocate some-
thing. Altruists appear more willing to pay for free tuition for university 
students and they appear more willing to spend more time in a hospital 
waiting room for non-threatening ailments if they know that this will ensure 
better drug coverage for those with cancer. Even when l change the cost 
terms from money to time, then, l find a consistent influence of altruism. 
However, as with a carbon tax there is not a clear difference between those 
who give a small amount of money away in a dictator game and those who 
give a lot. 
Finally, the bottom right panel demonstrates willingness to pay higher 
taxes in exchange for shorter wait times in hospitals. As with the previous 
examples, a clear pattern emerges where the altruistic are more willing to 
pay for this public good than the non-altruistic. However, in contrast to the 
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previous three examples, there is now not only a clear difference between 
those who give nothing and those who give something but also a difference 
between those who 
median. 
below the median and those who give above the 
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Figure 2.2: Demand Curves for Public Spending 
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AU of these figures have demonstrated a difference in the willingness to 
incur personal costs for greater public services consistent with a theory of 
altruistic motivation and strong reciprocity. However, these differences could 
just as easily be a function not of altruism but of sorne unobserved factor 
in the population. l address this through.a series of regressions (Tables 2.2-
2.5). Each regression is an ordered logit model. The dependent variable is 
the highest cost category a respondent was willing to enter for the public 
service in question before answering no or don't know. 4 This corresponds 
to 7 categories for the willingness to wait longer in return for better cancer 
coverage (Table 2.5) and 6 categories for the other three questions. 
Each model includes a number of relevant covariates. Dummy variables 
indicate if a respondent is fèmale or a francophone. They also measure 
whether the individual works in the public sector, is employed in the private 
sector, unemployed, a homemaker, or self-employed, or is a student. Retired 
respondents act as the employment reference category. Categorical variables 
measure age category, income category, education category, strength of par-
tisan identification, and two variables measure the current and prospective 
economic uncertainty of respondents. AU are scaled from 0 to 1. FoUowing 
4In the case of questions in which the priee was declining with each refusai, the category 
is the cost at which the respondent first indicated a willingness to pay. Either way, the 
variables are constructed so that a higher category indicates a willingness to paya greater 
arnount. In the cases where questions have begun with a high priee, respondents who 
answer Don't Know are discarded, as l cannot ascertain the priee at which they would 
agree to pay. In the cases where questions have begun with a low priee (Cancer Care and 
Pree Thition) l treat Don't Know responses as an unwillingness to payas respondents who 
do not know if they wou Id pay for a good at sorne priee can be assurned to be unwilling 
to pay for it at a higher priee. 
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previous work (see, e.g. Corneo and Grüner, 2002), l expect females and the 
better educated to be more supportive of public spending. l expect the sup-
port of the old to be contingent on the nature of the public good, as the older 
are more likely to benefit from better medical services but are likely less con-
eerned about environmental degradation and free university tuition. l expect 
the wealthier to be less opposed to greater spending as the indicated priee 
increases represent a smaller share of their income. And l expect those who 
work in the public sector to be more favourable to increased public spending 
(e.g. Blais, Blake and Dion, 1997). l do not have strong expectations based 
on prior work for the employed and unemployed or for those who faee eco-
nomic uneertainty. On the one hand, those who anticipate future economic 
trouble may also anticipate not paying taxes; despite a mention of increased 
cost in the question, they may be willing to indicate willingness to pay for a 
public good which they feel they could use in the future. Accordingly, l have 
no expectations for these variables. Similarly, l have no strong expectations 
for preferences among homemakers and the self-employed. 
Among partisans, l expect New Democrats, LiberaIs, and supporters of 
the Bloc Quebecois aIl to support greater public spending. l expect partisans 
of the Conservative party to support less public spending (for an organizaion 
of spending preferences along partisan lines, see Lewis and Jackson, 1985; 
Blais, Gidengil, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002). 
As outlined above, l operationalize altruism in three ways. These oper-
ationalzations are Models 1 to 3 in Tables 2.2-2.5. In reviewing my results, 
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l focus on Model 3, though l note that the effects of altruisrn are robust to 
each specification. In Model 3, those who give away any rnoney score 1, while 
those who give away nothing score O. As such, the odds ratios indicate the 
pereentage increase in the odds of being willing to pay the highest stated 
cost for sorne good over aU other priees for those who give sornething away 
in the dictator garne. 
Table 2.2: Willingness to pay for a carbon tax (Ordered Logistic Regression) 
Modell S.E. p Model2 S.E. p Model3 S.E. p 
Altruisrn 1.57 0.29 .01 1.17 0.05 .00 1.37 0.12 .00 
Age 0.75 0.24 .37 0.76 0.24 .38 0.76 0.24 .38 
Incorne 1.11 0.15 .43 1.13 0.15 .34 1.13 0.15 .34 
Education 2.25 0.29 .00 2.26 0.30 .00 2.25 0.29 .00 
French 0.78 0.11 .07 0.78 0.11 .08 0.78 0.11 .07 
Fernale 1.08 0.10 .44 1.07 0.10 .48 LlO 0.10 .47 
Ernployed 1.50 0.38 .11 1.49 0.38 .11 1.48 0.37 .12 
Unernployed 1.20 0.41 .59 1.20 0.41 .60 1.19 0.41 .62 
Self-Ernployed 1.18 0.22 .38 1.17 0.22 .39 1.17 0.22 .41 
Student 2.36 0.72 .01 2.33 0.71 .01 2.33 0.71 .01 
Hornernaker 1.17 0.28 .54 1.17 0.29 .52 1.16 0.28 .54 
Public Sector 0.65 0.14 .04 0.65 0.15 .04 0.66 0.14 .05 
Making Ends Meet 0.81 0.05 .00 0.81 0.05 .00 0.81 0.05 .00 
Job Loss Worry 0.90 0.05 .00 0.90 0.05 .00 0.90 0.05 .00 
NDP ID 2.81 0.64 .00 2.86 0.66 .00 2.85 0.66 .00 
Con. ID 0.31 0.05 .00 0.32 0.05 .00 0.32 0.05 .00 
Liberal ID 1.66 0.29 .00 1.66 0.29 .00 1.66 0.29 .00 
BQ ID 2.13 0.55 .00 2.12 0.55 .00 2.14 0.55 .00 
Cut 1 0.54 0.59 0.59 
Cut 2 1.21 1.33 1.33 
Cut 3 2.07 2.27 2.28 
Cut 4 2.93 3.20 3.21 
Cut 5 3.21 3.51 3.52 
LR x2 240.25 246.10 246.08 
LR x2 >~ Altruisrn Model 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 1789 
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Table 2.3: WiUingness to pay for free university tuition (Ordered Logistic 
Regression) 
Model! S.E. p Model2 S.E. p Model3 S.E. p 
Altruisrn 2.02 0.31 .00 1.22 0.05 .00 1.47 0.11 .00 
Age 0.47 0.13 .01 0.50 0.13 .01 0.50 0.13 .01 
Incorne 1.16 0.13 .20 1.18 0.13 .14 1.19 0.13 .13 
Education 1.23 0.14 .06 1.23 0.14 .06 1.23 0.14 .07 
French 0.28 0.04 .00 0.28 0.04 .00 0.28 '0.04 .00 
Fernale 1.14 0.09 .02 1.14 0.09 .02 1.14 0.09 .02 
Ernployed 1.08 0.24 .74 1.06 0.23 .79 1.05 0.23 .82 
Unernployed 1.25 0.37 .47 1.23 0.37 .48 1.22 0.37 .50 
Self-Ernployed 1.05 0.17 .78 1.04 0.17 .83 1.03 0.17 .87 
Student 1.89 0.48 .02 1.91 0.48 .01 1.91 0.48 .01 
Hornernaker 1.19 0.24 .38 1.20 0.24 .36 1.20 0.24 .37 
Public Sector 1.00 0.19 .98 1.03 0.19 .89 1.03 0.19 .87 
Making Ends Meet 0.99 0.05 .81 0.99 0.05 .85 0.99 0.05 .87 
Job Loss Worry 1.01 0.05 .78 1.01 0.05 .82 1.01 0.05 .84 
NDP ID 2.53 0.46 .00 2.53 0.46 .00 2.53 0.46 .00 
Con. ID 0.61 0.09 .00 0.61 0.09 .00 0.61 0.09 .00 
Liberal ID 1.33 0.20 .06 1.34 0.21 .05 1.34 0.20 .05 
BQ ID 5.37 1.38 .00 5.37 1.38 .00 5.41 1.39 .00 
Cut 1 0.60 0.66 0.66 
Cut 2 1.41 1.56 1.56 
Cut 3 3.54 3.92 3.94 
. Cut 4 8.63 9.56 9.59 
Cut 5 19.60 21.73 21.77 
LR x2 223.13 227.81 227.28 
LR x2 >~ Altruisrn Model 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N=2287 
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Table 2.4: Willingness to pay more taxes to reduce waiting times for medical 
services (Ordered Logistic Regression) 
Modell S.E. p Model2 S.E. p Model3 S.E. p 
Altruisrn 2.48 0.44 .00 l.29 0.06 .00 l.63 0.14 .00 
Age 2.34 0.72 .01 2.44 0.76 .00 2.43 0.75 .00 
Incorne 1.42 0.19 .01 1.46 0.19 .00 1.44 0.18 .00 
Education 1.46 0.19 .00 1.46 0.19 .00 1.44 0.18 .00 
French 0.76 0.10 .04 0.76 0.10 .05 0.75 0.10 .04 
Fernale 0.93 0.09 .43 0.92 0.09 .40 0.92 0.09 .40 
Ernployed l.42 0.35 .16 1.39 0.34 .19 1.38 0.32 .19 
Unemployed 1.71 0.58 .12 1.65 0.57 .14 1.63 0.56 .15 
Self-Ernployed 1.14 0.21 .47 1.13 0.21 .50 1.12 0.21 .53 
Student 2.15 0.64 .01 2.18 0.65 .01 2.19 0.65 .01 
Hornernaker 1.35 0.31 .20 1.35 0.32 .19 1.34 0.32 .21 
Public Sector 0.74 0.15 .16 0.77 0.16 .20 0.77 0.16 .21 
Making Ends Meet 0.83 0.05 .00 0.84 0.05 .00 0.84 0.05 .00 
Job Loss Worry 0.94 0.05 .25 0.84 0.05 .22 0.94 0.05 .22 
NDP ID 2.97 0.66 .00 2.9 0.67 .00 2.96 0.66 .00 
Con. ID 0.70 0.11 .02 0.71 0.11 .03 0.71 0.11 .03 
Liberal ID 1.26 0.22 .18 1.27 0.22 .16 1.26 0.22 .18 
BQ ID 1.30 0.35 .33 1.31 0.35 .33 1.32 0.36 .31 
Cut 1 0.94 1.06 1.05 
Cut 2 2.67 3.02 3.01 
Cut 3 5.68 6.42 6.39 
Cut 4 10.17 11.51 11.45 
Cut 5 10.97 12.41 12. 34 
LR x2 130.33 136.41 135.84 
LR x2 >~ Altruisrn Model 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N=1728 
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Table 2.5: Willingness to wait longer for medical care if cancer patients can 
receive drug coverage (Ordered Logistic Regression) 
Age 1.69 0.45 .05 1.74 0.46 .04 1.75 
Incorne 1.09 0.12 .46 LlO 0.12 .41 LlO 
Education 1.12 0.12 .32 1.11 0.12 .34 LlO 
French 0.88 0.11 .31 0.88 0.11 .30 0.88 
Fernale 1.15 0.09 .09 1.15 0.09 .08 1.15 
Ernployed 1.37 0.30 .14 1.38 0.30 .14 1.39 
Unernployed 1.38 0.42 .28 1.39 0.42 .28 1.39 
Self-Ernployed 1.23 0.19 .18 1.23 0.19 .18 1.23 
Student 1.63 0.42 .06 1.64 0.42 .05 1.65 
Homernaker 0.95 0.19 .79 0.94 0.19 .78 0.94 
Public Sect or 0.92 0.17 .67 0.93 0.17 .68 0.92 
Making Ends Meet 1.11 0.06 .04 Ll2 0.06 .03 1.12 
.Job Loss Worry 0.86 0.04 .00 0.86 0.04 .00 0.86 
NDP ID 1.29 0.23 .16 1.39 0.24 .15 1.30 
Con. ID 0.84 0.12 .24 0.85 0.12 27 0.85 
Liberal ID 1.27 0.19 .10 1.27 0.19 0.10 1.27 
BQ ID 2.04 0.50 .00 2.04 0.50 .00 2.04 
Cut 1 0.34 0.35 0.35 
Cut 2 0.98 1.00 0.98 
Cut 3 2.59 2.62 2.58 
Cut 4 4.34 4.38 4.32 
Cut 5 7.61 7.68 7.57 
Cut 6 11.71 11.81 11.64 
LRx2 52.25 46.34 44.19 
LR x2 >~ Altruisrn Model 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N=2199 
0.47 .03 
0.12 .40 
0.12 .37 
0.11 .29 
0.09 .08 
0.30 .14 
0.42 .27 
0.19 .18 
0.42 .05 
0.19 .76 
0.17 .67 
0.06 .03 
0.04 .00 
0.24 .15 
0.12 .27 
0.19 .10 
0.50 .00 
79 
Even in the face of several controls thought to influence support or oppo-
sition to greater public spending, indicators of altruism are associated with 
a greater willingness to pay for public spending. According to the estimates 
provided in the tables, the effect of altruism is always significantly different 
than zero, and the effects are often larger than those of other well-known 
correlates. Taking a carbon tax as an example (Table 2.2), those who give 
away something in a dictator game have 1.37 times higher odds of paying the 
maximum stated price for a carbon tax than those who give away nothing, 
according to Model 3. While this effect is smaller than the effects of age, 
education, student status, public sector employment and various partisan 
identifications, it is greater than the negative effects of current or anticipated 
economic hardship, age, income, gender, and employment status. Altruism 
is not the whole story, but it is explaining important variance in willingness 
to pay for public spending. 5 
Faced with the choice of paying higher taxes for free university tuition 
(Table 2.3), altruists are 1.47 times more likely to be in the highest cost 
category than non-altruists, according to Model 3. This a greater effect 
than income, education, gender, employment or unemployment, public sect or 
employment, and current or future economic uncertainty. It is also a stronger 
effect than moving from no partisanship to a strong Liberal partisanship. As 
with the Carbon Tax, the model fit is also significantly improved with the 
5 A likelihood ratio test suggests that it improves the fit of the model significantly over a 
model without altruism. This is the case for every specification of altruism in each mode!. 
80 
addition of altruism. 
The largest effect of altruism is in the willingness to pay for reduced 
waiting times for medical services (Table 2.4). Model 3 suggests that those 
who give something away in a dictator game are 1.63 times more likely to 
be in the highest cost category of willingness to pay than non-altruists. This 
effect is larg~r than the effects for income, education, gender, employment 
status, current and future economic difficulty. It is also larger than the effect 
of each partisan identification except one. It is smaÎler than the effect of 
being a student. Most importantly, it is nearly half the size of the difference 
between the oldest and youngest respondent. This is thus a rather remarkable 
magnitude, as the question makes explicit mention of medical surgeries which 
are most commonly for elderly patients (i.e. hip replacement and cataract 
removal). 
Finally, altruists are willing to wait longer than non-altruists for standard 
medical procedures if those who have cancer can have better drug coverage. 
Model 3 suggests that this effect is greater than every other predictor except 
anticipated economic hardship, BQ partisanship, and age. The willingness of 
altruists to bear costs for others, then, extends to non-monetary costs such 
as time. 
Taken together, these results suggest a consistent pattern. Those who 
exhibit more altruism in a dictator game state a greater willingness to pay 
for greater public spending. This willingness persists in the face of other well-
known correlates of the decision to support or oppose greater public spending. 
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Moreover) altruism often exhibits a stronger effect than these other factors, 
consistent with earlier findings (Rasinski and Rosenbaum, 1987; Hudson and 
Jones, 1994; 2001; Shiell and Seymour, 2002). 
These results are open to an obvious criticism: they are generated from a 
non-random sample in which the educated and wealthy are overrepresented. 
If the effect of altruism differs systematically between the wealthy and the 
non-wealthy, or between the highly educated and others, then these results 
may not obtain in the entire population. This endangers the generalizability 
( 
or external validity (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2000) of my findings. 
To examine this possibility, l have repeated the regressions and added 
interaction terms between altruism and education category and altruism and 
income category. If the main effect for altruisrn remains significant and is 
not washed out by the marginal effects in the interactions, this that 
the role of altruism is present across the population. My results, presented 
in Table 2.6) suggest that this is the case for three of four goods. Only in the 
case of cancer care does the main effect of altruism fail to reach statistical 
significance, despite being in the right direction. Moreover, I note that this 
is the only question for which costs are expressed in non-monetary terms, 
perhaps making the inducement to altruism less strong. Additionally, only 
two interactions of eight are significant, suggesting that the effect of altruism 
is and consistent across the population. In sum, these findings on the 
importance of altruism for support for public spending likely extend to a 
wider (and less educated and wealthy) population. 
Table 2.6: Main and conditional effects of altruisrn when interacted with education and incorne (Ordered 
Logistic Regression) 
Carbon Tax S.E p Free Tuition S.E p Wait Times S.E p Cancer Drugs S.E p 
Altruisrn (Model 3) 2.65 0.60 .00 1.41 0.27 .07 2.52 0.55 .00 1.31 0.25 .16 
Education * Altruisrn 0.60 0.16 .06 0.98 0.22 .91 0.53 0.14 .01 1.08 0.24 .74 
Incorne* Altruisrn 0.62 0.15 .04 1.12 0.23 .59 1.05 0.24 .01 0.76 0.16 .18 
Age 0.73 0.23 .32 0.50 0.13 .01 2.38 0.74 .01 1.73 0.46 .04 
Incorne 1.53 0.30 .03 1.11 0.90 .54 1.45 0.27 .85 1.30 0.22 .12 
Education 3.06 0.63 .00 1.24 0.21 .22 2.08 0.41 .00 1.06 0.18 .75 
French 0.78 0.11 .07 0.28 0.04 .00 0.75 0.10 .04 0.80 0.18 .30 
Fernale 1.07 0.10 .41 1.14 0.09 .10 0.93 0.09 .49 1.16 0.09 .07 
Ernployed 1.49 0.38 .ll 1.05 0.23 .81 1.37 0.34 .21 1.39 0.30 .13 
Unernployed 1.18 0.41 .64 1.23 0.37 .50 1.61 0.55 .17 1.41 0.43 .26 
Self-Ernployed 1.17 0.22 .39 1.03 0.17 .86 1.12 0.20 .55 1.23 0.19 .18 
Student 2.31 0.70 .01 1.92 0.48 .01 2.20 0.66 .01 1.64 0.42 .05 
Hornernaker 1.19 0.29 .47 1.19 0.24 .38 1.34 0.31 .21 0.95 0.19 .80 
Public Sector 0.65 0.14 .04 1.03 0.19 .86 0.77 0.16 .20 0.92 0.17 .64 
Making Ends Meet 0.82 0.05 .00 0.99 0.05 .86 0.84 0.05 .00 1.12 0.06 .03 
Job Loss Worry 0.89 0.05 .00 1.01 0.05 .82 0.95 0.05 .28 0.85 0.04 .00 
NDP ID 2.87 0.66 .00 2.53 0.46 .00 2.93 0.65 .00 1.30 0.24 .15 
Conservative ID 0.31 0.05 .00 0.61 0.09 .00 0.70 O.ll .02 0.85 0.12 .27 
Liberal ID 1.69 0.29 .00 1.34 0.20 .05 1.26 0.22 .17 1.27 0.19 .ll 
BQ ID 2.19 0.57 .00 5.38 1.39 .00 1.31 0.36 .33 2.06 0.50 .00 
Cut 1 -0.11 -0.44 . 0.30 -0.99 
Cut 2 0.70 0.42 1.36 0.04 
Cut 3 1.24 1.34 2.ll Loi 
Cut 4 1.58 2.23 2.70 1.52 
Cut 5 1.67 3.05 2.78 2.09 
Cut 6 2.51 
LRx2 256.81 227.57 142.21 45.96 
LR x2 >~ Altruisrn Model 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 (X) 
N 1789 2287 1728 2199 ~ 
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2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
Explanations of support for public spending which rely on self-interest alone 
are, however theoretically el egant , empirically implausible. When asked 
about spending programs from which they cannat be expected ta benefit 
or from which a net gain will not be realized, many citizens still indicate 
support. 1 argue that this is due to non-self-interested considerations, par-
ticularly altruism. Ta support this daim, 1 have demonstrated a consistent 
and strong link between allocations in a dictator game and support for greater 
public spending on a variety of programs with a variety of costs. By linking 
a behavioral indicator of altruism with a wiUingness ta pay higher taxes for 
public programs, 1 have established a stronger empirical link than previous 
studies and added support to arguments for strong reciprocity. 
This work is not without objections, particularly that it has occurred 
over a non-random sample. While my sample is more representative than 
a typical university convenience sample, it is still open to daims of limited 
generalizability or external validity (Shadish, Cook and Campbell, 2000). 
Despite this, 1 have shown that allocations in dictator games are generally 
unrelated to sociodemographic variables (see Table 2.1). Moreover, when 1 
control for the marginal effects of education and incarne, 1 find that the link 
still exists for goods with monetary costs. Accordingly, in the absence of 
an argument about why those who would refuse participation in the study 
would not behave similarly or hold similar preferences, 1 argue that my results 
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generalize broadly. 
These results have important implications both methodologically and 
substantively. From a methodological standpoint, these resu~ts demonstrate 
that, we can embed games from behavioral economics into large-sample sur-
veys and leam from the results. In doing so we can arguably introduce more 
valid and reliable indicators of concepts such as altruism. 
From a substantive viewpoint, these results tell us that individuals who 
exhibit more altruism hold different preferences for public spending than 
those citizens who do not. However, such individuals do not likely represent 
a majority of the population. Accordingly, any appeals for public spending 
which rely on altruism alone are not as likely to gamer support as broadly 
as those calls which also incorporate an element of self-interest. This likely 
has important implications for those who wish to explain the rise and fall of 
preferences for more public spending (e.g. Soroka and Wlezien, 2005). More 
generally, these findings reinforce the call to incorporate more than just self-
interest into our explanations of spending preferences. 
It is not our daim that these findings call into question the importance of 
self-interest in the explanation of political action. But they do demonstrate 
that other-regarding behavior can have an equally and sometimes st ronger 
impact. Our accounts of political behavior, then, should be open to ex-
planations which move beyond simple self-interest. They should, to put it 
differently, take regard of other considerations. 
Chapitre 3 
Affinity, Antipathy and 
Political Participation: How 
Our Concern For Other 
Partisans Makes Us Vote 
Ta be subrnitted at Canadian Journal of Political Science. 
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3.1 Introduction 
" ... voting is essentially a gTOUp experience" (Lazarsfeld et al 1968, 137) 
"Gypsies, tramps, and thieves, these ar'e the people who will vote fOT Mc-
Govern ... " As sung at the 1972 Republican National Convention. 
Elections are not the simple aggregation of millions of individual and 
independent decisions whether and for whom to vote. Nor are they simply 
about self-interested decisions. Elections are instead a competition between 
groups of people who rely on more than self-interest when deciding when and 
how to participatein politics. individuals engage in other-regarding 
behaviour in which they consider the benefits of an election outcome for 
whole groups of people. If we wish to understand the decision to participate 
in politics, we need to take account of this facto 
In this article, l provide an interpretation of other-regarding behaviour 
and electoral participation in which largue that antipathy and affinity to-
wards others - specifically, other partisans - can be used to explain the deci-
sion to vote or not to vote. Using agame from behavioural economics - the 
dictator game - l demonstrate empirically that citizens who have st ronger 
preferences or concern for sorne partisans than others are more likely 
to vote. This suggests that models of voter turnout which rely only on self-
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regarding considerations - including even dut y and social obligation are 
incomplete. A more fulsome account of the decision to vote 
this variation in individuals' concern for others. 
account of 
The demonstration of this argument proceeds as follows. In the next 
section, l justify a conception of poli tics as a contest between groups of citi-
zens. In this view, politics is not just a contest between parties fighting for 
the support of individual citizens. Rather, it is a fight over scarce resources 
between groups of citizens and their respective representatives in political 
parties. As such, how individuals feel about various partisan groups mat-
ters for their understanding of politics. In section 3, l formalize a calculus 
for voting which is consistent with this view of politics, particularly by in-
corporating a regard for others. The model demonstrates how affinity for 
co-partisans and antipathy towards other partisans can drive the decision to 
vote. It thus departs from the conventional rational choice model of vot-
ing by incorporating concern for others and not relying on a dut y term to 
explain the paradox of participation. It is also thus similar to those ~od­
els presented by Fû\vler (2006), Fowler and Kam (2007) and Edlin, Gelman 
and Kaplan (2007). In presenting the model, largue that su ch an account 
provides a more satisfactory theoretical explanation of the decision to vote 
than a mode! which depends on dut y, resources, or partisan identification. In 
section four, l describe a large online survey experiment which uses dictator 
to measure antipathy and affinity. Dictator games involve giving a 
subject a sum of money and then observing how much of that money they 
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are willing to share with a recipient. 1 describe the properties of dictator 
games and their suitability for the measurement of affinity and antipathy. 
1 show in the fifth section that behaviour in these games is consistent with 
what we should expect according to partisan identification. Partisans' give 
more to their fellow partisans and less to the partisans of other parties and 
this difference increases with strength of partisanship. For example, those in-
dividuals who identify with the Conservative party give more money to fellow 
Conservatives than to Liberais. And this difference increases with strength 
of partisanship. The sixth section presents multiple regression models of 
the decision to vote in the 2006 Canadian federal election which incorporate 
measures of antipathy and affinity. Cl'osely resembling conventional mod-
els of turnout, these models demonstrate that antipathy and affinity matter 
independent of other well-known correlates of the decision to vote, such as 
media attention, party identification, education, income, and election com-
petitiveness. Moreover, the models suggests that both affinity and antipathy 
independently predict turnout, but that affinity has a slightly st ronger effect. 
1 discuss these findings and conclude in the seventh section. 
3.2 Group Politics 
Poli tics can be understood as a contest between groups of people. Three 
sets of evidence support this view. First, we generally understand parties as 
having different bases of support; bases which can generally be described in 
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terms of social groups. l The Liberal party, for example, is the party of visible 
minorities and Catholics, of Quebec federalists, of francophones outside of 
Quebec. The Conservative party is traditionally the party of protestants, 
rural Canadians, and Westerners. And the New Democratie Party is a party 
of union members, women, and increasingly urban dwellers (Blais, 2005; 
Blais, Gidengill, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002; Bibby, 1990). While there is 
some debate over the importance of social groupings for vote choice (see, 
e.g., Clarke et al., 1979; LeDuc, 1984), it remains true that parties often 
think of their support in terms of groups and pursue votes accordingly (for 
a popular account, see Wells, 2006). And, as an empirical matter, we can 
explain vote choice as a function of group membership (Blais, Gidengill, 
Nadeau and Nevitte (2002), for a non-Canadian example, see Abramson, 
Aldrich and Rhode (2006)). 
Second, the rhetoric of parties frames politics as a competition between 
different groups. In doing so, parties attempt to paint a positive pictur~ of 
the individuals who support them and paint a negative picture of the indi-
viduals supporting other parties. While the invocation of gypsies, tramps, 
and thieves is perhaps too strong, parties do draw caricatures of their sup-
porters and their opponents. Take, for example, the leaders' debate during 
the 2006 Canadian federal election. 2 Stephen Harper, the leader of the Con-
IThis is especia.lly true if we conceive of class membership as a specifie instance of a 
group membership (see, e.g. Evans, 1999; Hout, Brooks and Manza, 1993, for accounts of 
the enduring importance of class). 
2 Ali the following quotes are drawn from the 2006 Canadian federal leaders' debate, 
according to the transcript of the Canadian Press (2006). 
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servative Party, characterized his party as "on the side of the people who 
work hard, pay their taxes, and play by the rules." Similarly, the leader of 
the New Democratie Party, Jack Lay ton, cast his party as the one which 
would "make politieians in Parliament accountable to you, and we'll work 
day in and day out, not for the well-connected, but for working families ... 
We'll ensure dignity and respect for seniors. And we'll make sure there's 
opportunities for young people ... "Prime Minister Paul Martin a~cused the 
Conservative party of being on the si de of "rieher Canadians" and opposed 
to the interests of their "working class" counterparts. In aU of these rhetori-
cal appeals, leaders are framing their policy offerings in terms of the groups 
which they benefit. Their intention is to draw a picture of the type of people 
who support their party. If a favourable picture can be drawn, then voters 
are more likely to be convinced that casting a ballot for a party is going to 
benefit people whom they like and people who are like them. 3 
Third, we know that voters think about their membership in parties in 
the same way they think about their membership in other groups. Indeed, 
Campbell et al. (1960)'s original conception of party identification was that it 
was similar to affiliation with other groups, whether religious, ethnic or racial 
(see also Greene, 2004, 136-137). Recent research has confirmed this view 
and argued that individuals identify with parties the same way they iden-
3In this respect, politicians also have an incentive to overstate the size of the gTOUp of 
voters they represent. The larger the group to which a voter belongs, the more individuals 
who will benefit from an election win. This perhaps explains the tendency of voters 
to overestimate the chances (and thus size) of the parties which they support (see, e.g. 
Bartels, 1988; Blais and Bodet, 2006). 
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tif y with other social groups (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Greene, 
2004). In doing so, they adopt positive images not only of the parties, but of 
the people who support the parties. And they sometimes adopt more nega-
tive views of those who support other parties (for more general work on social 
identity theory, see Tajfel, 1978). Arguably, this suggests that our concep-
tions of party identification are incompletely served by questions which ask 
only about attachment to a party and not about feelings towards a party's 
supporters. 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that people vote as groups, par-
ties conceive of elections as cont~sts between groups of voters, and vot ers 
think of parties and partisans in the same terms in which they think of other 
social groups. When we combine this with the fact that sorne individuals 
are motivated by a concern for others, then it becomes puzzling that existing 
models of the decision to vote would not take account of affinity towards 
others. What is needed, then, is an account of voting in which (sorne) in-
dividuals take account of their feelings of the various groups who stand to 
benefit from an election's outcome. In the next section, l formalize such a 
conception. 
3.3 A Different Calculus of Voting 
Riker and Ordeshook (1968) provide perhaps the definitive self-interested 
account of turnout. Indeed, in his extensive review of the decision to vote or 
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not to vote, Blais (2000) takes this as the rational choice model. A "paradox 
of participation" emerges from this model, namely in that it predicts no or 
very low turnout. To review, the original model posits three components: B, 
the benefits an individual receives from an eleetion outcome, C, the costs an 
individual ineurs in voting, and P, the probability that an individual's vote 
will be decisive. An individual decides to vote if PB> C. The problem with 
the model is immediately apparent. In only the rarest circumstances is Pever 
anything but infinitesimally small. Indeed, as Fowler (2006, 675) observes, 
numerous scholars have demonstrated formally (Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 
2007; Chamberlain and Rothchild, 1981) and empirically (e.g. Gelman, Katz 
and Bafumi, 2004; Mulligan and Hunter, 2003) that in any election, P is 
about equal to 1/ N. It thus does not make rational sense for a voter to go 
to the poIls. 
To resolve this paradox of participation, Riker and Ordershook proposed 
adding a dut y term, D, resulting in D + PB> C. Thus, if a citizen's sense 
of dut y plus the discounted benefits of winning were greater than the cost of 
voting, then they would cast a ballot. In his extensive review of the literature, 
Blais (2000, 1) outlines six additional amendments ta the madel by ratio-
nal chaice scholars (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1974; Mueller, 1989; 
Uhlaner, 1986, 1989a,b, 1999; Niemi, 1976; Barry, 1978; Aldrich, 1993) and 
four non-rational choice-based explanations (e.g. Brady, Verba and Schloz-
man, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1994; Blais, 2000, 13-14). After this, 
he too comes down on an explanation which "assumes that citizens are con-
93 
cerned with the well-being of their community as much as with their own 
self-interest" and that encapsulates such a concern in a sense of d'Uty. 
In my view, an explanation which on dut y is only half-right. That 
many citizens have a sense of dut y seems uncontroversial. That it would take 
the form of a concern for others seems equally uncontroversial. But, this is 
still a static explanation (Fowler, 2006, 675) because it does not condition 
this concern for others on the importance of the election. In other words, 
it does not explain why a sense of dut y would be greater for sorne elections 
than others. As such, it does little to explain the variation we see in levels of 
turnout between national and local elections, for instance.4 Finally, it does 
not clearly specify whether this obligation to the group lS oriented towards 
others in the group, i.e. individuals want to help others, or whether it is 
self-oriented, Le. an individual wants to feel as though she is a member of 
the group. 
We can find a way out of this paradox, land others would argue, if we 
develop a model which allows for a concern for others, and which effectively 
takes into account the outcome of elections.' Such a model is also more con-
sistent with a view of poli tics in which groups of people fight over power and 
resources, rather than a view in which parties simply play out a competition 
in front of unconnected and solitary citizens who think only of benefits to 
. thernselves. 
l present a model of turnout in which the decision to vote depends on 
4These variations likewise cannot be explained by discounted benefits, 
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the difference in regard which an individual has for the supporters of various 
political parties and for the benefits which will accrue to them given sorne 
election outcome (for similar models, see Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 
2007; Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 20(7). My model differs from these in a 
few subtie respects. First, in contrast to Fowler and Kam, l allow for the 
presence of more than two parties and do not demand that voters be evenly 
divided between them. Second, in contrast to Edlin et al., l do not include a 
feedback mechanism to explain habituaI voting. That said, the model clearly 
owes its fundamental intuition and implications to these prior models. 
As with the classical modei of voter turnout, the model assumes that 
there are costs to voting which individuals consider in the decision to vote. 
While these costs are often small; they are not nil. Individuals face costs, 
for example, in determining where and how to vote and in Iearning about 
parties and issue positions. Additionally, as with the classical model, voters 
consider the benefits to themselves. But they discount these benefits by the 
probability of their vote being decisive for their preferred party. However, 
unlike the classicai model, this modei assumes that vot ers also care about 
benefits to others, specifically the benefits which are realized by supporters 
of the winning party. The more they care about those supporters in contrast 
to supporters of other parties, the more likely they are to vote in an election. 
Formally,.Jthe m~del assumes that two sets ofbenefits exist. First, benefits 
to self: Bs. Second, benefits to the supporters of the winning party: Bo. In 
real terms, both sets of benefits couid include changes in tax laws which 
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favour the supporters of the winning party more than the losing party, on 
average. They couid similarly include new spending measures (or cuts) which 
disproportionately favour (harm) the supporters (opponents) of the winning 
party. The important point to be noted here is that the se benefits need not be 
construed in terms of patronage, but rather about the larger programmatic 
diflerences in spending which occur between parties of various stripes (e.g. 
Blais, Blake and Dion, 1993). By omission, the model thus assumes that 
no generalized benefits exist for aIl members of society given the election of 
some party over another (contra Fowler and Kam, 2007). 
The model further assumes that vot ers do consider P, the probability 
of casting a deciding or tying vote. As Fowler notes (Fowler, 2006), in any 
election in which the out come is uncertain this term generally equals The 
model also incorporates the concern or affinity of an individual for support-
ers of their own party, Ctaf f, and antipathy for supporters of other parties, 
Ctant. Finally, the model assumes that voters conceive of the election in 
terms of a competition between citizens who support their party, who make 
up some share of the population (nd, and those who support other parties, 
who make up another share of the population (n2)' Accordingly, l assume 
that nI + n2 1 and that voters adopt a mean level of antipathy towards aIl 
other partisans in their calcul us. 5 . vVhereas the decision to vote in a classicai 
5This corresponds to our Max-Mean specification in the empirical tests. Alternately, 
we can assume that voters conceive of elections as a contest between their awn group 
of supporters and the supporters of the least preferred group. This corresponds ta the 
Max-Min specification in the empirical tests. The two specifications produce very similar 
results. 
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model de pends on D + PB> C, in this model an individual votes if : 
which rearranges as: 
As P is approximately equal to l/N, then the PN term drops away.6 
Benefits to self, Bs, are similarly discounted by N and drop away from the 
model. However, as the benefits to others, Ba, are not discounted by P or 
N, then this can be a sufficient motivator to vote in the face of costs. Intu-
itively, voters care about the benefits incurred by others, and these benefits 
add up to a non-trivial sum wh en a group is sufficiently large. The model 
thus reduces to: 
Since one individual's vote can confer a non-trivial benefit on a whole 
group of people and deny the benefit to other groups, those voters who care 
about the utility of others can now be motivated to vote. This is true even in 
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the face of C. 7 As the difference in their concern for others inc~eases, i. e as 
(Yaf! increases and/or (Yant increases, then vot ers should become more likely 
to vote. Substantively, if politics is a competition between groups than those 
who see one group as more deserving of an election's spoils than others will 
be more likely to vote. Antipathy and affinity, then, should explain sorne of 
the decision to vote. l next describe a survey experiment designed to test 
this proposition. 
3.4 Survey and Research Design 
My study relies on an online survey of sorne 2035 respondents conducted 
1 
by a commercial public opinion research firm in Canada in May 2007. The 
respondents are broadly but certainly not perfectly representative of the pop-
ulation. The survey contained conventional questions about political partic-
ipation and political preferences, but also included a series of dictator games 
from behavioural economics aimed at revealing affinity and antipathy to-
wards other partisans. Below, l describe the survey, the survey participants, 
and the variables drawn from the survey. 
7We could add into the left hand side of the model terms for dut y, party identification, or 
sorne individual utility derived from voting regardless of the outcome. We could similarly 
add a negative cost term to reflect the cost of shame for a group member who does 
not vote. Ali of these factors could explain variation in the baseline probability of any 
individual voting. This is a case for including relevant control variables in an empirical 
mode!. However, as these variables are not central to the model presented here, l leave 
them out of the formai discussion. 
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3.4.1 Survey 
The survey was conducted online. Subjects were required to login to the 
survey using a unique identification. This allows me to call up previously 
entered demographic information from those who have completed prior sur-
veys. Those completing the survey for the first time were first asked a series of 
screening questions, including whether they voted in the most recent federal 
election and their partisan identification. Subjects answered sever al ques-
tions about recent news exposure, their attention to federal and provincial 
politics, and their views on federal and provincial politicians. Subjects then 
completed an unrelated eight-item module on empathy. They were next pre-
sented with the dictator game battery. Following this, they were presented 
with questions concerning their support for public spending, their past char-
itable gi'ving, their views of the public service, and their views of recent 
political events. The final effective sample was 2035 respondents. 8 
3.4.2 Subject Profiles 
Compared to a university-based convenience sample, the online survey meth-
ods affords a large number of respondents and comparatively representative 
population, particularly in regards to age, education and income. Compared 
to a telephone survey, it allows us to present subjects with more complex or 
. 8The sarnple is lirnited by three factors. First, l elirninate those who have not indi-
cated whether they voted in the 2006 federal election. Second, l elirninate those whose 
constituency is not identified. Finally, l elirninate those for whorn values are rnissing on 
incorne and education. 
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complicated questions, such as the dictator game questions used to measure 
affinity and antipathy, while not sacrificing the advantages of a broadly rep-
resentative sample. It should be noted, however, that the sample does not 
perfectly resemble one which is randomly drawn. 
Table 3.1 shows the characteristics of the sample and compares them to 
the 2006 Canadian Election Study, a RDD telephone survey. The average 
respondent in the internet sam pIe is slightly younger (t = 2.60,p < .00). 
There is also a lower incidence of French respondents (X2 = 13.93, p < .00) 
and female respondents (X2 7.06,p < .00) in the internet sample. Finally, 
the internet sample appears both wealthier (X2 = 123.55, p < .00) and more 
educated (X2 349.76,p < .00). 
In addition to the socio-demographic differences, the internet sample also 
appears to be more politically engaged. It exhibits a higher incidence of both 
weak and strong Conservative identifiers, weak Liberal identifiers, weak and 
strong NDP identifiers, and strong Bloc Quebecois identifiers. Overall, the 
internet sample has a higher incidence of those who identify with a party 
than the CES sam pie (X2 24.99,p < .00). 
The most glaring difference between the sample and the general popula-
tion is the incidence of turnout (it is 91.4% in the internet sample, 90.5% 
in the CES post-election survey, but only 64.7% in the population). The 
panel Îs quite c1early overpopulated by those who daim to have voted in the 
la..st federal election. Because vote is our dependent variable, this imbalance 
cannot be ameliorated by a control variable. To address this, l weight the 
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data according to the actual rate of turnout in the 2006 federal election. As 
a result, my regressions rely on control variables to account for differences 
on sociodemographic variables and party identification, and a weighting to 
address the over-reporting of voting (for a similar approach, see Blais et al., 
2004).9 
3.4.3 Antipathy, Affinity, and other variables 
To begin with standard variables, survey questions were used to capture 
respondent demographics as weIl as party identification. Furthermore, re-
spondents were how many days a week they read the newspaper and 
watch television news. They were equally asked how many hours a week they 
spend reading internet news. For interpretive ease, all variables are recoded 
from 0 to 1. Question wordings are available in Annexe D. 
Antipathy and affinity are measured through a series of dictator games 
(see Camerer, 2003), the properties of which are discussed in more detail be-
low. In addition to a regular $500 draw for survey participation, respondents 
were told that they were eligible to win up to four prizes of $100 at the end 
of the survey. In the case of one prize, they were asked how much of it they 
9To address the higher frequency of voters, 1 weight my sam pie to reflect national 
(rather than provincial or regional) rates of turnout. 1 make no corrections within demo-
graphie groups. Accordingly, voters receive a weight of 0.708 and non-voters a weight of 
4.08. 1 have also estimated a rare events logit (King and Zeng, 2001) for each model with 
corrections for the frequency of the dependent variable, but no McCullagh and Nelder 
correction or variance cluster correction. In the case of each model in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, 
the substantive results remain the same. 
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Table 3.1: Sarnple dernographic and political characteristics 
Current CES 
Variable % or Mean (SD) % or Mean (SD) 
Age 49.7 (13.5) 50.8 (16.5) 
French 18.2% 22.3% 
Fernale 49.1% 52.7% 
Household Incorne <$40000 24.0% 36.7% 
$40000 to $60000 20.8% 20.5% 
$60000 to $80000 17.7% 16.4% 
>$80000 37.4% 26.4% 
Education High School or less 14.8% 37.6% 
Sorne College 29.9% 25.6% 
Sorne University 55.2% 36.9% 
Conservative ID Weak 13.1% 11.5% 
Strong 7.3% 6.3% 
Liberal ID Weak 17.4% 15.5% 
Strong 6.0% 6.5% 
NDPID Weak 8.6% 5.4% 
Strong 3.1% 2.9% 
BQ ID Weak 3.4% 5.6% 
Strong 3.6% 2.1% 
Total Party ID 62.5% 55.8% 
Voted 91.3% 90.5% 
N 2035 4057 
would share, should they win, with an anonyrnous individual about whorn 
they knew nothing. For the other three prizes, they were sirnilarly asked 
how rnuch they would be willing to share with an anonyrnous individual 
about whorn they knew nothing except which political party the respondent 
typically supported (Conservative, Liberal or NDP; in the case of Quebec 
residents, Conservative, Liberal or Bloc Quebecois). The presentation or-
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der of the anonymous recipients was randomized. Question wording for the 
dictator games is available in Annexe B. 
The comparison of amounts can give us important information 
about the level of antipathy and affinity individuals have for supporters of 
other parties. For example, if an individual indicated she would give $50 
to a Conservative but nothing to a Liberal, then we may say she has more 
antipathy for LiberaIs than a respondent who gave the same amount to par-
tisans of both parties. Alternately, we cou Id say she has more affinity for 
Conservatives. 1 leave a discussion of the operationalization of these specific 
variables to Section 6. 
ln the past, dictator games have been used to measure other-regarding 
behaviour, whether altruism, social identification or fairness (e.g. Fowler, 
2006; Fowler Kam, 2007; Whitt and Wilson, 2007). The question remains 
as to whether they can be used to measure antipathy and affinity for other 
partisans. 1 argue that difIerences in partisan allocations in a dictator game 
are just such evidence of antipathy and affinity towards other partisans. That 
is, if an individual is willing to allocate $50 to a supporter of the Conservative 
party and $0 ta a supporter of the Liberal party, then they can be said 
to have antipathy towards LiberaIs and/or affinity for the Conservatives, 
particularly because they are displaying a real difIerence in their concern 
for others, and the display of this concern cornes at a real cost. Behaviour 
in the dictator game thus closely resembles that which we would expect 
according to social identity theory and the preference for sorne groups over 
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others (see Tajfel, 1978; Greene, 2004). It can similarly be construed as a 
measurement of "social distance" between respondents and other partisans 
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996) 
The use of behavioura.l economics games in political science and espe-
cia.lly in voting behaviour research is rather unconventional. As a result, 
several reasonable objections can be anticipated (see Benz and Meier, 2008, 
2-3). First, one could contend that subjects do not understand the play of 
the game and instead make allocations more or less randomly. However, An-
dreoni and Miller (2002) and Dawes and Fowler (2007) have shown through 
the manipulation of payoff functions that individuals do. understand the game 
and do not simply make up allocations as they go along. Instead, their al-
locations consistently and rationally match their stated preferences. Second, 
it cou Id be argued that the small stakes of the games mean that individuals 
would play differently if the stakes were higher. Most research, however, sug-
gests that subjects play consistently provided the stakes are real (as they are 
in our game) (e.g. Camerer and Hogarth (1999); Carpenter, Verhoogen and 
Burks (2005), but see also Cherry, F'rykblom and Shogren (2002)). Third, 
it can be argued that despite consistent play, behaviour in dictator games 
does not correspond to the real world equivalents we wish to measure. Benz 
and Meier (2008), however, review strong evidence of the correlation between 
dictator game allocations to anonymous individuals (taken as a measure of 
altruism) and charitable giving, among other actions (for a longer review, 
see Loewen (2008b)). Accordingly, l am confident behaviour in these games 
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reveals respondents' concern for others. 
These objections aside, the dictator game has substantial advantages over, 
for example, asking subjects to state how they feel about other partisans (e.g. 
Greene, 2004). First, stated opinions are arguably more subject to social de-
sirability than revealed preferences in a dictator game, precisely because the 
former are virtually costless to make. Dictator game allocations ask subjects 
to put their dollars where their hearts are. Second, while asking subjects to 
allocate money may seem like an abstract task, it is likely one which subjects 
can undertake with more consistency and meaning than, for example, trying 
to translate their preferences for sorne partisans over others onto a 7-point 
Likhart scale or onto a 0-100 thermometer. lndeed, the dictator game is 
desirable because it asks subjects to demonstrate their affection for sorne 
groups over others at a cost to themselves, and it does so in quantities which 
a subject can readily understand. 
3.5 Antipathy, Affinity, and Party Identifica-
tion 
Table 3.2 demonstrates the different allotments of partisans in the dictator 
games. The differences in these allocations suggest that the dictator game 
does uncover affinity and antipathy between political supporters, as subjects 
give more to co-partisans than they do to rival partisans. Moreover, they are 
likely to give more to those who are not identified with a party than those 
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who are identified with another party. For example, the first row in Table 
3.2 shows that weak Conservative identifiers give $21.20 to other Conserva-
tives on average, while they given only $12.50 and $12.70 to Liberal and New 
Democratie respondents, respectively. These differences become more stark 
when we consider the allocations of strong Conservative identifiers. These 
individuals on average give other Conservatives $26.70, while they give Lib-
eral and New Democratie respondents only $10.60 and $10.20 respectively. 
A similar pattern obtains for New Democratie, Bloc Quebecois and Liberal 
partisans. They allot more money to their co-partisans than to other parti-
sans, and these differences are larger for strong partisans than for weak. This 
pattern only fails to obtain with regards to the allocations of strong LiberaIs 
and strong Conservatives to Bloc partisans. 
Those who do not identify with a politieal party - more than a third of our 
sample - appear to give less to partisans compared to anonymous individuals. 
On average, non-partisans give $22.40 to anonymous recipients (partisans 
give about the same on average). They conversely give between $15.30 and 
$16.70 to partisans. Taken together, aIl of these results suggest that the 
allocations in the dictator game are consistent with respondent partisanship 
or non-partisanship. 
Table 3.3 demonstrates the within-subject differences in allocations. Each 
cell presents the average within-subject differences by donor. For example, 
the cell in the upper left demonstrates the average difference in allotments to 
Conservatives and LiberaIs by Conservative donors. l then use a Wilcoxon 
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sign-rank test to determine the significance of this finding. As a consequence 
of being non-parametric, the Wilcoxon does not assume that the quantities 
being compared are normally distributed as with a conventional t-test. The 
test reports a probability that the direction of the real difference in scores 
is the opposite of that observed. Accordingly, the p-values in parentheses 
represent the probability that the difference exhibited is in fact in the other 
direction (Wilcoxon, 1945). 
An examination of these results finds that, as with the observations in 
Table 3.2, within-subject allocations are consistent with partisanship. Con-
servatives allocate significantly more to Conservatives than LiberaIs, more 
to Conservatives than New Democrats, more to Conservatives than to Blo-
quistes, and more to Conservatives than anonymous individuals. Moreover, 
they give more to anonymous individuals than to any other partisans. As im-
portantly, they make no distinction between Liberal and New Democratie re-
cipients. Liberal, New Democratic and Bloc identifiers make similarly consis-
tent allocations, allocating their co-partisans significantly more money than 
other partisans and non-partisans. 
A final observation is warranted. Fowler and Kam (2007) find that partic-
ipants in their experiments exhibit a bias against Republicans. A similar bias 
against Conservatives is exhibited in these data. Non-partisan recipients give 
significantly less to Conservatives than to New Democrats or LiberaIs. New 
Democrats similarly give less to Conservatives than to LiberaIs, and LiberaIs 
give less to Conservatives than to New Democrats. Two possible sources of 
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this Conservative bias both support a view of politics as a struggle between 
different groups of partisans. Non-Conservatives may exhibit less concern 
for Conservative partisans because they believe they are unfairly enriched by 
the current Conservative government. They could also exhibit less concern 
. because they believe that, as a group, Conservatives are less in need of the 
support of others, consistent with a view of Conservative supporters as well-
off financially. These explanations are not exclusive, and both support the 
view that citizens approach poli tics with clear distinctions between groups 
of partisans, differences which translate into varying levels of concern. 
Table 3.2: Partisanship and Average Allocations in the Dictator Game 
Donor jRecipient Anon. Cons. Liberal New Dem. Bloc.Que. 
Weak Conservative 20.7 21.2 12.5 12.7 2.9 
Strong Conservative 22.3 26.7 10.6 10.2 19.3 
Weak Liberal 23.6 16.3 23.4 19.5 8.8 
Strong Liberal 24.0 11.3 28.5 15.7 15.9 
Weak NDP 23.1 11.7 18.3 28.8 14.5 
Strong NDP 23.4 13.2 19.1 33.8 13.5 
Weak BQ 20.6 12.7 12.2 20.7 
Strong BQ 19.5 12.1 11.4 29.1 
Non-Partisan 22.4 15.3 16.7 16.6 16.7 
N 
311 
168 
414 
143 
188 
70 
80 
82 
896 
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3.5.1 Why Antipathy and Affinity are not just Party 
Identification 
Given the preceding the results, it can be objected that rather than measuring 
the affinity and antipathy towards other partisans, the dictator game alloca-
tions are simply a different measure of partisan identification. Three pieces 
of evidence militate against this contention. First, many partisan identifiers 
give nothing to their co-partisans: 30.1% of Conservative identifiers, 36.6% of 
Liberal identifiers 27.7% of NDP identifiers and 36.8% of Bloc identifiers give 
nothing to their fellow partisans. Second, most non-partisans allocate money 
to one or more co-partisans. Indeed, only 41.3% of non-identifiers allocate 
nothing to aIl other partisans. Together, these findings suggest thatpartisan 
identification is neither sufficient nor necessary to display differing levels of 
concern for the partisans of other parties. Third, as the models presented 
below in Tables 4 and 5 show, when measures of affinity and antipathy are 
added to a turnout model with party identification, aIl variables remain sig-
nificant and the marginal effects of partisan identification remain unchanged. 
Indeed, as the models below demonstrate, l obtain stronger results when l 
model the decision to turnout as a function of concern for others, as sug-
gested by our theoretical model. Taken together, this evidence suggests that 
l am tapping into feelings which, while related to the traditional measure of 
partisan identification, are not one and the same. Instead, they reach into 
another element of partisanship, particularly that which involves the feelings 
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of partisans towards other partisans and not just formaI parties (see aiso 
Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Greene, 2004). 
Table 3.3: Within-Subject Differences in Dictator Game Allocations (Wilcoxon Sign-Rank Differences) 
Con-Lib Con-NDP Con-BQ Lib-NDP Lib-BQ Con-Anon Lib-Anon NDP-Anon BQ-Anon 
Donor Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) Mean (p) 
Conservative 11.4 (.00) 11.4 (.00) 13.3 (.00) -0.4 (.63) 4.6 (.02) 2.0 (.00) -9.4 (.00) -9.5 (.00) -10.1 (.00) 
Liberal -9.7 (.00) -4.0 (.00) 5.4 (.00) 6.6 (.00) 11.1 (.00) -8.7 (.00) l.0 (.02) -5.5 (.00) -10.8 (.00) 
New Democrat -6.4 (.00) -18.0 (.00) -1.4 (.95) -11.1 (.00) 0.9 (.68) -11.0 (.00) -4.6 (.00) 6.3 (.00) -3.0 (.97) 
BQ 0.6 (.27) -12.9 (.00) -13.5 (.00) -7.7 (.00) -8.2 (.00) 5.2 (.00) 
N on-Partisan -1.4 (.02) -l.5 (.01) 0.0 (.80) -0.0 (:37) 1.2 (.62) -7.1 (.00) -5.7 (.00) -6.0 (.00) -4.6 (.01) 
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3.6 Antipathy, Affinity, and Turnout 
My contention is that those who display higher amounts of antipathy towards 
the supporters of other parties and higher amounts of affinity for supporters 
of their party should be more likely to vote than those who do not make a 
distinction between the supporters of various parties. Moreover, this effect 
should be independent of other predictors of the decision to vote, such as 
education, income, gender, political interest, and partisan identification. 
Table 3.4 presents results from three logis tic regressions. The first presents 
a standard model in which the decision to vote is regressed on party iden-
tification, sociodemographic factors, three measures of news consumption, 
and the closeness of the race in the respondent's constituency. In keeping 
with many prior research findings (e.g. Leighley and Nagler, 1992b,a; Strate 
et al., 1989) older, more educated and wealthier citizens are all more likely 
to vote. Likewise, those who identify with a political party are more likely 
to have reported casting a ballot (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992). While fe-
males appear less likely to vote, and internet news consumption has no effect 
on the turnout decision, all other variables conform to a standard account of 
turnout (for a similar turout model using Canadian date, see Blais, Gidengill, 
Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002). 
The second and third models add two combined measures of affinity and 
antipathy. The first, Max-Min, is the difference between the maximum allo-
cation to a partisan less the minimum allocation to a partisan, rescaled 0-1. 
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The second, Max-Mean, is the difference between the maximum allocation 
to a partisan less the mean allocation to all other partisans, rescaled 0-1. So, 
if a respondent gave $50 to a Conservative, $40 to a Liberal and $30 to a 
New Democrat, then Max-Min would read 0.2 (($50-$30)/100). Max-Mean 
would read 0.15 (($50-($40+$30)/2)/100). Obviously, these two measures 
are closely related (r = .95, p = .00). 
Table 3.4: Antipathy, Affinity and Turnout (Logistic Regression) 
Empty Max-Min Max-Mean 
Coef S.E. p Coef S.E. p Coef S.E. p 
Affinity, Antipathy 0.71 0.27 0.01 0.82 0.33 0.01 
Margin 0.55 0.39 0.16 0.63 0.39 O. 0.60 0.39 0.12 
Party ID 1.19 0.15 0.00 1.14 0.15 0.00 1.13 0.15 0.00 
Age 2.24 0.29 0.00 2.21 0.29 0.00 2.21 0.29 0.00 
Education 0.68 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.14 0.00 
Income 0.74 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.14 0.00 
French 0.14 0.15 0.33 0.13 0.15 0.35 0.13 0.15 0.36 
Female -0.49 0.11 0.00 -0.50 0.11 0.00 -0.49 0.11 0.00 
Newspaper 0.55 0.14 0.00 0.56 0.14 0.00 0.57 0.14 0.00 
TV News 0.62 0.16 0.00 0.60 O. 16 0.00 0.60 0.16 0.03 
Internet News -0.56 0.28 0.04 -0.61 0.22 0.00 
Constant -2.02 0.21 0.00 -2.07 0.22 0.00 -2.06 0.22 0.00 
LR 2> 1,p 0.01 
LR 3 > l, p = 0.01 
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Both of these variables are significant and positive, suggesting that in-
creased affinity and/or antipathy increases the probability of voting, even in 
the face of standard controls. Moreover, the magnitude of this effect is not 
small and is only eclipsed by the effects of age, partisan identification and 
income. According to column three, the difference in average probability of 
voting between our youngest and oldest· respondent is sorne 43 percent age 
points. Moving from no party identification to a strong party identification 
and holding aIl other variables at their mean increases the average probabil-
ity of voting by 23 percentage points. The effect of moving from the lowest 
to the highest income category is 16 percent age points, on average. By con-
trast, the effect for affinity and/or antipathy is 16 percentage points. This 
is greater than the effect of gender (11 percent age points), television news 
consumption (13 percentage points), newspaper consumption (12 percentage 
points), and internet news consumption (14 percentage points). The deci-
sion to vote clearly depends on more than just sociodemographic factors, 
media attention, and even an identification with one party or another. It 
also depends on how much an individual is concerned with the well-being of 
co-partisans versus those who support other parties. lO 
My formaI model suggests that any increase in antipathy or affinity is 
likely to increase turnout. The combined measures provided above suggest 
this is just the case. However, the question remains as to which element has 
a st ronger effect if observed separately. 
lOThese quantities are al! based on Clarify estimates with 1000 simulations. 
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In Table 3.5, l make a distinction between Antipathy and Affinity. Be-
cause l am not now just measuring a distance between two allocations, I. 
need a common reference point against which to calculate affinity and an-
tipathy. Dictator game allocations to a completely anonymous individual 
provide just such a reference point. Accordingly, l define affinity as the dif-
ference between the maximum allocation to a partisan and the allocation to 
the anonymous individual. Affinity thus demands that an individual have 
more concern for at least one group of partisans than completely anonymous 
individuals. l censor negative values at zero. Antipathy is defined as the 
completely anonymous allocation less the minimum partisan allocation. An-
tipathy thus demands that a respondent like sorne group of partisans less 
than individuals about whom they know nothing. As with affinity, l cen-
sor negative values at zero. As with the previous two variables, these are 
rescaled from 0 to 1. Importantly, these two variables are significantly but 
not strongly correlated (r = -O.lO,p = .OO)Y. 
The results in Table 3.5 suggest little change in the effect of the con-
trol variables. More importantly, they suggest that affinity plays a slightly 
stronger role than antipathy. l use Figure 3.1 to show the comparative effects 
of these two measures on the probability of voting when considered together. 
The Z-axis (the vertical axis on the left) measures the pro babili ty of voting. 
Il Tt is possible that sorne respondents rnake allocations in'consistent with their prefer-
ences, narnely by allocating the rnost to supporters of a party with which they do not 
identify. l find that 4.1% of respondents rneet this condition. They are retained in the 
analysis 
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Table 3.5: Separating Antipathy and Affinity (Logistic Regression) 
1 2 
Coef S.E. p Coef S.E. p 
Antipathy 0.77 0.28 0.01 
Affinity 0.92 0.42 0.03 
Margin 0.55 0.39 0.16 0.61 0.39 0.12 
Party ID 1.19 0.15 0.00 1.14 0.15 0.00 
Age 2.24 0.29 0.00 2.19 0.29 0.00 
Education 0.68 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.14 0.00 
Income 0.74 0.14 0.00 0.76 0.14 0.00 
French 0.14 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.15 0.34 
Female -0.49 0.11 0.00 -0.50 0.11 0.00 
Newspaper 0.55 0.15 0.00 0.56 0.15 0.00 
TV News 0.62 0.16 0.00 0.59 0.16 0.00 
Internet News -0.56 0.28 0.04 -0.64 0.28 0.02 
Constant -2.08 0.22 0.00 -2.08 0.22 0.00 
LR X2 380.98 392.60 
LR 2 > 1, p = 0.00 
N=2035 
The X axis measures antipathy and the Y axis measures affinity. The base-
line probability of voting (65%) is represented by the 'Roor' of the graph. 
The plane shows that both antipathy and affinity increase the probability of 
voting from 65% to around 80%. The slightly st ronger effect for affinity can 
be see in the top right hand corner of the plane:' wh en antipathy is equal 
to a the probability of voting at maximum affinity is 82% (as shown by the 
change in the shade on the plane). By contrast, wh en affinity is 0, maximum 
antipathy leads to a probability of voting of just below 80%. On balance, 
however, both effects appear substantively important, even if one is slightly 
smaller than the,other. Moreover, they do so in the face of traditional con-
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troIs for party identification. 1 can thus better explain the decision to vote 
by incorporating measures of individuals' concern for other partisans. 
0.80 
0.0 
1.0 
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Figure 3.1: The figure demonstrates the increase in the probability of voting 
at each level of antipathy contingent on the level of affinity, and vice-versa. 
As the two variables cannot sum to more than one, the plane shows the 
range of aIl possible predicted values. Predicted probabilities are based on 
1000 Clarify simulations. 
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3.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
1 have presented an explartation of turnout which was captured in a sim-
ple decision theoretic model and demonstrated empirically using a series of 
dictator embedded in an online survey. Moreover, these results were 
shown to be robust to a number of conventional controls. results lend 
support not only to my account, but the similar accounts of Fowler (2006), 
Fowler and Kam (2007), and EdIin, Gelman and Kaplan (2007). 
This model of turnout is more fulsome than one which on tradi-
tionaI conceptions of party identification or duty. It recognizes that party 
identification is about more than a preference for one party over another. In-
stead, it is membership in a social group. Moreover, it recognizes that senses 
of obligation to others are likely to drive decisions to participate, especially 
when the stakes ?f participation increase. The fulsomeness of this model, 
then, cornes from taking a broader view of Pftrtisanship and a view of dut y 
which is not deaf to instrumental outcomes. 
findings have important implications for our study of poli tics and 
the decision to participate in politics. The results support the view of politics 
as a competition between groups in which individuals are concerned not only 
with their own well-being, but also the well-being of others. One the positive 
side of the ledger, this is an encouraging result for those who desire a politics 
which is typified by civic concern and not just by pure self-interest. Indeed, 
these results suggest that many people participate in elections because they 
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care about others. 
These findings are not entirely positive, however. Looking at these re-
sults from the perspective of antipathy, we see that as a preference for sorne 
citizens over others increases, sorne individuals are more likely to vote. By 
extension, this means that if groups of partisans can be made more polarized 
and more distrusting of one another, then their likelihood of participating 
should increase. In short, if politics can be made more negative, then voter 
turnout could be expected to increase. This does not necessarily recommend 
negative politics, but it does caB into question the view that greater voter 
participation is necessarily a virtue. Indeed, it supports a much older view 
that high turnout is not necessarily indicative of civic engagement but of 
conflict (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954). 
Whether one takes these results as positive or negative, the sum result is 
that a better model of turnout incorporates individuals' concern for others. 
Elections are not contested by parties which appeal to a disaggregated col-
lection of atomized individuals. Rather, they are contested by parties who 
compete for the support of groups of voters. In doing so, they often portray 
the supporters of other parties in an unfavourable light. As the story goes, 
an election win for an opposing party is thus likely not only to perhaps make 
aggregate welfare worse off, but especiaBy to comparatively enrich those who 
gave the party their support. According to this conception of elections, the 
views individuals hold of those supporting other parties matter. As their 
concern for those who support other parties differs from their concern for 
121 
those in their own party, they become more likely to vote. Of aU the expla-
nations for turnout, then, we should have increased affection for· those which. 
incorporate other-regarding preferences. 
Chapitre 4 
For Want of a Nail: Direct 
Mail and Negative Persuasion 
in a Leadership Race (with 
Daniel Rubenson) 
Under review at Quarterly Journal of Poli tic al Science. The experiment was 
conceived by Rubenson and Loewen. Loewen negotiated an agreement with the 
campaign. Rubenson and Loewen oversaw the execution of the expèriment. 
The analysis was performed collectively. Loewen wrote the first dmft of the 
paper. Subsequent dmfts have been perfor-med equally between Rubenson and 
Loewen. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Does direct mail work? Political campaign managers certainly believe it 
does. In nearly every type of political campaign at every level of compe-
tition, sorne form of mail is used. Sometimes this mail serves the purpose 
of outlining a candidate's position, or casting an opponent's position in an 
unfavorable light. At other times it is used for fundraising. It sometimes 
serves a mobilizing function, encouraging potential voters to participate in 
an election. Most often it takes up several of these tasks at once. Whatever 
its purpose, there seems little question that direct mail is a frequently used 
tool in politics generally. 
The ubiquity of direct mail is easily explained. It is a relatively cheap 
manner in which to reach a large number of voters. Moreover, when its design 
incorporates individuallevel data on a voter's preferences or concerns (or even 
their consumer habits and financial status) it promises still greater potential 
effectiveness. Most importantly, direct mail allows parties or candidates to 
personally connect with voters through poteritially highly targeted messages. 
This combinàtion of low cost and tailored messaging should only increase the 
importance of direct mail in the future. Despite this, the persuasive effects 
of political direct mail have not undergone systematic academic study. The 
question remains: ls direct mail an effective tool for persuading voters? More 
precisely, is direct mail an effective tool to persuade elites to support a party 
leadership candidate who holds controversial positions? 
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This paper presents evidence from a field experiment into the effectiveness 
of direct mail in changing elite vote intentions and increasing a candidate's 
likeability. As such it speaks to two literatures. First, a growing literature of 
field experimental research into the effectiveness of modern campaign tech-
niques. Second, to an important literature on the strategic communication 
of leaders. The experiment we present was conducted in cooperation with 
the Michael Ignatieff campaign in the 2006 Liberal Party of Canada lead-
ership race. To our knowledge, this represents the first field experiment in 
Canadian poli tics and the first within the context of leadership elections. 
It marks, then,an extension of both geography (Canada) and, more im-
portantly, do main (elite politics). As we discuss in more detail below, the 
Ignatieff campaign provides us with an interesting and unique case for testing 
the persuasive power of direct mail. Ignatieff was a candidate who sought to 
change the direction of the Liberal Party on several important and contro-
versial issues. Other candidates who were doser to the Liberal consensus had 
( the job of convincing delegates that they were the best person to manage and 
implement that consensus. Ignatieff had to not only win over delegates to 
the view that he was the best person to le ad the party; he also took up the 
more difficult task of persuading delegates to adopt new, non-mainstream 
positions on core policies. He did so boldly and unambiguously. 
The findings are striking. Contrary to campaigns' beliefs about the ben-
efits of their st rat egy, for at least one frontrunning candidate, there was 
no positive effect from communicating controversial campaign positions di-
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rectly. To the contrary, we find evidence of a negative persuasion effect. 
, 
These findings correspond with other recent studies demonstrating contmst 
(Chong and Druckman, 2007 a) or boomerang effects (Peffiey and Hurwitz, 
2007; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Johnson et al., 2003). Taken together, 
these findings a warning about leaders' persuasion efforts: Ineffective 
or weak arguments do not risk merely falling on deaf ears. Rather, they carry 
the risk of ""o'v(.hOJ."'" opposition to a candidate or policy among those who 
are initially opposed or ambivalent. While these findings do not conclusively 
demonstrate the disutility of direct mail or the inability of leaders to per-
suade, they do raise important questions about the conditions under which 
leaders can change the minds of elites. 
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by situating our research 
in existing literature on leadership communication and literature on the per-
suasive capacities of direct mail. We then briefly discuss the race in which 
the experiment occurred. In section four we outline our field experiment 
and justify its use in comparison to other inferential techniques. Section five 
presents our model and results. After discussing our findings, we conclude. 
4.2 Direct Mail and Persuasion 
As in other jurisdictions, direct mail is ubiquitous in Canadian political cam-
paigns. Older evidence suggesting the importance of printed materials, such 
as that presented by Paltiel (1974), has been confirmed by recent analyses 
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of modern campaigns. Cart y and Eagles (2005), in particular, have docu-
mented the importance of printed advertising for modern local campaigns. 
Using data from the 2000 Canadian federal election, they observe that print 
advertising was the largest expense of candidates in aIl parties. While this 
material en compasses much more than just direct mail, our own conversations 
with local and national campaign managers suggest that direct mail makes 
up a large portion of this spending and often the largest. Clearly, it is a tool 
frequently drawn from a campaign manager's toolbox. This trend promises 
to continue as parties become increasingly adept at collecting individuallevel 
data and mining it for insights which can then be leveraged through direct 
contact with individual voters (see Cart y, Cross and Yo~ng, 2000; Gibson 
and Rommele, 2001; Norris, 2003, and for a more popular account Wells, 
2006). 
The importance of direct mail in general elections is probably surpassed 
by its importance in party leadership races. Whether conventions or direct 
elections, leader~hip races seem especially amenable to this campaign tool. 
These races are often paid little sustained attention by the media, especially 
for less competitive candidates. They tend to feature candidates who are of-
ten difficult to distinguish on ideological or policy grounds (Vavreck, Spiliotes 
and Fowler, 2002). Moreover, party leadership campaigns are increasingly 
large scaled affairs in which it is difficult for candidates to personally reach 
every member in the electorate through face-to-face meetings (Cross, 1996, 
312). At the same time, the number of eligible voters (i.e. party members) 
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relative to the typical budget does make it possible to reach each voter by 
mail, often multiple times. Mail thus allows a candidate to speak directly to 
each party member or delegate. In races with many candidates, persuasion 
becomes a principal activity as campaigns seek to build coalitions which can 
deliver a majority of delegates or voters over a series of ballots. Direct mail 
plays an important role in this persuasion. Wearing's (1988) accounts of the 
1976 and 1983 Progressive Conservative and 1984 Liberal leadership conven-
tion campaigns and Flanagan's (2003) account of the 2002 Harper campaign 
for the leadership of the Canadian Alliance provide convincing evidence of 
the importance that campaign managers assigned to direct mail in these 
races-an importance that we think generalizes fairly easily to aIl leadership 
races and elite politics more generally. Whether direct mail actually works, 
however, remains unclear. 
In contrast to the political science literature, marketing is one field in 
which direct mail has been extensively studied. As a result, a substantial 
and broad literature exists. Among its findings, the marketing literature in-
cludes theory and knowledge about the elements of direct mail which make 
for success (eg Nash, 1984; EIsner, Krafft and Huchzermeier, 2004), how di-
rect mail campaigns (especially coupons) affect purchasing (Bawa and Shoe-
maker, 1989; Bult and Wansbeek, 1995), how they affect incremental sales 
and how direct mail campaigns can be optimized based on past purchasing 
information (Allenby, Leone and Jen, 1999; Neslin, Henderson and Quelch, 
1985). Moreover, much of this literature includes an experimental element. 
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For example, Irons, Litle and Klein (1983) present a met a analysis of sixt y 
field experiments on the effects of coupons on purchasing habits. 
We can learn clear method6logical lessons from this literature, particu-
larly about the analytical power of field experiments. But despite this, it is 
unclear how much we can apply the lessons of consumer behavior to elec-
toral politics. The decision to consume more goods or change the mix of 
goods that an individual consumes does not accurately reflect the nature of 
political choice in which a decision is forced (you have to vote at a certain 
time) , zero sum (you have to vote for one candidate and not others) and 
essentially civic (in that one is likely, in making one's choice, to think about 
more than self interest or the meeting of a need). In short, individuals may 
bring a substantially different calculus to vote choice, one which is respon-
sive in a different way-or not at alI-to direct mail efforts. What is more, 
direct mail may vary systematically in its design from that in the commer-
cial world. Accordingly, we look principally to evidence within poli tics and 
political science. 
Whether in general elections or leadership contests, there is a lack of 
systematic evidence on the effectiveness of political direct mail. Examin-
ing direct mail effects using existing data is problematic for two reasons. 
First, even if we can assume that party and campaign spending is measured 
consistently and correctly (Ansolabehere and Gerber, 1994), its accounting 
is often not precise enough to identify direct mail outlays specifically (see 
Loewen, 2005, for a Canadian account). Second, even if we could observe the 
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different types of spending, we could not easily extract strong causal state-
ments from these observations. While we discuss this at greater length in 
the next section, the basic problem is easily stated: Because spending deci-
sions and communications strategies are not developed randomly, we cannot 
determine if the effects of campaign practices are a function of the types and 
extent of the method or the unobserved factors which influence campaigns 
to choose sorne methods over others. This problem is far from unique to 
Canada or Canadian political science. lndeed, there are many examples of 
observational research on campaign effectiveness that are confronted with this 
empirical problem (for British examples see Johnston and Pattie, 1998; Pat-
tie, Johnston and Fieldhouse, 1995; Whiteley andSeyd, 1994, for American 
examples see Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; Vavreck, Spiliotes and Fowler, 
2002). What is required is sorne form of inquiry not subject to Leamer's "in-
ferential monsters lurking beyond our immediate field of vision" (1983, 83). 
That is, sorne form of inquiry where we can reasonably limit the number 
of possible explanatory variables and focus on one in particular-i.e. direct 
mail. 
A growing line of research has sought to confront this problem of unob-
served heterogeneity in campaign effects by engaging in field experiments. 
This research pro gram has been both wide and deep. It covers several differ-
ent campaign methods including direct mail, door-to-door canvassing, var-
ious tèlephone techniques and leafleting; and it reaches down into several 
types of elections, several different types of campaigns and several different 
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locales. The most important feature of these experiments is the random as-
signment of a treatment of interest to a well defined population, followed by 
a statistical analysis of the effects of the treatment (Green and Gerber, 2004, 
11-22). While these studies have not been without criticism-particularly 
in terms of execution and estimation (eg rmai, 2005)-they have allowed for 
strong conclusions to be drawn on the effects of direct mail, especially as 
it relates to mobilization. Following Green and Gerber's (2004) summary, 
while non-partisan direct mail seems to increase turnout, mail which ex-
presses opposition to a candidate do es not seem to have an effect. Partisan 
mail is effective in mobilizing partisans but not in bringing "swing voters" 
to the polls. On balance, the mobilizing effects of direct mail appear highly 
conditional and modest. 
Less work has been undertaken on the persuasive effects of partisan di-
rect mail. One early study examines the effects of a single candidate mailing 
in a weakly contested Democratic congressional primary (Miller and Robyn, 
1975). It found no effect, though it was conducted over a rather small sam-
pIe. Bositis, Baer and Miller (1985) conducted a unique experiment on timing 
and order effects in a Committeeman endorsement letter. Following up an 
election with a survey, they found persuasion to vary across message tim-
ing and order. Gerber (2004) single handedly expanded the field, conducting 
field experiments with five different campaigns during the 1999-2000 election 
cycle. These experiments-conducted during amayoral race, a New Jersey 
state assembly election, astate legislative race in Connecticut, a Congres-
130 
sional primary and a Congressional general election--examined the effect of 
campaign mailings on vote totals, which we take to be a test of the persuasive 
capacities of direct mail. In sorne cases, post-election surveys were used to 
estimate effects while in others they were measured by ward-Ievel differences 
in vote totals. The results generally show that while incumbent mailings had 
little effect (except in primaries), challenger mailings were effective in sorne 
cases. 
Taken together with the mobilization literature, it is difficult to arrive at 
a firm conclusion on the effectiveness of direct mail. Its utility is contingent 
both on the type of race and the type of candidate. As a consequence, 
these results do not directly inform our expectations of the persuasiveness of 
direct mail in a leadership race. However, they do demonstrate two things. 
First, we can effectively ascertain the causal properties of campaign methods 
through field experiments. Second, at sorne of the daims of those who 
advocate direct mail appear to be false. The mobilizing capacity of direct 
mail has, at best, been overestimated by its advocates. Might it be the same 
for its persuasive properties? 
While proponents of direct mail maintain that it serves to persuade voters 
to support the candidate sending the mail, there is evidence that attitudes 
, and opinions can be resistant to such attempts, under certain circumstances 
(Knowles and Linn, 2003). As Peffiey and Hurwitz (2007) point out, this is 
particularly the case wh en it cornes to contentious issues that people hold in-
tense attitudes about. In these instances it can be difficult to move opinions, 
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as attitudes can be resistant to attempts at pers~asion. 
There is also the possibility that arguments aimed at swaying individu-
aIs' opinions can have the effect of moving attitudes in the opposite direc-
tion to that intended by the argument. That is, receiving more information 
about, say, a candidate can make that candidate less attractive to certain 
voters. Chong and Druckman study the impact of competing "frames", or 
arguments, on opinion formation and find evidence of such contrast effects 
whereby, "weak frames will backfire in the face of strong competition by 
pushing the recipient further in the direction of the st ronger frame than if 
he or she had been exposed only to the strong frame" (2007 a, 7). Similarly, 
the results uncovered by Peffiey and Hurwitz in their study of attitudes to-
wards the death penalty among blacks and whites in the United States, are 
illustrative of similar reactance or boomerang effects (2007, 13). Both Chong 
and Druckman (2007a) and Peffiey and Hurwitz (2007), as weIl as others (eg 
Johnson et al., 2003), make the point that such negative effects of persuasion 
attempts are most likely to occur among engaged, knowledgeable citizens; 
what Lodge and Taber refer to as motivated r'easoneTS (2000). These peo-
ple are those whom we would expect to latch onto confirmatory information 
while subjecting contradictory information to increased scrutiny in a man-
ner which confirms their predispositions or increases their stock of negative 
considerations. We argue that delegates to a leadership convention are prime 
candidates for such a label. In many cases, they are long-time party mem-
bers. They have likely invested significant time and money in securing their 
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spots as delegates. And they are likely to feel strongly about the candidates 
involved in the election. 
Given delegates' levels of sophistication and commitment, the stakes at-
tached to communicating information become an the higher for candidates. 
This is even more so if the candidate happens to also be a polarizing one. 
While Ignatieff was considered by most to be the clear front runner in the 
race, on many salient issues he adopted positions apart from the median of the 
activists of the Liberal Party. In his campaign material, including his direct 
mail, Ignatieff called for the eventual constitutional recognition of Quebec 
as a "nation", for the righting of the "fiscal imbalance" and for continued 
Canadian involvement in a war in Afghanistan. In addition, his support 
for the 2003 US led invasion of Iraq was weIl publicized in Canada. These 
were aIl positions outside the historical and recent mainstream of the Liberal 
Party. For example, while Ignatieff support.ed the ext.ension of Canada's mil-
it.ary mission in Afghanist.an to at least 2009, this view was shared by only 
36 percent. of Liberal delegat.es from out.side Quebec. Fifty-seven percent of 
delegates believed Canada's involvement should eit.her end immediat.ely or 
in 2007. Similarly, only 37 percent. of delegat.es outside of Quebec support.ed 
a parliamentary resolut.ion t.o recognize Quebec as a nat.ion wit.hin Canada. 
Ignatieff's posit.ion for constitutional recognition was much stronger than a 
simple parliamentary resolution and thus llkely even supported (Strate-
Counsel, 2006). 
Aside from his support for t.he Iraq war, the policy positions articulated 
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by Ignatieff in the leadership race were not weIl known before the start of 
the campaign. Indeed, Ignatieff was better known for his record as an inter-
national human rights scholar and activist and an advocate of centrist so-
cial policy-positions much more in line with the Liberal Party mainstream. 
Thus, Ignatieff sought not merely to lead the party, but to move it in a 
certain direction. His candidacy needed to not only inform delegates of his 
views; he needed to persuade people to change their views. Thus, clearly 
communicating a policy direction outside the party mainstream was a risky 
strategy. It is in this respect that Ignatieff's gamble provides interesting and 
unique insight into questions of strategie communication. 
A growing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies of communica-
tion available to leaders (Zeckhauser, 1969; Shepsle, 1970, 1972; Aragonés 
and Neeman, 2000; Meirowitz, 2005; Dewan and Myatt, 2008). There are 
a number of dimensions along which su ch communication can be char acter-
ized. For instance, one might think of communication as varying between 
of clarity and obfuscation. That is, a leader can deliver her mes-
sage with varying levels of precision. Moreover, a leader's judgment about 
policies-the substance of her communication-can reftect more or less "sense 
of direction" (Dewan and Myatt, 2008, 2). 
It might seem obvious that a leader is better off wh en she communicates 
clearly. However, numerous scholars have nùted that ambiguity and obfus-
cation have strategic advantages (eg Zeckhauser, 1969; Shepsle, 1970, 1972). 
Shepsle points out that, " ... observed ambiguity often typicaIly involves pre-
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cisely those issues on which the election hinges" (1972, 555) and underlines 
"the politician's advantage in speaking 'half truths' and in varying his ap-
peals with variations in audience and political climate" (1972, 559). Aragonés 
and Neeman (2000) provide a model in which candidates opt for ambiguity 
in order to remain flexible and because it allows them to broaden their ap-
peal. Dewan and Myatt follow in this vein and argue that "attention-seeking 
leaders will intentionally obfuscate" (2008, 9). 
As we have argued, Ignatieff presented a set of policies that deviated from 
the Liberal mainstream; and he did so with sorne measure of clarity. There 
was no mistaking where he stood on controversial issues such as Afghanistan 
or national unity. And, as it turned out, delegates were not convinced by his 
"judgment" or "sense of direction" (Dewan and Myatt, 2008). The theoreti-
calliterature on leadership communication and strategie ambiguity suggests 
that leaders such as Ignatieff ought to equivocate and obfuscate in delivering 
their message. Dewan and Myatt's (2008) model illustrates that when com-
munication skills are endogenous (leaders can manipulate the clarity of theii 
message), the relative influence amongst the best communicators is greater 
for those with lower variance in their judgment. In other words, in the case 
of the Liberal leadership candidates, while Ignatieff was certainly a good 
communicator, his appeal was circumscribed by the perception among dele-
gates that he would take the party in the wrong direction. From this arises 
our empirical question: when elite voters are confronted with a controversial 
position via direct mail, do they become more likely to support a candidate 
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or less likely? That is, do es direct mail persuade, or does it merely inform 
and lead to possibly negative effects? 
After describing the race for the Liberal leadership, we turn to an exam-
ination of whether 19natieff's gamble paid off. That is, whether direct mail 
had the desired effect of persuading voters or if voters in this election were re-
sistant to the information presented in campaign mail-or worse, susceptible 
to reactance. 
4.3 The Race 
After losing the January 2006 federaI election, Prime Minister Paul Martin 
( 
resigned as parliamentary leader of the Liberal Party of Canada. In the sub-
sequent weeks the party outlined the conditions of its leadership selection 
process-much of which was predetermined by the party's constitution. A 
leadership convention was held in Montreal on December 3, 2006. Delegates 
to the convention were elected from among party members. In addition to 
ex-officio delegates who were guaranteed a place at the convention, the reg-
ular delegates from each federal electoral district were allotted to leadership 
candidates according to the total preferences of ail members in that electoral 
district. On the first ballot non-ex-officio delegates were thus obliged to vote 
for the candidate to whom they were pledged. lndeed, they received marked 
ballots upon their arrivaI at the convention. This apportionment process 
occurred at a "Super Weekend" at the end of September. Only those party 
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members who were of good standing as of July 1, 2006 were allowed to vote 
in the Super Weekend. 
The race was nothing if not exciting. More than twenty names were 
identified as potential candidates and eleven officially entered. By the time 
of the delegate selection meetings the field had narrowed to eight candidates. 
Michael Ignatieff was the clear front runner, obtaining the support of about 
30 percent of pledged delegates, as well as many ex-officios (see Table 4.1). 
Ignatieff, recently returned from more than twenty years outside the country 
as an academic and journalist, was generally seen as being on the right of the . 
party. He was a polarizing candidate. Bob Rae, a former Premier of Ontario 
(as the leader of the social democratic New Democratie Party), was the clear 
second place candidate. He could also be regarded as polarizing. Rounding 
out the top four were Gerard Kennedy, a former Ontario provincial cabinet 
minister, and Stéphane Dion, a former federal cabinet minister (and p6litical 
scientist) known far more for intellectual battles with sovereigntistjseparatist 
leaders in Quebec than for his political panache. The bottom four comprised 
Ken Dryden, Joe Volpe, Scott Brison and Martha Hall Findlay. 
To the surprise of many, Dion would eventually win the leadership. Re-
sults from the pre-convention delegate selection and the four ballots at the 
convention are presented in Table 4.1. Dion finished in third place on the 
first ballot, just two delegates ahead of Kennedy. He would receive Kennedy's 
endorsement after widening his lead .on the second ballot. On the strength 
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Table 4.1: 2006 Liberal Party leadership election results (%) 
Candidate Pre convention 1"'t ballot 2nd ballot 3rd ballot 4th ballot 
delegates 
Ignatieff 1,377 (29.3) 1,412 (29.3) 1,481 (31.6) 1,660 (34.5) 2,084 
Rae 943 (20.1) 977 (20.3) 1,132 (24.1) 1,375 (28.5) 
Kennedy 820 (17.5) 854 (17.7) 884 (18.8) 
Dion 754 (16.1) 856 (17.8) 974 (20.8) 1,782 (37.0) 2,521 
Dryden 238 (5.1) 238 (4.9) 219 (4.7) 
Volpe 226 (4.8) 156 (3.2) 
Brison 181 (3.5) 192 (4.0) 
Hall Findlay 46 (1.0) 130 (2.7) 
Undeclared 112 (2.4) 
Total votes 4,697 (100.0) 4,815 (100.0) 4,690 (100.0) 4,817 (100.0) 4,605 
of that hand-tipping he would vault past both Ignatieff and Rae on the third 
ballot, thus eliminating Rae. He defeated Ignatieff on the fourth and final 
ballot, receiving 54.7 percent of the votes to Ignatieff's 45.3 percent. Rather 
than polarizing delegates, as the two front-runners had, Dion was successful 
in portraying himself as a safe second-choice. Whether by luck or design, he 
appeared a master of convention politics. 
Our experiment was situated within the period between the election of 
delegates and the convention in Montreal, what Wearing calls the "second 
stage" of delegated conventions (1988). This period provided a crucial test 
of the persuasive ability of campaigns. Rather than selling memberships and 
encouraging supporters to stand as delegates, campaigns in this period of 
the pro cess were dedicated to ensuring delegates attended the convention; 
and, crucially, to persuading delegates for other candidates to select their 
candidate as their next choice should their preferred leadership candidate 
fall off the ballot or withdraw. Among many tactics, direct mail played an 
(45.3) 
(54.7) 
(100.0) 
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important role in this critical period. For example, the Dion campaign sent a 
DVD featuring a series of short interviews with their candidate. The Ignatieff 
campaign sent a 40-page bilingual poHcy book entitled "Agenda for Nation 
Building: Liberal Leadership for the 21st Century." l The book outlined 
in unusual detail Ignatieff's policy on the economy, the environment, the 
constitution, national unit y and foreign affairs. 2 The Ignatieff campaign also 
sent out a simple col or brochure summarizing Ignatieff's positions. As we 
outlined above, Ignatieff's stand on many of these issues was in contrast to 
the prèvailing opinion within the Liberal Party. 
4.4 The Experimental Study 
Our experiment consisted of two components: First, a randomized program 
of direct mail from a front-running campaign conducted over a subset of 
elected delegates in the last week of October and first week of November, 
2006. Second, an academic mail-back survey of the same delegates which 
measured, among other things, their likeability evaluations of each candidate 
as well as their preferences between the various leadership candidates. We 
describe each in more detail below. 
lThe title on the French side of the book was "Bâtir notre nation: le leadership libéral 
pour le 21e siècle." 
2Electronic versions of both documents can be seen at http://1JIN.politics. 
ryerson. ca/rubenson/downloads/IgnatiefCbook .pdf and http://1J1J1J . politics. 
ryerson.ca/rubenson/downloads/english.pdf. 
\ 
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4.4.1 The Experiment 
Our experiment relied on a partnership with the Michael Ignatieff campaign. 
After the selection of delegates at the end of September, we randomly se-
lected a subset of 800 delegates from those who had a current address on 
the official party list of delegates. 3 In addition to restricting our sample to 
those delegates who had addresses, we also excluded Quebec, Manitoba and 
British Columbia.4 Among these 800 delegates, we identified those who had 
not pledged to support Ignatieff at delegate selection meetings, reducing our 
sample to 567. Among the se remaining delegates, we randomly assigned 100 
to receive two pieces of mail from the Ignatieff campaign and 200 to receive 
one piece of mail. 5 AIl those who received mail received a copy of Ignatieff's 
40-page policy book in the last week of October. Those who were assigned to 
receive a second pie ce of mail also received a copy of a color brochure in the 
first week of November. This material was developed by the campaign and 
was identical to that sent to aIl delegates not included in the experiment. 
By randomly assigning mail we (theoreticaIly) ensured that the reception of 
mail was not a function of a respondent's personal characteristics or prefer-
ences. As with conventional random assignment in a laboratory, this affords 
us much analytical leverage. 
3This represents approximately 16 percent of delegates. 
4Delegates from Quebec were excluded as they were subject ta a different ad campaign 
by the Ignatieff campaign. Manitoba and British Columbia were excluded from the party's 
delegate list at the time because of incomplete Iists or disputes between several 
campaigns over the status of various delegates. 
5We describe our treatment assignment procedure in more detail in Annexe E. 
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4.4.2 The Survey 
One week after the second wave of mailing, we mailed each delegate wit'hin 
our subset an academic survey from the Department of Politics at Ryerson 
University. By sending the survey under the coyer of the University, we 
concealed any connection between the survey and the experiment. Moreover, 
we excluded any mention of the field experiment on our respective academic 
websites. The survey included a postage-paid return envelope, as well as 
an ethics disclaimer and short introduction. The survey obviously made 
no mention of the experiment, though it did include recall questions on the 
reception of direct mail from campaigns since the selection of delegates. Most 
pertinent to our study, the survey included questions about preferences for, 
and evaluations of candidates, which allowed us to test the persuasive effects 
of direct mail. 
The advantages of combining a survey and an experiment become clear 
when we consider the typical alternative approach to studying the impact 
of campaigns on individual voters, i.e. a survey which may or may not 
include contextual information about the campaign (for leadership campaign 
examples see Perlin, 1988; Stewart, 1997; Vavreck, Spiliotes and Fowler, 2002; 
Bartels, 1987). As Gerber and Green (2000); Green and Gerber (2004) have 
argued, relying on a survey alone to gage the effects of direct mail-and 
other campaign contacts more generally-suffers from two problems. First, 
individual respondents are demonstrably poor at recalling whether or not 
they have received mail from a campaign. For example, our survey included 
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a recall question which asked delegates to identify from which campaigns 
they had received mail since the conclusion of delegate selection meetings. 
Because we know which delegates received mail from the Ignatieff campaign 
we were able to measure the level of error in delegate recall. Of those who did 
not receivemail from the campaign, 85 percent correctly recalled that they 
received no mail. However, 15 percent did report receiving mail. The case 
is more grave with those who did receive mail, with less than two-thirds (64 
percent) correctly recalling receiving mail. Moreover, based on a question-
wording experiment embedded in our survey, we found that recall was not 
improved by giving sorne delegates a further prompt identifying the types of 
mail they may have received.6 Accordingly, even with a carefully designed 
survey we would risk serious measurement error in identifying who received 
direct mail from a campaign. Our study avoids this pitfall because we know 
to whom the campaign sent mail. 7 
Second, political campaigns are often strategic in their targetirig of direct 
mail. Mailings are targeted and tailored to refiect a campaign's beliefs about 
the recipient. For example, campaigns may be more likely to send mail 
6The question asked "Do you recall receiving any postal mail (snai! mail) from any 
of the campaigns since the Delegate Election Meetings at the end of September?" The 
question wording experiment then added "For example, have any campaigns sent you 
mail soliciting support for later ballots, or telling you about events that their candidate is 
holding in your area?". 
7We also know that the mail at least landed in their mailbox. We used the same 
addresses for the surveys as for themail.soit is not possible that a delegate received and 
responded to our survey without receiving the mail. While delegates may very weil be 
selective about what they choose to read (see Barlett et al., 1974), we can be certain that 
we are at least dealing with cases in which they had the opportunity to read the mail sent 
to their address. 
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to those whom they believe are at least open to supporting the campaign. 
By merely observing the relationship between direct mail and behaviors, 
we cannot know whether any direct mail effect is the result of the mail 
itself or the individual in question being predisposed to support the party 
or candidate. Even with a bevy of control variables this problem cannot 
be easily solved statistically, if at all (Gerber, Green and Kaplan, 2004). 
However, in the case of our experiment we know that the assignment of 
mail was random and thus uncorrelated with individual characteristics. Any 
observed effèct of mail on leader ratings or preference orderings is likely the 
result of mail. 
In comparison to the experiments outlined above, one caveat is in or der. 
. Those experiments typically test the effects of a treatment-direct mail for 
example-on a directly observable behavior such as voting as determined by 
an official record. Our experiment, by contrast, still relies on estimates of 
an effect drawn from a survey. As we could not peer inside the ballot boxes 
at the party convention, we are left to ascertain the effects of direct mail 
through our survey questions. We are thus left open to many of the problems 
associated with survey responses. However, we are not confronted with the 
more fundamental problems of respondent recall or the strategie allotment 
of a treatment. As a result of this, the effects we observe are "real" to the 
extent that surveys capture "real" aspects of delegates' considerations and 
evaluations in the run up to the convention. 
Our final sample includes 161 respondents, a response rate of 28 percent. 
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This sample is evenly balanced between those who did receivemail (81) and 
those who did not (80). Treatment is unrelated to the pledged support of 
delegates (X2 = 7.78, p = 0.35), province of residence (X2 = 3.73, p = 0.81), 
or delegate typé (X2 = 8.95, p = 0.26). Most importa~tly, survey response 
is unrelated to our 3-category treatment assignment (X2 = 0.61, p = 0.74). 
4.5 Results and Discussion 
In a leadership race such as the one we study here, direct mail has two princi-
pal aims. First, campaigns want to make their candidate more likeable while 
at the same time decreasing voters' positive evaluations of rival candidates. 
Second, and more importa,nt, in multi-ballot elections, campaigns want to 
persuade voters to shift their support to the campaign's candidate. In other 
words, the aim is to convince voters to change their preference rankings of 
candidates. We examine the effects of direct mail across two different mea-
sures in order to assess its effectiveness in achieving each of these aims. In 
each case, we compare those who did and did not receivemail using relatively 
simple models (Achen, 2002).9 Rather than specifying complicated models, 
we rely on the power of random assignment. 
We first measure whether those who received direct mail evaluate the like-
8Delegates are classified by the party according to gender, age and aboriginal status. 
gOur treatment regime specified that sorne individuals receive two pieces and others 
one piece. Because of our relatively small n, we have collapsed these two treatments into 
one in the analysis. Our substantive results do not change when we consider those who 
received two pieces of mail separately. We note again that ail those in treatment received 
the detailed policy book. 
, 
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ability of the eight candidates differently than those who did not. The expec-
tation of those sending direct mail-at least for the campaign in question-
was that mailers would increase positive evaluations of their own candidate 
and reduce positive evaluations of other candidates. Table 4.2 reports the 
results of t-tests on differences in the mean rating of candidates with and 
without mail. We use a conventional 0-100 rating scale. Initially we only 
considered one-sided hypotheses in the direction expected by the campaign. 
That is, Ignatieff mail should make Ignatieff more likeable and other candi-
dates less likeable. As is clear from the results in Table 4.2, we find little 
evidence of such positive effects for direct mail. Only in the case of Ken 
Dryden is the test statistically significant and in the expected direction. Re-
ceiving mail from the Ignatieff campaign appears to have caused delegates 
to reduce their positive evaluations of Dryden. However, those who received 
mail did not give higher ratings to Ignatieff, on average. Moreover, sorne 
of the results are statistically significant in the opposite direction to that 
anticipated by the campaign. In the case of Dion, Brison and Volpe, it ap-
pears that direct mail from the Ignatieff campaign increased the likeability 
of these candidates. On the whole, receiving mail did not move the opinions 
of those who were not already pledged to support Ignatieff in the expected 
and desired direction. 10 
lOWe have also estimated these effects with separate OLS regressions for each candidate 
with leader rating on the lefthand side and mail and a small number of control variables 
on the righthand side. Our results do not change. 
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Table 4.2: Effects of Ignatieff mail on average leadership candidate ratingsa 
Candidate Mean rating with Mean rating with N 
no mail (s.d.) mail (s.d.) p-valueb Mail (No mail) 
Michael Ignatieff 46.3 (32.6) 47.8 (33.7) 0.38 75 (80) 
Bob Rae 61.4 (33.6) 63.6 (33.9) 0.66 75 (81) 
Gerard Kennedy 73.6 (26.1) 73.9 (26.7) 0.53 74 (80) 
Stéphane Dion 72.6 (23.7) 77.3 (21.4) 0.90 75 (79) 
Ken Dryden 60.7 (26.0) 54.7 (26.9) 0.08 72 (79) 
Joe Volpe 15.5 (22.6) 20.8 (25.5) 0.91 70 (79) 
Scott Brison 42.4 (27.5) 54.3 (26.1) . 0.99 67 (76) 
Martha Hall Findlay 49.5 (27.0) 49.7 (27.9) 0.51 65 (78) 
a Note: Calculations of difference rely on unpaired t-tests with an assumption of unequal variance. 
b For Ignatieff ratings, the p-value is from the onesided alternative hypothesis that 6 > 0; for ail other 
candidate ratings the alternative hypothesis is 6 < o. 
As a consequence of the multiballot nature of a competitive delegated 
convention, moving a candidate up in delegates' preference rankings is a 
principal objective for campaigns. Indeed, a particular feature of a contest 
such as this one is that candidates have little choice but to communicate 
with delegates supporting rivaIs in order to entice them to change their mind 
on later ballots, contrary to general elections where a candidate can choose 
to not speak to a large portion of the electorate. Given that the final ballot 
pairing in this race was far from obvious, campaigns were compelled to send 
mail to aIl delegates. For a potentially polarizing candidate such as Ignatieff 
this presents a dilemma. He would want to get his message out but that 
message may in fact be damaging to him among delegates who have an 
antipathy toward him. 
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Table 4.3: Effects of Ignatieff mail on delegates' preference orderinga 
Model1 Model2 
Variable Odds ratio p-value Odds ratio p-value 
Ignatieff mail 0.642 0.07 0.590 0.05 
(0.156) (0.160) 
Attention to the race 0.843 0.00 
(0.046) 
Interest in the race 1.169 0.14 
(0.124) 
Senior 1.018 0.95 
(0.262) 
Youth 1.586 0.36 
(0.791 ) 
Female 1.043 0.89 
(0.321) 
eut 1 -0.524 -0.467 
(0.157) (0.688) 
eut 2 0.583 0.659 
(0.143) (0.733) 
eut 3 1.186 1.275 
(0.159) (0.734) 
Wald 3.26 34.90 
Prob > X2 0.071 0.000 
N 160 160 
a Note: Odds ratios are from ordered logit models, clustering on province; 
robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Our results suggest that receiving direct mail from the Ignatieff campaign 
seems to have done little to achieve the objective of moving Ignatieff up in 
delegates' preference orderings. Quite the opposite, receiving mail appears 
to have moved Ignatieff down in the preference rankings of sorne delegates. 
Table 4.3 presents results from two ordered logit models, both of which take 
Ignatieff's position in a delegate's preference ranking as the dependent vari-
able. We constructed the variable from three questions. The first asked del-
egates to identify their second choice. The second asked delegates to identify 
their third choice. The final question asked delegates to identify any candi-
dates for whom they would never vote. We are thus left with four categories: 
Never Choose ~ Ambivalent .....-7 Third Choice ~ Second Choice. The first 
model includes only a dummy variable indicating whether the delegate re-
ceived mail from the Ignatieff campaign. ll The second model adds a 0 to 10 
measure of a respondent's interest in the campaign, a 0 to 10 measure of the 
respondent's attention paid to the campaign and dummy variables indicating 
whether the respondent was a youth delegate, a senior or a female delegate 
to improve the precision of our estimates. 12 
The results in our first model suggest a negative effect of mail on pref-
erence orderings. The odds of making Ignatieff second choice versus aH the 
other options are 35.8 percent lower for those who received mail than for 
11 We present robust standard errors calculated over provincial clusters. As campaigns 
were organized provincially, we want to control for unobserved differences across provinces. 
12Interest and attention appear: unrelated to the reception of mail. Interest: (3 = 
-0.35,p = .20; Attention: (3 = -0.24,p = .26. 
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those who did not receive mail. After controlling for attention and interest 
paid to the race and delegate demographics, the reception of mail continues 
to have a strong negative effect on the vote choice: For delegates who re-
ceived mail, the odds of making Ignatieff their second choice over all other 
options are 41 percent lower than for those who did not receive the mail. Our 
second model provides a better fit of the data, a more accurate classification 
of cases and a less ambiguously significant effect for direct mail. It is an 
effect, however, quite contrary to the campaign's expectations. 
Taken together, these results lead us to a clear conclusion. In the face of 
crystallized preferences, receiving one or two mailings from a campaign was 
not enough to positively alter delegates' assessments or intentions. Rather, if 
it had any systematic effect it was in making delegates more negative towards 
Ignatieff's candidacy. This finding is consistent with recent work highlighting 
contmst (Chong and Druckman, 2007 a) or boomemng effects (Peffley and 
Hurwitz, 2007; Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2001; Johnson et aL, 2003). These 
studies argue that when individuals are motivated, engaged and hold intense 
prior views on issues and candidates, attempts at persuasion can backfire. 
By merely informing voters, Ignatieff gave them more reasons to vote against 
him. 
In the case of Ignatieff's mail, there was much on which motivated rea-
soners could take hold. His positions on foreign policy, the constitution and 
fiscal federalism were well outside of the mainstream of the party he was seek-
ing to lead. Presented with clear evidence of this, delegates who harbored 
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prior neutral or negative dispositions about Ignatieff may have become even 
less disposed to his candidacy. This finding should give campaign managers 
pause. Political direct mail is a communication of a message which can have 
three effects. It can increase the appeal of a candidate; it can have no ef-
fect; or it can decrease the appeal of a candidate. If direct mail makes clear 
positions or attributes which voters find objectionable, it may have such a 
negative effect. For a candidate as polarizing as Michael Ignatieff, this final 
outcome appears to have been very real. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Given the mixed evidence on the mobilizing effects of direct mail and given 
the lack of evidence of positive persuasion effects, why do we observe cam-
paigns devoting substantial resources to this tool? We have three explana-
tions. First, campaign operatives are certain that these tools work. This 
message is rather consistently delivered in trade publications such as Carn-
paigns and Elections and in operative training sessions such as the "uni ver-
sities" which Canadian parties ho Id prior to elections. It only makes sense 
to use these tools, given the received 'wisdom. Second, it is not difficult to 
talk oneself int.o believing that a chosen campaign tool is working des pite a 
lack of evidènce of positive effects or evidence to the contrary. In the hub-
bub and stress of a campaign an operative will look for any affirmation that 
things are on the right track. A positive comment about direct mail can 
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quickly become enough to convince one of larger effects. Similarly, it is easy 
to become convinced of the importance of direct mail, when one knows it 
is being used by other campaigns. A third possibility exists-one which is 
less pessimistic about the analytical abilities of campaign managers. Even if 
direct mail were known to have very smaU effects, it may still be the most 
efficient use of resources. Volunteers cannot be bought, professional caU cen-
ters and automated caUs are demonstrably inefficient, a candidate can only 
work phones or shake hands a certain number of hours each day and time 
cannot be stretched. The implication is that a campaign which did not spend 
its remaining money on direct mail may not be able to spend it at aIl. More-
over, direct mail can be sent at a relatively low cost and can often be easily 
scaled up into repeated or more substantial mailings. Indeed, once a cam-
paign has settled on a message and obtained a list of voters, the marginal 
cost of mailing consists only of the cost of producing materials and postage. 
Knowing this, why would a campaign not spend whatever extra resources it 
had on printed material? Perceiving that direct mail has some effect, know-
ing that it is widely used in other campaigns and being able to send it rather 
economically, what campaign manager cou Id be expected to take the risk of 
not sen ding the mail ? 
vVe think a similar logic holds when explaining why Ignatieff would com-
municate such controversial positions. While a post-hoc analysis suggests 
that his positions were controversial and costly, the campaign may not have 
been able to conclude this during the course of the election. Having achieved 
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a front-runner status on the strength of his organization and the appeal of 
his personality, Ignatieff's campaign may have wrongly concluded that he 
was capable also of moving delegates' on a core set of issues. Or, they may 
have misread the appeal and popularity of these issues to begin with. Either 
way, only a more strategically adroit candidate, faced with the possibility 
of remaining silent and los'ing, could be convinced not to communicate posi-
tions which he believed to be both correct and compelling. Like the faU of 
a kingdom for the want of a nail, who would risk the loss of a campaign for 
the want of mail? Our results would suggest that even if direct mail is the 
most sensible expenditure given resource and time constraints, it may be a 
message better left unsent. 
Chapitre 5 
Testing the Power of 
Arguments with a 
Bradley-Terry Model (with 
Daniel Rubenson and Arthur 
Spirling) 
Under review at Public Opinion Quarterly. Loewen conceived of the experi-
ment. The experiment was designed by Loewen and Daniel Rubenson. Arthur ' 
Spirling developed the statistical model. Spir-ling and Loewen performed the 
Brad ley- Terry analysis. Loewen performed the conventional analysis. Loewen 
wrote the first draft of the article and Spirling wrote a second draft. Spiding, 
Rubenson and Loewen all completed the final drafts. 
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5 .1 Introduction 
Public opinion research and political science have long been centraUy con-
cerned with assessing the persuasive power of arguments (see, e.g., Aristotle 
. (322BCj1991) for an early treatment, and e.g. Mutz, Sniderman and Brody 
(1996) for a more recent discussion). For example, do es a caU for greater 
social welfare spending which appeals to a respondent's sense of equality 
elicit greater support than an appeal based on self-interest? Or, in a more 
oppositional manner, if a liberal argument for higher taxes is pitted against 
a conservative argument for lower taxation, which garners more support? 
By exposing respondents to various arguments in a controlled setting, public 
opinion research can tell us a lot about the foundations of preferences, as 
well as rhetorical and political suc cess in real world arenas. 
Elections are perhaps the most obvious arena in which issues and ar-
guments compete (see, e.g., Page, 1978; Erikson and Wright, 1997; An-
solabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2001). However, in this case, issues and 
arguments are often 'bundled' together such that it becomes difficult to deter-
mine the effects of issues and arguments independent of candidates. A more 
systematic discussion of positions is seen in referendums-formaI piebiscites 
in which voters directly convey their preferences on a binary choice that 
may concern anything from a new policy commitment to potentiallypro-
. . 
found constitution al changes. Since so much is at stake in such national 
reform votes, political scientists and public opinion researchers have an ob-
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vious interest in attempting to understand why citizens choose as they do. 
In sorne senses, this exercise ought to be empirically easier for referendums 
since, relative to elections, such votes are depersonalized: the candidate is 
an inanimate proposition, rather than an individual (or collection of individ-
uals). Vot ers thus receive more focused and explicit discussions of the issue 
at stake, with party and other (partisan) loyalties sometimes at crQss-cutting 
angles. 1 As a result, scholars have direct access to the explicit arguments and 
types of reasoning used to buttress a position, rather than having to piece 
together the more rhetorical, nebulous and eclectic sources of appeal that a 
particular party or politician uses. Using such political arguments and voter 
responses-observationally or experimentally-analysts ought to be able to 
teach us much about the outcomes of these events. 
Unfortunately, analysts of public opinion face pronounced methodological 
problems when attempting to assess the 'power' of different political argu-
ments. First, in observational studies, it is not always apparent precisely 
which arguments vot ers have received. Objectively measuring probable ex-
posure is difficult and asking voters to self-report their treatment is problem-
atic. Another solution is to take an experimental approach within a survey, 
and have subjects receive one of k total contrasting arguments, followed by 
a report on which argument theyagreed with. For increasing values of k, 
lConsider, for example, the UK's EEC referendum vote of 1975: Prime Minister Wilson 
and most of his cabinet united with the majority of Margaret Thatcher's Conservatives 
to recommend a Oyes' vote. Meanwhile, a left-wing contingent of Labour MPs~and sorne 
right-wing Tories~campaigned for a 'no'. 
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however, the size of the relevant sample on which inferences are based is 
quickly reduced. Alternatively, exposing each subject to a large number of 
arguments and then soliciting opinions on which is 'most convincing', risks a 
learning or cumulative effect where responses are a function of previous and 
current treatments in the series, rather than the content of the argument per 
se. 
These two problems are exacerbated if we wish to pit particular argu-
ments against one another in order to mimic the way that debates take place 
in practice. Consider the case where we have m arguments in favour of a 
position, and the same number against. Randomly assigning a total of T 
respondents to receive one pro argument and one con argument yields just 
n = ;;:2 subjects per treatment. For a sample of, say, 500 individuals picking 
between, say, 6 pairs of arguments, TL < 15: that is, there are less than 15 
respondents per condition! Clearly then, whether using conventional com-
parison of means tests or logistic regression, statistical power is an issue in 
this set-up. And, of course, assigning multiple treatments risks the learn-
ingjfatigue effect noted above. 
We suggest an innovative solution to this problem: a novel application of 
the Bradley-Terry model of pairwise comparisons (Bradley and Terry, 1952). 
This model has a unique value proposition. It can give survey researchers a 
comparatively large amount of information in a small amount of survey space .. 
By way of example, we use a survey experiment of just 520 respondents in 
which respondents are assigned one of six arguments for and six against 
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electoral reform (creating 36 treatment groups). We show that both me ans-
test and traditionallogit methods fail to give us clear insights into the power 
of arguments for and against reform. However, by conceptualizing arguments 
as contestants engaged in bouts with other arguments, we can use the model 
to estimate the probability that an argument wins. We can then rank-order 
arguments according to their power to persuade. Moreover, we can also 
determine the sources of an argument's power, i.e. the components which 
_ make it more persuasive than another argument. We will show that the 
utility of this method exceeds more traditional approaches. Our principal 
motivation, then, is to introduce these models to public opinion researchers. 
Substantively, we are motivated by the question of which arguments for 
and against electoml refonn are most powerful. To this end, we conducted 
a survey experiment in the midst of a province-wide referendum on whether , 
to change electoral systems in Ontario, Canada. This new data consists of 
randomly assigned respondents receiving one of six arguments in favor of the 
existing First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system and one of six argu-
ments in favor of the proposed Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system. 
By knowing which arguments influence a voter to choose one electoral sys-
tem over another and by knowing the sources of their power we can gain 
important insight into support or opposition to electoral reform. By under-
standing why certain arguments are more powerful, we also contribute to the 
literature on 'framing' in public opinion. 
Ontario is one of many jurisdictions that have put the question of re-
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forming the First Past the Post system to a referendum. Citizens in Ire-
land (1958), New Zealand (1993), ltaly (1991, 1993) and other provinces 
of Canada (British Columbia in 2004, and Prince Edward Island in 2005) 
have been asked for their preferences on the rules that turn votes into seats. 
Outcomes in referendums such as these have the potential to fundamentally 
alter the structure of a polit y, the number of parties, the power of its elites 
and the representation of minority groups (see, e.g., Gallagher, 1998; Norris, 
1997; Vowles et al., 1998; Horiuchi and Saito, 2003). More generally, ref-
erendums and initiatives play an important and often major role in several 
modern democracies. As such, analysts have devoted considerable atten-
tion to the desirability and effects of this device (see, e.g., Hamilton, 1970; 
Vanderleeuw and Engstrom, 1987; Johnston et al., 1996; Smith, 2001; Lu-
pia and Matsusaka, 2004; Matsusaka, 2005) and it is not difficult to identify 
controversial, newsworthy and wide-ranging examples of this application of 
direct democracy.2 Our secondary motivation, then, is to use this mode!. to 
gain useful insight into the substantively meaningful question of support for 
electoral reform. 
We proceed as follows. In the next section we describe our research design 
2Instances include. Britain's European Communities membership referendum of 1975 
that determined the UK wou Id remain in the ECC and similar recent referendums in 
several other European countries; California's Proposition 13 of 1978 that severely lim-
ited property taxes in that state; the Charlottetown Accord of 1992 that would have 
divided federal and provincial powers in Canada but was ultimately defeated; the 1999 
Austmlian Tefer-eTtdum that retained the monarchy; various referendums in the Republic 
of Ireland that dealt with laws concerning abortion (1992, 2002), divorce (1995) and the 
death penalty (2001); and the 2005 vote that approved a new constitution for a çlemocratic 
Iraq. 
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and the substantive context in which it was conducted. We also draw sorne 
connections to the large 'framing' literature in public opinion. In Section 3 
we introduce our novel econometric approach for pairwise comparison, the 
Bradley-Terry model. In Sections 4 and 5 we describe our results and com-
pare and contrast the utility of traditional analysis with our method. We 
conclude by suggesting other questions to which this model might be applied 
in the analysis of public opinion. 
5.2 Data, Context and Connections 
Our experiment occurred within the context of a referendum on electoral 
reform conducted in the province of Ontario, Canada, in October 2007. The 
referendum was conducted concurrently with a provincial election. In the 
previous provincial election, the Liberal Party of Ontario had pledged to hold 
a 'Citizens' Assembly' to consider the question of electoral reform (Cross, 
2005, 77). Making good on their promise, the government called together 104 
citizens~one randomly-selected from each electoral district plus a chair~ 
in the summer of 2006 and tasked them with deliberating about electoral 
systems and possibly recommending a shift from Ontario's First Past the 
Post (FPTP) system. Any recommendation would be put to a referendum 
and a change in systems would require a 60% majority and a majority of 
support in 60% of electoral districts. The Assembly eventually recommended 
the move to a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, similar to that 
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in place in Germany and New Zealand. 
The First Past the Post system is perhaps the most simple of aIl electoral 
systems, and sorne commentators cite this feature as one of its best qualities. 
Citizens vote for candidates in local constituencies and the candidate with 
the most votes (the plurality) wins the constituency's seat. To win election, 
then, candidates must have sorne degree of local appeal in a clearly defined 
constituency-again a distinct advantage of this arrangement according to 
sorne pundits. The party with the most seats (almost always) forms the 
government. As FPTP systemsmost often result in single-party majority 
governments, the party in power can exercise an almost exclusive influence 
over legislation until the time of the next election (Blais, Forthcoming). Sorne' 
argue that this allows for a more 'dedsive' polit Y with clear lines of electoral 
responsibility: large parties are over-represented relative to their vote shares 
and small parties may be entirely excluded from legislative and executive 
representation (see Powell, 2000, for a discussion). Ontario has operated 
under a FPTP system since 1792. 
Mixed Member Proportional systems incorporate elements of the FPTP 
system and proportional representation systems, which had previously been 
the principal reform alternative to FPTP systems (Blais, Forthcoming). MMP 
systems elect sorne share of legislators from local constituencies in a plurality 
fashion identical to FPTP. However, the remaining share of representatives 
are allotted to parties according to a party vote such that the overall com-
position of the legislature is proportional to each party's support. These 
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legislators are drawn from lists composed by the parties. In the proposed 
system, voters would thus cast two ballots, one for a local representative and 
one to indicate their party preference. The result is a mix of sorne local rep-
resentation and greater proportionality, with parties playing a more central 
role. Sorne have argued that MMP represents a compelling 'middle way' in 
this regard (Dunleavy and Margetts, 1999). According to the Ontario pro-
posaI, ninety representatives would be elected locally and thirty-nine would 
be elected from party lists. 
The Ontario MlVlP proposallost the ensuing referendum, garnering just 
38% of the vote and a majority in only five districts. It was not a loss at-
tributable to the proposing government, as they won the concurrent election 
rather overwhelmingly. Thus, this loss was much to the consternation of 
electoral reform advocates who believed that the arguments for electoral re-
form were clearly superior to those in support of the current system. Indeed, 
in the days following the referendum, advocates claimed that had the pub-
lic been better educated on the proposed system, especially its underlying 
values, then support would have been higher, perhaps surpassing the 60% 
threshold required for reform (Fenlon, 2007). 
To put to the test claims that the arguments for the MMP system are 
more powerful upon exposure than those for the FPTP system, we developed 
six arguments in favor of each position, drawn from campaign materials pro-
duced by both sides of the campaign, conversations with advocates on both 
sides and academic literature on electoral systems (e.g. Blais and Massicotte, 
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2002; Powell, 2000). We describe these arguments in the next section. 
5.2.1 Experimental Design 
To assess the comparative power of arguments, we conducted an online survey 
experiment with 520 voting-aged Ontarians in the last week of the referen-
dum campaign. Our experimental module was contained at the end of the 
survey, after three sections related to federal politics, provincial politics and 
environmental issues. No questions prior to the experimental module were 
related to electoral reform. A profile of our subjects is found in Annexe F. 
. In the experiment, subjects read: "As you may know, there will also be a 
referendum during the October lOth election. The purpose of the referendum 
is to determine whether Ontario should change its electoral system from the 
current first past the post system to a mixed member proportional system. 
We'd like to present you with an argument for each system and then get 
your view on which system you prefer." Respondents were then presented 
with one of six arguments in favor of the existing system and one of six 
arguments in favor of the proposed system. The order of· the arguments 
was also randomized. After receiving the arguments, respondents were then 
asked to indicate their preferenc~ between MMP and FPTP; they were not 
able to give a 'Don't know' response and had to indicate a preference before 
proceeding to the end of the survey. 
The six arguments for FPTP and MMP were: 
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• A first past the post system is better because it creates strong majority 
governments that can implement their policies. (FPTP1) 
• A first past the post system is better because it makes sure that ev-
ery Member of Provincial Parliament is elected from a constituency. 
(FPTP2) 
• A first past the post system is better because one ballot is less confusing 
than two. (FPTP3) 
• A first past the post system is better because it allows local party 
members to choose all of a party's candidates. (FPTP4) 
• A mixed member proportional system is worse because it will lead to 
unstable coalition governments. (FPTP5) 
• A mixed member proportional system is worse because it puts too much 
control in the hands of parties and political elites. (FPTP6) 
And, 
• A mixed member proportional system is better because it makes sure 
that parties that have support of sorne of the population still get sorne 
representation. (MMP1) 
• A mixed member proportional system is better because it lets voters 
indicate their preference for both a local representative and a party. 
(MMP2) 
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• A mixed member proportional system is better because parties should 
get the same share of seats as their share of the vote. (MMP3) 
• A mixed member proportional system is better because it will lead to 
more diversity in the legislature. (MMP4) 
• A first past the post system is worse because it gives sorne parties a 
share of the seats much .larger than their share of the vote. (MMP5) 
• A first past the post system is worse because it shuts out small parties. 
(MMP6) 
As the pro and con arguments were assigned randorhly and independently, 
we have 36 approximately equal sized groupS.3 
We are not only interested in the power of arguments, but also their 
sources of power. In other words, what is it about the content of argu-
ments that makes sorne more powerful than others? We note that sever al 
arguments share common components. For example, sorne arguments refer-
ence local candidates, others appeal to notions of proportionality or fairness, 
others reference government stability and effectiveness, others highlight' the 
strengths or weaknesses of the ballot structure in FPTP and MMP. Many 
make reference to political parties, while another refers to increased diversity 
in the legislature as a result of MMP. Sorne arguments are phrased in posi-
tive terms (i.e. a first past the post system is better because ... ), while others 
3 A X2 test indicates that the assignments are independent of one another (X2 = 
26.41 p = .39). 
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are phrased negatively (i.e. a mixed member proportional system is WOTse 
because ... ). And sorne arguments combine many of these features. Table 5.1 
summarizes the characteristics of the arguments. We are thus not only inter-
ested in which arguments are more powerful, but also what components make 
an argument more persuasive than another. Accordingly, we use both con-
ventional methods (in Section 5.4.2) and a structured Bradley-Terry model 
(in Section 5.5.2) to attempt to identify the most persuasive arguments and 
the components which make them persuasive. 
5.2.2 The 'Framing' Connection 
We see a connection between our endeavors here and the large literature 
on 'framing' in public opinion. In that work, the central conceit is that "an 
issue can bé viewed from a variety of perspectives and be construed as having 
implications for multiple values or considerations" (Chong and Druckman, 
2007b, 104). In our experiment, different arguments for the same system 
are phrased in different ways, highlighting particular features of the voting 
arrangements under debate. In this sense, we are firmly within the 'emphasis' 
framing paradigm-wherein the frames are not simply equivalent ways to 
convey the exact same information (see Druckman, 2004, for discussion of 
this clarification). Since each of these characteristics potentially appeals 
differently to voters via a distinct "frame in communication" (Chong and 
Druckman, 2007b, 104), we might expect sorne frames to do better than 
Table 5.1: Argument Characteristics 
Argument Fairnessj Local Membersj Government Formationj Ballot Diversity Political Negative 
Proportionality Control Stability jEffectiveness Structure Parties 
FPTPl X 
FPTP2 X 
FPTP3 X 
FPTP4 X X 
FPTP5 X X 
FPTP6 X X 
MMPI X X 
MMP2 X X X 
MMP3 X X 
MMP4 X 
MMP5 X X X 
MMP6 X X X 
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others in convincing voters. lndeed, we will demonstrate this to be the case. 
As an aside, we candidly note that a fundamental issue that is difficult for 
us to explore directly in our study is that of 'moderators'. These variables 
essentially condition the effect of the frame, perhaps amplifying or damping-
down its consequences for the subject (see Druckman, 2001; Raider-Markel 
and Joslyn, 2001, for example). Predispositions such as 'values' or 'expe-
rience' are generally considered important, though this is less of a concern 
for us because the referendum in Ontario was a new issue for voters whose 
views may not have settled a priori of the framing information they received. 
Moreover, as we will demonstrate when we describe the Bradley-Terry model 
below, it is the relative performance of randomly assigned arguments that we 
wish to examine here, rather than their performance in some absolute sense. 
5.3 Measuring the Power to Persuade: A Sta-
tistical Model 
. We contend that arguments vary in their 'power to persuade' citizens who 
receive them. The central econometric concern is to estimate this persuasion 
'power', possibly as a function of the characteristics of the arguments them-
selves. We begin by supposing that in any two-way comparison in which an 
argument pertaining to FPTP is paired with one pertaining to MMP, one 
argument makes a more convincing case than the other for its respective 
electoral system; it is thus more likely to persuade the respondent. For any 
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given comparison or 'contest' between arguments-or 'players'~i and j let 
?Ti,j E (0,1) be the probabîlity that the respondent finds i more compelling 
than j and thus prefers the electoral system (implicitly or explicitly) pro--
moted by i. Write the odds that argument i 'beats' argument j as a function 
of their 'powers' ai, aj which are latent (and thus unobserved) but positive 
valued 
a' t \.J' \.J' 
- v2, VJ. 
aj 
(5.1) 
Implicit in Equation (5.1) is the fact that ?Tj,i == 1 ?Ti,j. In other words, 
there can be no tied contests: either i wins and j loses or j wins and i loses.4 
The task is to estimate ai and aj. Suppose that i and j corppete against 
one another a total of Ni,j times and let ni,j be the number of times i beats 
.7. If aIl these contests are independent, then it is natural to assume nij ·is 
distributed as a binomial (Ni,j, ?Ti,j). With t total arguments competing~ 
i.e. aU the specifie is and that are actually compared in the survey~the 
likelihood is 
L(aln) (5.2) 
Maximization of (5.2) yields estimates of the elements of a subject to the 
identification restriction that sorne ai set equal to one.5 Notice that, via an 
assumption of transitivity, the a may be estimated even if ni,j is zero for 
sorne pairings, so long as there does not exist sorne subset of arguments that 
4Effectively, this means not allowing 'don't know' responses, 
5 Alternatively, the researcher could set L:i Œi = 1. 
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never meet with others in competition. 6 A logit linear form of the problem 
proceeds by defining exp( Ài ) == (Xi and executing the maximization above. In 
this case, with rearrangement of Equation (5.1), 
(5.3) 
and, in terms of log-odds, 
log [prO beats j)] = À. - À .. 
Pr(j beats i) , J (5.4) 
The intuitive message from Equations (5.3) and (5.4) is clear: the larger the 
value of Ài relative to Àj, the more likely it is that argument i beats argument 
j in a pairwise contest. 
The approach here may appear unusual to public opinion researchers, 
but is well known to statisticians as the 'Bradley-Terry model' for pairwise 
comparison (Bradley and Terry, 1952) and has been used by psychologists 
interested in subjects selecting items from choice sets for sorne time (see, for 
example, Luce, 1959; Thurstone, 1959).7 The model has seen use in other 
fields such as biology (e.g. Stuart-Fox et al., 2006), genetics (e.g. Sham and 
Curtis, 1995), the investigation of journal citation patterns (e.g. Carter and 
Spirling,. Forthcoming; Stigler, 1994) and sports science (e.g. Agresti, 2002). 
6More technically, the design must be 'connected' though it need not be 'complete'. 
7In practice, Thurstone (1959), opts for a slightly different form of the model: in 
selecting a function, j for the link 7ri,j = j-l().,i - ).,j), he uses the inverse probit; as seen 
in Equation (5.4), Bradley and Terry (1952) use the logit. 
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Spirling (2007) considers an application to the United States Senate, however 
we can find no other application of this model in political science.8 
An important extension of the Bradley-Terry model is provided by Springall 
(1973), in which 'player'-specific (here, argument-specifie) variables XiI,"" Xip 
are used to predict the 'power' of the players (the À) directly. These inde-
pendent variables enter the model via the linear predictor in the sense that 
P 
Ài = L {3r X ir, (5.5) 
r=1 
and interest focuses on the estimated coefficients {31, ... ,{3p. In the current 
context, these (3 inform the analyst as to the source, or 'cause', of the argu-
ments' power. Firth (2005) devotes considerable effort to designing software 
for t!le fitting of both 'unstructured' models of the form given in Equation 
(5.4), and 'structured' versions as noted in Equation (5.5). Our work below 
utilizes his implementation in conjunction with the R language and environ-
ment (R Development Core Team, 2006). In the next section though, we 
review the use of more conventional techniques before demonstrating the 
utility of our model. 
8Indeed, a search of ail major political science journals on JSTOR resulted in only one 
hit; an article mentioning the Bradley-Terry model in an end note (Monroe, 1995). 
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5.4 The Power of Arguments: . Conventional 
Results 
5.4.1 Testing the Power of Arguments 
We consider two conventional methods of testing the power of arguments. 
The first is to observe the me an level of support for MMP according to 
the assigned FPTP and MMP arguments and then identify which arguments 
elicit significantly higher me an levels of support. The results in Tables 5.2 and 
5.3 do just this, comparing support for each argument. The arguments are 
arranged in order from most to least powerful. 9 Of the six arguments for the 
existing system, FPTP6 appears to be the weakest of aIl arguments. lndeed, 
four arguments elicit significantly higher support. However, according to 
convention t-tests of means, aIl other arguments appear equaIly powerful. 
We can find even less difference in the persuasive power of arguments 
for a mixed member system (Table 5.3). When we consider aIl respondents, 
we find aIl arguments are equaIly persuasive, with the exception of MMP6, 
which is significantly more persuasive than MMP4. 
These findings are instructive as far as they go. We can create rank 
orderings of arguments but without much certainty about differences in their 
levels of power. We may also be able to infer the reasons for differences in 
persuasiveness, or power. For example, we could infer that the difference 
9 As the quantity is percentage agreement with MMP, FPTP arguments with lower 
support are more persuasive. 
171 
between FPTP1 and FPTP6 exists because FPTP1 references government 
effectiveness while FPTP6 does not. However, our inference would end there. 
We would not be able to make statements with measured uncertainty about 
why FPTP1 is more powerful than FPTP6. At best, we are left with' an 
uncertain rank ordering and litt le insight into the sources of an argument's 
power. 
Rather than a means-test, we could also perform a logistic regression 
in which we set support for MMP as the dependent variable and dummy 
out the arguments a respondent received. We do this in Table 5.4. The logit 
tests clearly suffer from low statistical power. Using conventional significance 
levels, the coefficients tell us nothing about which arguments are more or less 
powerful. We do note, however, that both age and gender' have significant 
effects. The results suggest that MMP is more preferred by women while it is 
less supported by older citizens. The results also demonstrate that even with 
520 respondents, the logit model is able to pick up the larger effects due to 
gender and age. If the effects of arguments for and against electoral reform 
are small~and we would expect them to be on a sophisticated panel~then 
relying on a traditionallogit analysis arguably significantly increases the risk 
of Type II errors. This difficulty only becomes greater if we dummy out 
each argument pairing, as shown in Table G.1 in Annexe G. Here only one 
argument pairing variable out of 36 reaches conventional levels of statistical 
significance, less than we would expect even by chance. 
Table 5.2: Agreement with MMP by FPTP Arguments (mean 
differences) 
Argument 
FPTP2 
FPTP1 
FPTP3 
FPTP4 
FPTP5 
FPTP6 
Mean % (sd) 
41.4 (49.5) 
44.4 (49.9) 
45.2 (50.1) 
45.6 (50.1) 
47.8 (50.2) 
.56.7 (49.8) 
Dominates (p-value, one-tailed) 
FPTP6 (0.02) 
FPTP6 (0.06) 
FPTP6 (0.08) 
FPTP6 (0.08) 
Table 5.3: Agreement with MMP by MMP Arguments (mean 
differences) 
Argument 
MMP6 
MMP3 
MMP5 
MMP1 
MMP2 
MMP4 
Mean % (sd) 
51.2 (50.3) 
49.3 (50.3) 
48.2 (50.3) 
46.3 (50.1) 
45.1 (50.0) 
40.6 (49.3) 
Dominates (p-value, one-tailed) 
MMP4 (0.08) 
5.4.2 Determining the Sources of Power 
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In the previous section, we demonstrated that with a large number of treat-
ments we could learn little about the power of arguments using a traditional 
logit set-up. We did succeed in construGting rank orderings of the power of 
arguments according to their mean levels of support, but we could not infer 
from this the sources of their power, i.e. the elements of sorne argument 
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Table 5.4: Logistic Regression of Argument Powera 
Model1 Model2 
Variable Coefficient se p-value Coefficient se p-value 
FPTP2 -0.13 0.30 0.64 -0.13 0.30 0.66 
FPTP3 0.01 0.32 0.96 -0.05 0.32 0.87 
FPTP4 0.07 0.30 0.83 0.00 0.31 1.00 
FPTP5 0.14 0.29 0.64 0.04 0.31 0.90 
FPTP6 0.47 0.31 0.14 0.46 0.32 0.15 
MMP1 -0.21 0.30 0.50 0.17 0.57 0.76 
MMP2 -0.08 0.30 0.79 -0.12 0.31 0.70 
MMP3 0.12 0.33 0.71 0.12 0.33 0.72 
MMP4 -0.25 0.31 0.42 -0.27 0.13 0.40 
MMP5 0.04 0.32 0.90 0.02 0.32 0.95 
MMP6 0.14 0.32 0.64 0.07 0.32 0.81 
Female 0.41 0.18 0.03 
Age -0.22 0.08 0.00 
N 520 520 
Pseudo 0.01 0.03 
R2 
a FPTPl is the reference category. 
which made it more convincing than other arguments for a similar policy 
position. These results should be of little surprise to seasoned analysts of 
public opinion. We have designed an experiment with a very large number 
of treatment groups and a small number of respondents. This lack of results 
is not a criticism of these methods peT' se. Rather, it is a demonstration of 
a limit of these methods. A similar limit exists if we attempt to locate the 
sources of an argument's power. 
In Table 5.1, we identified the characteristics of the various arguments for 
174 
and against electoral reform. For example, did the argument appeal to the 
value of local control, did it reference fairness, etc? We create eight such vari-
ables: Fairness, Local, Government Stability jEffectiveness, Ballot Structure, 
Diversity, Parties, Negative Frame, FPTP. Fairness indicates an argument 
which makes appeals based on proportionality, while Local is a variable indi-
cating that an argument makes reference to local representation or control. 
Stability essentially refers to the notion that governments are more likely to 
survive longer periods and be able to make policy in sorne systems rather than 
others. Ballot Structure refers to an argument about how simple or confus-
ing the actual voting papers are in practice, while DiveTsity is a reference to 
arguments making daims of variegation or heterogeneity of representation in 
the legislature. Parties indicates that an argument mentions political parties 
and Negative occurs when an argument is in favor of a system only insofar 
as it highlights a detracting feature of the opposing position. Finally, not 
recorded in Table 5.1, FPTP indicates that the argument is in favor of the 
existing (status quo) system: of .course, this takes a value of '1' for FPTPl 
through FPTP6. Because sorne arguments share sorne characteristics but 
not Others, the question of which characteristics really make an argument 
persuasive is an interesting one, but not necessarily easily answered. 
One way of locating the sources of an argument's power is to create vari-
ables that indicate whether an argument (and its opposing position) contain 
certain characteristics. Each of the seven variables is coded as 1 if a respon-
dent received only an MMP argument which had this characteristic, 0 if both 
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or neithervariables had this characteristic and -1 if only the FPTP argument 
had this characteristic. For example, both FPTP3 and MMP2 refer to ballot 
structure in a manner favorable to their side. So, if a respondent received 
both FPTP3 and MMP2, then the Ballot Format variable would read o. 
If they received MMP2 but not FPTP3, then Ballot Format would read l. 
Vice-versa and the variable would read -l. 
Using a logit setup, we regress the choice for MMP on these seven ar-
gument variables, as weIl as controls for age and gender. As the results 
reported in Table 5.5 indicate, we find no significànt differences in the argu-
ment characteristics, though we do again find significant demographic effects. 
This suggests that there are no differences in the ability of various argument 
components to persuade. Moreover, we still fail to find significant predictors 
if we perform a series of bivariate regressions between each component and 
support for MMP. 
5.5 The Power of Argunlents: The Bradley-
Terry Method 
5.5.1 Unstructured Results 
We have have previously presented a rank-ordering of arguments by mean 
support. We were able to uncover sorne differences· using tests of means, 
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Table 5.5: Logistic Regression of Sources of Argument 
Power 
Variable Coefficient se p-value 
Fairness 0.55 0.51 0.28 
Local Control 0.44 0.35 0.21 
Stability jEffectiveness 0.30 0.42 0.48 
Ballot Format 0.37 0.48 0.44 
Diversity 0.08 0.77 0.92 
Parties -0.14 0.30 0.65 
Negative Frame 0.02 0.18 0.92 
Female 0.41 0.18 0.03 
Age -0.23 0.07 0.00 
Constant 0.14 0.60 0.82 
N 520 
Pseudo R2 0.03 
but we were unable to compute from these the probability that one argu-
ment would beat another. We have also attempted to ascertain comparative 
power through a logit analysis to little avail. Moreover, we have (unsuc-
cessfully) tried to de termine the sources of arguments' power using a sec-
ond logit analysis. In place of these more conventional approaches, we now 
present Bradley-Terry results. Our first 'unstructured' results are in Table 
5.6. Unstructured results consist of a power coefficient for each argument, 
Ài' which can be used to compare its power with that of other arguments. 
The reported coefficient for FPTP2, the most powerful argument, iq set to 
o. All other coefficients (and their p-values), are reported in comparison to 
the power of this FPTP argument. The arguments are ordered from most 
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to least powerful. By examining the coefficients we can determine which 
arguments are estimated as less powerful than others. Moreover, by exam-
ining the p-values, we can determine which arguments are significantly less 
powerful than FPTP2 (i.e. MMP4 and FPTP6). With such a rank ordering, 
the Bradley-Terry model do es not differ much from a mean-support type 
approach outlined above and the order of the arguments appears the same. 
However, this approach does offer the distinct advantage that we can easily 
compute the estimated probability that one argument dominates another. 
Recall Equation (5.3); if we wanted to know the probability that FPTP2 
defeated MMP2, we enter the power estimates into the equation and find 
that: 
1f2,2 = exp(O.OO) = 0 60 
exp(O.OO) + exp( -0.422) .. (5.6) 
Similarly, we could calculate the probability that FPTP2 beats the more 
evenly matched MMP6 at 0.55. We cannot make similar probability state-
ments from merely observing means. Nor can we derive them from a logistic 
regression which returns insignificant coefficients. 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 break up the results by FPTP and MMP and in the case of 
each argument includes an indication of which other arguments it dominates. 
The arguments do not now appear as well-matched as in Table 5.6. Rather, 
we see that FPTP2 dominates one argument for MMP, and FPTP1 also 
weakly dominates a MMP argument. No argument for MMP systematically 
dominates a FPTP argument. The advocates of a FPTP system had a clear 
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Table 5.6: Bradley-Terry Model of Argument 
Power 
Argument Power p-value 
FPTP2 0.000 
FPTP1 -0.137 0.63 
FPTP3 -0.151 0.63 
MMP6 -0.197 0.50 
FPTP4 -0.203 0.49 
MMP3 -0.224 0.45 
FPTP5 -0.278 0.34 
MMP5 -0.302 0.30 
MMP1 -0.343 0.23 
MMP2 -0.422 0.12 
MMP4 -0.593 0.04 
FPTP6 -0.605 0.05 
advantage. 
In Figure 5.1 we present our findings in a slightly different way. Here, each 
'fan' represents an argument. A fan's size is proportional to the argument's 
'power' as estimated in the Bradley-Terrymodel. Each section of each fan is 
sized proportionaIly to the probability that the argument would defeat each 
of the eleven others in a contest. As with Table 5.6, we see that the top 
three most powerful arguments aIl concern FPTP, while three of the four 
least powerful arguments concern MMP. This further suggests an overaIl 
advantage for FPTP advocates. In the next section we examine whether 
there in fact was a systematic advantage for FPTP arguments. 
FPTP2 
FPTP4 
MMP1 
· FPTP1 
MMP3 
MMP2 
FPTP2 
FPTP1 
FPTP3 
FPTP5 
MMP4 
MMP5 
MMP6 
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MMP6 
MMP5 
FPTP6 
Figure 5.1: Power of arguments: unstructured results. Each 'fan' represents 
an argument and its size is proportional to its 'power' (thus FPTP2 is the 
largest and most powerful). Each section of each fan is sized proportionally 
to the probability that the argument beats the others in a direct contest. 
Note the key at the bottom of the diagram. 
Table 5.7: Power of FPTP Arguments 
Argument Power Dominates (p-value) 
FPTP2 
FPTP1 
FPTP3 
FPTP4 
FPTP5 
FPTP6 
0.000 MMP4 (0.04) ; FPTP6 
-0.137 MMP4 (0.10) 
-0.151 
-0.203 
-0.278 
-0.605 
Table 5.8: Power of MMP Arguments 
Argument Power Dominates (p-value) 
MMP6 
MMP3 
MMP5 
MMP1 
MMP2 
MMP4 
-0.197 
-0.224 
-0.302 
-0.343 
-0.422 
-0.593 
(0.05) 
5.5.2 The Sources of an Argument's Power 
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In the previous section, we estimated the power of twelve arguments for and 
against electoral reform. Our task now is to estimate the sources of this 
power. In other words, what are the charaGteristics of an argument that 
make it able to overcome other arguments-in our case, for or against elec-
toral reform? In Table 5.1 we summarized the attributes of each of the FPTP 
and MMP arguments. By including these traits as covariates in a struc-
tured model we are able to estimate the sources of an argument's power-or 
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'ability'-to persuade. ID 
Since the model is estimated via maximum likelihood, standard proce-
dures for finding the 'best-fit' are available: for example, the analyst may use 
the Akaike or Bayes Information Criterion. We use the AIC to determine a 
'best-fit' model in Table 5.9. As a result, we finish with four predictors. We 
take this systemic advantage for sorne components over others as evidence 
that at least sorne of our sample was responding to arguments systematicaUy, 
rather than merely stating prior opinions. With the exception of Parties, aU 
the variables are significant at the 10% level. When we repeat the logit anal-
ysis in Table 5.5 using these variables, only Fairness achieves significance at 
the 10% level. 
Table 5.9: Model of Sources of Argument Power 
Variable Coefficient se p-value 
FPTP 0.282 0.147 0.055 
Fairness 0.534 0.240 0.026 
Local 0.318 0.177 0.071 
Parties -0.275 0.180 0.127 
AIC 141.88 
AU else equal then, an argument in favor of the status quo appears system-
atically advantaged. Local is a characteristic of arguments for both FPTP 
and MMP, as an MMP system does retain local representation. However, 
lOThis is Equation (5.5) in Section 5.3. 
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MMP does not allow the local selection of all candidates, suggesting that 
in actual rhetoric the scope of local arguments favors FPTP. Faimess argu-
ments clearly advantage MMP, as proportionality is a central component of 
this system and is never present in arguments for FPTP. Finally, the mention 
of political parties makes an argument less appealing. This is likely to the 
disadvantage of MMP, as the logic of the system (and thus at least some of 
the arguments in its favor) rely on mat ching the votes and seats of political 
parties. Parties are thus arguably more central to an understanding of MMP 
than FPTP.u 
Using this model and the formula in Equation (5.3) we can then esti-
mate the probability that one argument dominates another according to its 
characteristics. For example, we can estimate the probability that FPTP2 
(which mentions local control) dominates MMP6 (which makes a fairness 
argument): 
exp(0.282 + 0.318) _ 0 
7T2,6 = ( ) ( ) - .52. exp 0.282 + 0.318 + exp 0.534 (5.7) 
By contrast, if we pit FPTP2 against MMP4, an argument which has no 
significantly powerful attributes, then the probability of FPTP dominance 
rises to 0.65. 
Figure 5.2 presents our findings in a slightly different way. The figure 
11 As an aside, we note that the issue of 'negative' framing is a popular research topic 
in political science (see, for example, Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1997). We found that 
'Negative' was not a significant predictor (on its own) for the structured model, though 
it had a negative sign implying that vot ers are (ail else equal) less convinced by such 
phrasing. 
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compares the probability of an argument with various covariate profiles win-
ning against the modal argument (which does not mention 'fairness', 'local' 
or 'parties', but does make reference to 'FPTP'). The arrows show the effect 
of moving from one covariate profile to another. For example, in a contest 
with the modal argument, an argument that is identical but which mentions 
fairness would do better: the probability of a win for this second argument 
increases from 0.5 to around 0.64. By contrast, an argument that is identical 
but which does not mention FPTP would do worse: the probability of a win 
for this second argument decreases from 0.5 to around 0.45. On the left side 
of the plot, we report the predicted probabilities for the arguments in the 
study based on their covariate profiles. Reading from top to bottom, we see 
that FPTP2 is once again the most powerful argument in keeping with our 
unstructured results. 12 
12In Annexe H, we consider the differences between the predicted probabilities generated 
from structured and unstructured models. We find the models generate similar predictions, 
on average. 
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Figure 5.2: Power of arguments: structured results. The arrows show the 
effect of moving from one covariate profile to another. On the left side of 
the plot, we report the predicted probabilities for the arguments in the study 
based on their covariate profiles. The modal arguments are FPTP1, FPTP3, 
and FPTP5. 
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5.6 Further Applications and Conclusion 
We havedemonstrated that Bradley-Terry models can generate meaning-
fuI results from pairwise matchings of arguments, even when the number of 
treatment groups is large and the sample size small. Similar results were not 
uncovered by conventional means-tests or logit analysis. Moreover, struc-
tured models can be used to identify the source of an argument's persuasive 
power. These models are thus well-suited for a situation in which a researcher 
wishesto test a large number of arguments on a small sample size. 
We have also gained substantive insight into the comparative power of 
arguments for and against electoral reform. While the arguments were gener-
ally well-matched, we have found a small advantage in status-quo arguments 
for a FPTP system, in arguments which reference local candidates and in 
arguments which appeal to fairness norms. Overall, this advantaged argu-
ments for the existing system in Ontario, and goes sorne way in explaining 
the failure of electoral reform in the province. They also conform with a 
more general status quo bias in referendums and initiatives (e.g. see Bowler 
and Donovan, 1998). These insights were not apparent from conventional 
analyses. 
Just as these models have found application in a large number of other 
fields, we can find further, applications for them in public opinion research. 
For example, we could measure the comparative power of frames over a small 
number of respondents without the need to repeat frames (e.g., Chong and 
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Druckman, 2007 a). The models cou Id also be used to identify sources of 
persuasion in studies using a 'jury method' (e.g., London, Meldman and 
Lanckton, 1970). They could be used in experimental studies determining 
the characteristics of candidate attractiveness (e.g., Sigelman, 1990). Indeed, 
any research design with dichotomous outcomes and direct confrontation 
between units or actors is a candidate for these models. 
Our suggested approach is not without drawbacks. It does require a min-
imum degree of fluency in the R environment (though sorne of its components 
can be undertaken in STATA). Similarly, it requires pairwise comparison and 
dichotomous outcomes. Accordingly, it cannot be used if researchers are in-
terested in measuring degrees of support for a position and/or if they are not 
interested in testing arguments in an oppositional manner. Similarly, a re-
searcher cannot easily estimate tournament-:specific (or respondent-spedfic) 
effects with a Bradley-Terry model. It is not a panacea. However, if re-
searchers wish to make pairwise comparisons with dichotomous outcomes, 
this approach provides a powerful solution when a number of arguments 
need to be tested and a small number of respondents are at hand. Indeed, 
we are convinced that when matched against more conventional methods, 
these models are up to the test. 
Chapitre 6 
Partisanship and Altruism: 
Results from a Dictator Game 
Experiment (with Angelo Elias) 
Under T'eview at Political Behavior. Loewen designed, executed and analysed 
the experiment. Loewen dmfted the first version of the article. Elias helped 
dmft a second. Loewen completed the final dmft. 
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6.1 Introduction 
Partisanship matters. Partisans are more likely to vote than non-partisans 
(Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995; Franklin, 1996, 2002; Norris, 2002; Dal-
ton, 2006; Blais, Gidengill, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002) and to do so consis-
tently (Campbell et al., 1960; Dalton, 2006; Blais, Gidengill, Nadeau and 
\ 
Nevitte, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996). Partisans are more likely to follow 
politics (Campbell et al., 1960) and they are more likely to have ,structured 
opinions (Hamill, Lodge and Blake, 1985; Sharp and Lodge, 1985; Lodge 
and Hamill, 1986). As important as differences between partisans and non-
partisans are those among partisans. We know, for example, that parti-
sanship can lead to system0tically different views on issues Blais, Gidengil, 
Nadeau and Nevitte (2002). We also know that different partisans attend to 
and receive news and political arguments differently (e.g. Zaller, 1992; Bar-
tels, 2002; Johnston, 1992). These basic differences between partisans are 
well-known and generally travel across several countries (e.g. Clarke et al., 
2004). 
This note asks if partisans differ in another way, specifically if partisans 
of sorne parties are more altruistic than others. That is, are sorne partisan 
identifiers systematically more generous when given the opportunity to im-
prove the lot of others at a cost to themselves (Rushton, 1,982; Ridley and 
Dawkins, 2003; Aronfreed, 1980; Piliavin and Charng, 1990; Margolis, 1983)7 
In keeping with a growing trend in political science, we answer this question 
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experimentally (see Druckman et al., 2006). The altruism of partisan iden-
tifiers in Canada is measured through a series of dictator games (Camerer, 
2003) - a tool from behavioural or experimental economics - embedded in 
an online survey. By measuring the impact of different partisan identifica-
tions on allocations to completely anonymous individuaIs, other partisans, 
and co-partisans, we can identify whether partisans differ in their altruism. 
We find that New Democrats exhibit more altruism than Conservatives and 
LiberaIs in two of three scenarios, and that LiberaIs exhibit more altruism 
than Conservatives in one scenario. When we consider all scenarios together, 
we find that New Democrats exhibit more altruism on average. We also find 
that all partisans exhibit more altruism towards co-partisans than towards 
anonymous individuals and more altruism towards anonymous individuals 
than towards the supporters of other parties. 
This note proceeds as follows. We first describe the dictator game and 
defend it as a measure of altruism. We also briefly review the properties of 
the game. We then describe the survey in which the games were embedded. 
We finally present and discuss our results. 
6.2 Altruism and the Dictator Game 
We use a minimalist definition of altruism: an altTuistic act OCCUTS when an 
individu al undeTtakes action which is ta the mateTial benefit of anotheT at 
a mateTial cast ta heTself. To satisfy this definition of altruism we do not 
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. need to observe or infer intent (contra Batson et al., 1978, 1979). We merely 
need to observe an action which confers a benefit and cornes at a cost. In 
this manner, our definition is consistent with other well-known minimalist 
accounts (e.g. Sorrentino, 1991; Margolis, 1983). 
We measure the altruism of partisans through a series of dictator games 
(see Camerer, ,2003) embedded within an online survey. The dictator game 
is playèd as follows: Player A is given sorne sum of money (or the chance to 
win this money). She is then asked how much of this money (should she win) 
that she would like to share with Player B. The distribution is made and the 
game ends. In short, Player A 'dictates' a share of the prize to Player B. 
Any non-zero sum represents an altruistic action as it improves the material 
lot of Player B at a cost to Player A. Larger allocations thus represent more 
altruistic actions. 
While the use of dictator games is rather new in political science (e.g. 
Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Whitt and Wilson, 2001), it is corn mon 
in economics. In that context, economists have demonstrated that alloca-
tions in dictator games are consistent and rational (Andreoni and Miller, 
2002), they differ little according to the size of the stakes provided that the 
stakes are not fictional (though they can be merely expected) (Camerer and 
Hogarth, 1999; Carpenter, Verhoogen and Burks, 2005; Fowler, 2006), and 
they correlate as expected with real world behavior (Benz and Meier, 2008). 
The few studies which have considered the effects of partisanship on dic-
tator game allocations to anonymous individuals (Fowler, 2006; Fowler and 
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Kam, 2007) have typically failed to find significant relationships between 
partisanship and allocations. This is consistent with findings that sociode-
mographic variables, with the exception of gender (Eckel and Grossman, 
1996, 1998), are generally unrelated to dictator game allocations (see also 
Camerer, 2003). These findings, however, should be viewed with caution as 
dictator games typically occur within convenience samples which are both 
small and unrepresentative of the general population. Fowler (2006), for ex-
ample, fails to find significant relationships, but his data suggest that they 
may exist between allocations and age and partisanship and go undetected 
because of a small sample. 
6.3 The Study 
6.3.1 Subjects 
Our survey was conducted in May 2007 by a Canadian commercial public 
opinion research firm. As the survey was cond ucted online, respondents 
were required to login to the survey using a unique identification. While 
the original survey included 5399 respondents, we include only those who 
identify with a political party, live outside of the province of Quebec l , and 
completed the relevant questions. We are left with 1942 respondents in our 
effective sample. Our sample is probably more politically sophisticated than 
IThe exclusion of Quebec from analysis of political behavior in Canada is commonplace 
(see, e.g. Blais, Gidengill, Nadeau and Nevitte, 2002). 
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the general population of partisans in Canada. For example, while 59% of 
our effective sample indicates having attended at least sorne university, the 
equivalent quantity in the most recent Canadian Election Study is just 37%. 2 
To address this, we include controls for education in our models. At the end of 
the note, we report simple robustness checks for the effects of sophistication. 
This objection aside, we are confident that an online survey is an ap-
propriate method by" which to evaluate the altruism of partisans through a 
dictator game. First, while our sample may not be properly representative, 
we know no reason why self-selection into our panel would affect the direc-
tion or nature of the relationship between altruism and partisanship. We 
are, in other words, confident that the partisans in our sample use the same 
considerations in deciding whether to be altruistic as partisans in the general 
population (Best et al., 2005). Second, giving money in a dictator game as 
a function of social desirability is likely lower in an online survey than in a 
laboratory or a telephone survey (Taylor and Thomas, 2005) as respondents 
are not interacting with a human experimenter or caller. Accordingly, an 
online approach may allow for a more accurate measure of behavior in the 
diCtator game. 
2While it would be ideal to compare our sam pIe to census data, this is not possible 
given that our sample is limited to partisans. Accordingly, we have compared it against 
the randomly-sampled Canadian Election Study. 
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6.3.2 The Survey 
People completing the survey for the first time responded to a number of 
screening questions, including a query about their partisan identification. 
AU respondents were presented with a series of questions about recent news 
exposure, attention to federal and provincial politics, and views on various 
politieians. Subjects then completed an eight-item measure of empathy based 
on a larger instrument (see Loewen, Lyle and Nachshen, 2007; Wakabayashi 
et al., 2006) as well as four dictator games which are described in the next 
paragraph. Following this, subjects answered questions concerning their sup-
port for publie spending, past charitable giving, views of the public service, 
and views of recent politieal events. 
6.3.3 Dependent Variable: Dictator Game Allocations 
The dietator game experiment consisted of four iterations. Subjects read an 
introduction to the game and were then presented with instructions. Vpon 
being informed that they would have four chances to win one of four $100 
prizes at the end of the survey, subjects were asked how much they would 
like to share with a completely anonymous individual about whom they know 
nothing and who would never know their identity. Subjects entered their pre-
ferred split. The game was then repeated three times with subjects being 
informed that the anonymous recipient supports the Conservative, Liberal, 
or New Democratie parties. The order of the recipients was randomized. Re-
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spondents could give away any amount between $0 and $100. The complete 
instructions for the game are available in Annexe B. For the purposes of our 
model, we create three different dependent variables. Allocations to Anony-
mous Individuals, to Other Partisans, i.e. partisans of party other than the 
respondent's, and to Co-Partisans, i.e. partisans of the same party as the re-
spondent. We also create a pooled variable, Pooled Allocations, which pools 
all allocations by partisan respondents. 
6.3.4 Independent Variables 
The principal independent variables, Conservative, Liberal, and New Demo-
crat, are based on the standard question "Thin king about federal politics 
in Canada, generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Liberal, 
Conservative, N.D.P, or none of these?" Those who indicated a partisanship 
received the standard follow-up question: "And, generally speaking, how 
strongly do you think of yourself as a (party)?" Respondents who indicated 
a strong or fairly strong identification with any party are included. All oth-
ers are excluded. (Blais et al., 2001) We make this exclusion because we are 
. interested exclusively in differences between partisans, rather than between 
non-partisans and partisans. 
We inèlude a number of other independent variables, including income, 
education, age, gender, and a dummy for unemployment. The question word-
ing for all variables is available in Annexe 1. For interpretive ease, all inde-
pendent variables are rescaled from 0 to 1. 
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We also include another variable measuring the nature of respondents' 
concern for others. Empathy measures the capacity of respondents to vic ar-
iously experience the distress of others and to feel a motivation to alleviate 
that distress. Prior research has demonstrated a strong link between empa-
thy and prosocial, helping behaviours (Vitaglione and Barnett, 2003; Staub, 
1978, 1980). More pointedly, the Empathy-Altruism hypothesis argues that 
those who feel greater empathy exhibit greater altruism (Batson et al., 1981; 
Kruger, Hicks and McGue, 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004). Accordingly, more 
empathic respondents should make more generous allocations (Batson et al., 
1979; Batson, 1994). The variable is a scale measuring average responses to 
eight questions drawn from a larger scale (see Loewen, Lyle and Nachshen, 
2007; Wakabayashi et al., 2006). Having controlled for the effects of altruism 
due to empathy, any results due to partisanship are arguably a result of the 
different behavioural norms towards helping associated with each partisan 
identification. This is precisely the quantity we wish to identify: the inde-
pendent of contribution of partisanship to altruism holding constant another 
well-known and basic determinant of altruism. 3 
In the case of each model, we specify an ordinary least squares linear 
regression. As the values of our dependent variable are left-censored, a tobit 
model may be more appropriate. However, our tobit results do not differ sub-
stantively, i.e. we find no differences in the significance of our partisanship 
3We note that the correlations between empathy and each partisanship - New Democrat 
(r = .08,p = .00), Liberal (r = .08,p = .00), Conservative (T = -.14,p = .00) - are weak 
but significant. 
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variables and no differences in the ordering or direction of effects. Accord-
ingly, we report more easily interpreted OLS coefficients (Roncek, 1992). 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.1 presents the results when the dependent variable is dictator game 
allocations to completely anonymous. individuals. We observe the following 
means on this measure: New Democrats give $25.52 (sd = $23.81), Liber-
aIs give $23.25 (sd = $25.35), and Conservatives give $21.72 (sd = $25.96). 
These suggest that New Democrats appear more altruistic than LiberaIs (t = 
1.49,p = .07) and more altruistic than Conservatives (t = 2.44,p = .01). Lib-
eraIs in turn appear more altruistic than Conservatives (t = 1.17, p = .12).4 
However, controlling for all other factors we find only one significant differ-
ence on account of partisanship. Being a New Democrat makes one weakly 
more altruistic towards completely anonymous individuals than being a Con-
servative. However, there is no difference between New Democrats and Lib-
eraIs, and no difference between LiberaIs and Conservatives. In keeping with 
previous findings, women donate $3.01 more than men. We do not find other 
significant sociodemographics effects. As expected, empathic respondents 
give significantly more. For the most basic measure of altruism, then, New 
Democrats appear to more altruistic than one other group of partisans. 
When altruism is measured as allocations to partisans of another party 
4Reported p-values for bivariate means tests are one-tailed. 
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Table 6.1: Dictator Came Allocations to Anonymous Individuals (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -1.940 (1.562) 
Conservative -2.856 t (1.607) 
New Democrat 0.000 (0.000) 
Income -0.290 (1.544) 
Education -2.340 (1.666) 
Female 3.099* (1.213) 
Age Croup 2.468 (2.199) 
Unemployed -4.691 (3.291) 
Empathy 9.159** (2.716) 
Intercept 18.485** (2.842) 
N 1958 
R2 0.017 
F (8,1949) 4.270 
Significance levels : t : 10% *: 5% ** : 1% 
(Table 6.2), we observe the following means: New Democrats give $22.90 
(sd = $20.26), Liberais give $16.13 (sd = $20.47), and Conservatives give 
$12.19 (sd = $19.94). As with giving to anonymous individuals, New Democrats 
appear more altruistic than Liberais (t = 5.44,p = .00) and Conservatives 
(t = 8.66,p = .00). Liberais also appear more altruistic than Conservatives 
(t = 3.85, p = .00). Controlling for all other factors, the marginal effect 
of being a Conservative is to give $9.33 (95%c.i. = $6.81, $11.84) less than 
New Democrats, while the marginal effect of being a Liberal is to give $5.91 
(95%c.i. = $3.46, $8.35) less than a New Democrat. Liberais demonstrate 
significantly more altruism than Conservatives (F = 10.76,p = .01) but sig-
nificantly less altruism than New Democrats. As in the case of anonymous 
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recipients, we find women are again more generous, giving $2.53 more than 
men. We also find that more educated respondents exhibit more altruism and 
older respondents demonstrate less. In keeping with the previous finding, the 
more empathie are also more generous. 
Table 6.2: Dictator Game Allocations to Other Partisans (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -5.908** (1.247) 
Conservative -9.326** (1.282) 
New Democrat 0.000 (0.000) 
Income -1.890 (1.232) 
Education -2.927* (1.329) 
Female 2.531 ** (0.968) 
Age Group -3.068t (1.755) 
Unemployed -3.264 (2.626) 
Empathy 7.356** (2.167) 
Intercept 21.622** (2.268) 
N 
R2 
F (8,1949) 
1958 
0.055 
14.164 
Significance levels : t: 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
When altruism is measured as an allocation to co-partisans (Table 6.3), 
we observe the following means: New Democrats give $31.92 (sd = $25.07), 
LiberaIs give $24.35 (sd = $24.99), and Conservatives give $23.82 (sd = 
$25.29). Once again, New Democrats appear more altruistic than LiberaIs 
(t = 4.96,p = .00) and Conservatives (t = 5.21,p = .00). However, there ap-
pears to be no difference between LiberaIs and Conservatives (t = 0.41, p= 
.34). Controlling for aIl other factors, we find that those identifying as Lib-
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eral or Conservative demonstrate significantly less altruism than those who 
identify as New Democrats. The difference is equal to approximately $7.00; 
the difference between Liberal and Conservatives does not achieve statistical 
significance. There are no significant sociodemographic predictors. However, 
empathy is very powerful. 
Table 6.3: Dictator Came Allocations to Co-Partisans (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -7.060** (1.551) 
Conservative -6.945** (1.596) 
New Democrat 0.000 (0.000) 
Income -2.195 (1.533) 
Education -0.810 (1.654) 
Female 0.885 (1.205) 
Age Croup 2.308 (2.183) 
Unemployed -2.548 (3.268) 
Empathy 13.228** (2.697) 
Intercept 23.390** (2.822) 
N 1958 
R2 0.031 
F (8,1949) 7.893 
Significance levels : t: 10% *: 5% ** : 1% 
As a final test, we have pooled our observations across allocations and run 
a fourth model. In this case the dependent variable is Pooled Allocations. We 
include the same demographic controls as before, as well as variables indi-
cating whether the allocation was to a Co-PaTtisan or to an OtheT PaTtisan. 
Allocations to anonymous individuals by New Democrats serve as the refer-
ence group. As we have muÏtiple observations for each respondent, we specify 
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robust standard errors. 
The results from the pooled model confirm the results found above. Lib-
eral and Conservative partisans exhibit significantly less altruism than New 
Democrats, on average. However, they do not differ significantly from one 
another (F = 1.47,p = .23). Second, we find that all partisans allocate 
significantly less to other partisans than to anonymous individuals and to 
co-partisans. Third, we find a significant difference between allocations to 
anonymous individuals and (larger) allocations to co-partisans. Finally, we 
find that the more empathie are more generous, as are women. We fail to 
find significant effects for age, income, or education. 
Table 6.4: Pooled Dictator Came Allocations (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.) 
Liberal -4.936** (1.303) 
Conservative -6.334** (1.323) 
Other Partisan -7.120** (0.415) 
Co-Partisan 2.574** (0.450) 
Female 2.139* (1.002) 
Income -1.493 (1.275) 
Education -2.045 (1.320) 
Unemployed -3.565 (2.592) 
Empathy 9.897** (2.254) 
Intercept 23.068** (2.012) 
N 
R2 
F (9,1957) 
5874 
0.056 
79.387 
Significance levels: t: 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Taken together, these results suggest that partisanship matters for altru-
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ism. The differences we find - that partisans discriminate between partisans 
and among partisans and non-partisans - conform to a more positive and 
less suspicious view of fellow partisans. They also conform to the view that 
partisans feel socially doser to their co-partisans than to other partisans 
(Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; 
Greene, 2004; Goeree et al., 2008; Eckel and Grossman, 1996) 
As discussed above, the fact that our sample may overrepresent the po-
litically sophisticated could lead to inferences which do not generalize to the 
entire population of partisans. To check against this, we ran each regres-
sion on two different subgroups: the low educated and the highly educated, 
defined as those with at least sorne university education. In each case, the rel-
ative positioning of the parties did not change (i.e. New Democrats revealed 
more altruism than LiberaIs, and LiberaIs sometimes revealed more altruism 
than Conservatives). The differences of note are that among low education 
partisans, LiberaIs do not behave more altruistically than Conservatives; and 
among high education partisans, Conservative display significantly less altru-
ism than New Democrats. In the pooled analysis among the highly-educated, 
LiberaIs appear more generous than Conservatives. These differences in sig-
nificance aside, we are confident that the relationship between partisanship 
and altruism generalizes to the larger population of partisans in Canada. 5 
5These supplernentary tables are available in Annexe J. 
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Partisans differ from non-partisans and they differ from one another in their 
views on issues and in their poiiticai behavior. We have examined whether 
partisans differ in their levels of basic altruism as revealed in a series of dicta-
tor games. Our results suggest that in two of three cases New Democrats are 
significantly more altruistic than Conservatives and LiberaIs. In the case of 
other partisans, Liberais are significantly more altruistic than Conservatives. 
These findings have two important implications. Methodologically, we 
have shown how we can use an experimental framework and tools borrowed 
from a cognate discipline - in this case, experimental or behavioural eco-
nomics - to learn about partisanship. Similar techniques have been used to 
explore altruism and voting (Fowler, 2006; Fowler and Kam, 2007; Loewen, 
2008a), interethnic trust (Whitt and Wilson, 2007), and preferences for pub-
lic spending (Loewen, 2008b). The experimental turn in political science 
(Druckman et aL, 2006) still has much to teach us. 
The larger substantive implication of these findings is that partisans main-
tain distinct views of other partisans and that these views are important 
enough to effect their level of altruism. This conforms to a view of partisan-
ship as not just a perceptual screen for the filtering of information (Campbell 
et al., 1960; Bartels, 2002) and not just a standing opinion or running tally 
(Fiorina, 1981). Instead, partisanship involves viewing partisans as distinct 
social groupings (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Greene, 2004), sorne 
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of whom are more deserving of help than others. Wh en these findings are 
combined with more recent findings about the deep-rooted nature of parti-
sanship (Dawes and Fowler, 2008; Settle, Dawes and Fowler, 2008) an im-
portant puzzle emerges: do altruistic individuals choose to identify with the 
New Democratie Party with greater frequency or does identification with the 
party lead to a more altruistic orientation? Understanding how individuals 
sort themselves into different parties and then have their views shaped by 
this identification is an open and important question. That such stark dif-
ferences in a basic behavior present along partisan lines oilly increases the 
importance of this question. 
Chapitre 7 
Does Compulsory Voting Lead 
to More Informed and Engaged 
Citizens: An experimental test 
(with Henry Milner and Bruce 
M. Hicks) 
Forthcoming at The Canadian Journal of Political Science. Henry Milner 
initiated the pT'Oject and secured the agreement of the participating institution 
and the Director Geneml of Elections. Milner, Hicks and Loewen designed the 
experiment. Loewen performed the analysis and dmfted the joumal version 
of the article (an eaTlier version appeared as a working paper dmfted in equal 
parts by all three authors). Loewen saw the article thT'Ough the submission 
and revision pT'Ocess. 
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7.1 Introduction 
In his well-known Presidential Address to the American Political Science 
Association, Arend Lijphart (1997) called for compulsory voting as a solu-
tion to unequal electoral participation in the United States. In doing so, he 
res'tated the main arguments of the advocates of compulsory voting. Most 
importantly, compulsory voting would increase turnout in elections. Sec-
ond, compulsory voting would lead to a more politically knowledgeable and 
engaged electorate. l 
There can be no quibble with Lijphart's first assertion, which we regard 
as- a first-order effect of compulsory voting. The cross-sectional (Jackman, 
1987; Blais and Cart y, 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska, 1998; Franklin, 1996, 
2004) and quasi-experimental (Hirczy, 1994) evidence for this daim is dear. 
Compulsory voting increases turnout in national elections on average by sorne 
10 to 15 percentage points - and even more in regional and local elections. 
However, the evidence for the second-order effects of compulsory voting is 
mu ch less dear, at least partly because of the difficulty of making causal 
daims about cross-national differences in more subjective variables like po-
litical knowledge and engagement. 
We argue that an experimental approach is an appropriate way in which 
to address this gap in our knowledge. To this end, we conducted an exper-
iment in the winter of 2007 in the midst of the Quebec provincial election. 
1 Lijphart also daimed that compulsory voting cou Id reduce the incentive for attack ads 
and reduce the influence of money in politics. We do not test these daims. 
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Our experiment required that one group of (first-time) voters complete two 
surveys to receive a monetary reward, while another group was also required 
to vote in the provincial election. That is, they faced a financial penalty 
if they chose to abstain from voting. We take between-group differences in 
knowledge, news consumption, and political discussion as measures of the 
second-order effects of compulsory voting. To anticipate our findings, we 
find little evidence of the second-order effects of compulsory voting. 
In section 2, we briefly review existing knowledge on the second-order 
effects of compulsory voting. In doing so, we draw a connection between 
the lack of current evidence and the value of an experimental approach, an 
approach which is gaining currency in political science (see Druckman et al., 
2006). In section 3, we first operationalize Lijphart 's second-order daim in 
the form of three hypotheses and then describe our experimental design and 
procedure. In section 4, we present our results. We then condude. 
7.2 Existing Knowledge and the Case for Ex-
perimentation 
We lack a body of systematic empirical knowledge about the second-order 
effects of compulsory voting. For example, Bilodeau and Blais (2005) could 
uncover no empirical studies to support Lipjhart's daim. To fill the gap, 
they attempted to substantiate his daim in three ways. They first examined 
whether citizens in Western European countries with compulsory voting re-
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port that they discussed politics more than those in non-compulsory coun-
tries. Second, they examined the behaviour of immigrants to New Zealand 
from compulsory-voting Australia. Third, they examined the behaviour of 
immigrants to Australia from compulsory voting countries. In each case they 
sought differences in reported levels of political discussion, inter est in politics 
and attitudes toward voting, but were unable to find evidence of second-order 
effects due to compulsory voting. 
A recent analysis of Belgian survey data by Engelen and Hooghe (2007) 
could not find evidence Qf knowledge effects from compulsory voting. They 
used the hypothetical question "what if voting were not compulsory" to iso-
late those who vote to avoid sanction. They find evidence that those who 
vote to avoid sanction are less knowledgable about and engaged in politics, 
suggesting that while compulsory voting is effective at bringing the other-
wise less engaged to the polls, it is not necessarily effective at increasing 
their knowledge levels .. Another recent study using data from the Polish 
Election Survey used the same method in reverse, asking non-voters what 
they would do if voting were compulsory (Czesnik, 2007). Not surprisingly, 
those who reported voting to avoid sanction were the least interested and 
knowledgeable. As with the Belgian study, this merely demonstrates that 
compulsory voting would bring the otherwise less knowledgable to the polls. 
Finally, Ballinger (2007) looked at the British and Australian evidence, con-
cluding that Australian respondents are no better-informed about political 
systems than British respondents. 
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While all of these studies are informative, they illustrate two method-
ological obstacles to testing the second-order effects of compulsory voting. 
First, in contrast to an objective measure like turnout, there is a major 
problem with cross-national comparability in survey questions tapping po-
litical knowledge. It is very difficult to establish that two national scales are 
measuring the same type and amount of political knowledge (King et al., 
2004). Moreover, even if our scales are measuring exactly the same quan-
tities, we cannot be certain that each country requires the same amount of 
knowledge for effective democraticcitizenship. Second, even if one can co.me 
up with directly comparable measures of survey knowledge, the analyst will 
still be confronted with a problem of unobserved heterogeneity. It is entirely 
plausible that countries which adopt compulsory voting are also those which 
have a more engaged citizenry than those countries which do not require 
compulsory voting. Rence, we cannot assume that any observed differences 
are a function of compulsory voting and not sorne unobserved variable(s) in 
the populations (Gerber, Green and Kaplan, 2004). 
In the absence of a change in electoral law within a country allowing 
for a before-and-after quasi-experiment, there is no unambiguous empirical 
basis f?r determining the second-order effects of compulsory voting. What 
is needed, therefore, is a method which decouples the presence of compul-
sory voting from pre-existing levels of citizen engagement and knowledge. 
One such method is an experiment which randomly assigns sorne voters to 
a treatment which resembles one context (i.e. compulsory voting), while as-
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signing others to a control condition. This is an analytical strategy in keeping 
with the experimental turn in political science (Druckman et al., 2006; Mc-
Dermott, 2002; Lupia, 2002; Druckman and Lupia, 2007). We now describe 
and report results from one such experiment. 
7.3 Hypotheses and Experimental Design 
7.3.1 Hypoth~ses 
Following Lijphart, compulsory could lead to a more informed and engaged 
electorate (Lijphart, 1997, 10). We operationalize these second-order effects 
in the form of three hypotheses: 
• Hl: Those who face a financial incentive against abstention should learn 
more about politics than those who do not face a similar incentive. 
• H2: Those who face a financial incentive against abstention should 
discuss politics more frequently than those who do not face a similar 
incentive. 
• H3: Those who face a financial incentive against abstention should 
follow the news more frequently than those who do not face a similar 
incentive. 
To each of the se three hypotheses we add this common extension: the 
second-order effects should be greatest among those who would not otherwise 
210 
go to the polIs. 
To test these hypotheses, we conducted an experiment among eligible-
to-vote students at a Montréal CEGEP during the March 2007 provincial 
election. The logic of our experimental design is quite simple. We recruited 
a group of students to participate in a study about 'youth attitudes', consist-
ing of two surveys administered approximately one-month apart, at either 
end of a provincial election campaign. AlI students who completed these 
surveys were eligible to receive $25 (CDN).2 However, to receive this money 
1 
a randomly selected subset of the students were also required to vote in 
the provincial election.a Accordingly, we were left with two groups, one of 
which faced a financial disincentive if they chose not to vote, the other of 
which faced no such disincentive. By comparing differences between these 
two groups in political knowledge, media news consumption and reported 
discussion about politics, we are able to draw inferences about the effects 
of compulsory' voting-like incentives on voters, especiaIly first-time voters. 
We note that those in our treatment condition faced a financial incentive 
to vote, wh.ich is not theoretically identical to the prospect of losing money 
through a fine (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979b; Kahneman, 2003; Cohen and 
Blum, 2002). However, we feel confident that, for the pur poses of our exper-
2This compares with compulsory voting fines of $20 (AUS) in Australia, and far exceeds 
fines in countries such as Argentina (approximately $3,25 to 6.50 (CDN)) or sorne Swiss 
cantons (approximately $3 (CDN)). 
3The requirement that aU participants be entitled to be paid was a requirement of the 
Director General of Elections, so that in a formai sense it was not a matter of people being 
paid to vote. 
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iment, this sufficiently approximates compulsion. Moreover, it is the closest 
we could come within reasonable ethical limitations. 
The office of the Director General of Elections in Quebec is responsible 
for the administration of elections in the province, including the registration 
of voters and the administration of polling stations. Their cooperation made 
it possible to verify voting by our subjects.4 The survey was conducted at 
Vanier College, a Montreal English-Ianguage CEGEP with over 5000 students 
from a variety of socio-economic 'groups and a wide number of ethnicities, 
the majority of whom are in pre-university programs. 
7.3.2 Subject Recruitment and Survey Administration 
Recruitment occurred in over 60 Vanier College classes, specifically targeting 
students in pre-university social science and commerce general education 
courses (i.e. those with minimal admission requirements). The targeted 
classes were those most likely to contain students who would be at least 18. 
years of age on Election Day, the voting age in Quebec (as in the rest of 
Canada). Interested students were asked to fill out a registration form. This 
form contained ten unrelated questions, 5 one of which asked if the students 
expected to vote in the upcoming Quebec election. 
Our subject recruitment occurred in two waves. First, once the election 
was formally announced, 205 students who filled out the forms and who 
4We should like to note that this required no sm ail effort on the part of the DGE. 
5This included questions such as "Do you play sports on campus?", "Do you own a 
cellphone?", and "Do you plan to go on to university?" 
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were eligible to vote were invited by email or telephone to complete the 
questionnaire in a class-room at the coUege on a given date and time. Our 
initial sample included aU students who indicated on the recruitment form 
that they did not expect to vote. The balance of participants were drawn 
randomly from those who indicated they intended to vote. Half of the 205 
were randomly assigned to two treatment rooms and the other half were 
randomly assigned to two control rooms. 6 In total, 55 students showed up as 
instructed. AU subjects were administered instructions, a research consent 
form and a questionnaire, with the only difference being the subjects who 
attended the two treatment rooms were informed of the future obligation 
to vote. Subjects in the control group rooms were not informed that any 
subjects were being asked to vote. The subjects were not told that the 
survey was associated in any way with the election, only that there would be 
a second questionnaire in approximately one month's time. 
To exp and our sample, we then sent out an email or telephoned those who 
did not turn up at the first invitation and to 255 of the remaining students 
who hàd fiUed out the forms (and stated that it was likely they would vote). 
We offered the option of either completing the attached sur vey by email or 
completing it in a secretary's office on the coUege campus at a time of their 
convenience (within a five-day window). Once again, assignment to treat-
6Vanier College has two closely-situated campuses. To ensure maximum ease of par-
ticipation, students were given a choice of coming to a room on' either of the campuses, 
and the time coincided with the weekly universal break when no classes are supposed to 
be scheduled. This break occurs in the middle of day. 
.1 
213 
ment was randomly determined (for details coneerning the randomization 
proeess, see Annexe K). At the end of the first round we had 82 subjects in 
the control condition and 101 in the treatment condition. Overall, 52 pereent 
of subjects completed the first survey online, while the remainder filled out 
a paper copy version. Results of this first survey displayed no significant 
differences between our control and treatment group in political knowledge, 
political discussion, or media usage. Moreover, we could find no significant 
bivariate differences in demographics. We take this as evidence of proper 
randomization and balance (see Annexe K for more details). 
The second round of the survey was administered in the five days prior 
to the election. All subjects from the first round of the survey were emailed 
the second survey and asked to complete it online or to complete it in on 
paper at the same secretary's office within the five day window. The email 
text differed for those in the treatment and control groups only in regards 
to the obligation to vote. The deadline tocomplete the second questionnaire 
coincided with the close of polls on Election Day (March 26, 2007). One-
hundred and forty-three (143) students completed the second questionnaire 
(all but six corn pleted i t electronically). 
All subjects had to complete and sign a research consent form in person 
to give permission to the college to provide the DGE with their name and 
address in order to verify that they had voted. Renee, excluding those who 
failed to fill out consent forms as well as those who we could not officially 
confirm had voted, we had 55 subjects in the control group and 66 in the 
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treatment group at the end of the study.7 
7.3.3 Survey and Dependent Variables 
Those subjects who chose to participate in the experiment (either on paper 
or online) were aIl given the same survey. The first survey asked them a 
number of questions about media usage, political discussion, and attitudes 
toward politics and political involvement, followed by 11 political knowledge 
questions. 
As the overall pur pose of the experiment is to determine whether those 
who have a financial incentive to vote (or a financial disincentive not to vote) 
engage more in and learn more about politics, we carefully selected a variety 
of different knowledge questions. These ranged from questions about the 
positions of the parties on the issues (e.g. on raising university tuition), to 
relevant political facts (e.g. which party was in power wh en the election was 
caIled), to knowledge about the elections, (date, and eligibility to vote). In 
sum, we included a variety of knowledge questions which should distinguish 
those with a rudimentary knowledge about politics generally and current 
Quebec politics specifically. We did much the same with the second ques-
tionnaire. However, we added several political knowledge questions, bringing 
the total to 20. Nine repeated the previous questions verbatim, two repeated 
7The attrition rate between the first and second round surveys was slightly higher 
among those in the treatment condition than the control condition (32.9% and 34.7% 
respectively). We have excluded those whom the DGE could not find on a voters list so 
as to verify their having voted. 
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them in altered form, and 9 new questions were added, almost aIl of which 
were closely linked to developments in the campaign (These questions are 
available in Annexe L). We are confident that the full battery of questions 
provides an appropriate instrument for uncovering any significant knowledge 
differences between our two groups relevant to electoral participation in this 
time and place. A variable caIled Knowledge measures respondents' political 
knowledge as a percentage of questions correctly answered. 
We measure political discussionusing four questions. The first two ques-
tions ask respondents how often they foIlow what is occurring in "government 
and public affairs" and how closely they have followed the Quebec election. 
Each question allows four response categories ranging from "Never" to "Most 
of the time." The next two questions query how often respondents discuss 
current events with friends and family, with response categories ranging from 
"Never" to "Very often". We scale each of these responses from 0 to 1, and 
then create a variable, Discussion, which averages these scores. Accordingly, 
a subject with a high score follows current events and discusses them with 
friends and family. A subject with a lower score engages in less such discus-
sion. 
Our final dependent variable is Media Usage. We queried subjects on 
how many days a week they read the newspaper, watch the national news 
on TV, listen to news on the radio, or read news on the internet. Our final 
variable measures the average number of days a week an individual consumes 
aIl of these media. Accordingly, a subject with the maximum possible score 
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(7) would consume all of these media every day, whereas a subject with the 
lowest possible score (0) would consume none of these media on any day of 
the week. 
7.3.4 Sample Profile 
Table 7.1 presents a profile of our final subjects and their scores on relevant 
variables. Our subject pool certainly refiects what we would expect from 
a convenience sample at an English CEGEP. Our subjects are young and 
principally English. While they are likely more interested in politics than 
their peers who declined to participate in the survey, they cannot easily be 
described as politically sophisticated. In the first round of the survey, sub-
jects answered less than one in three knowledge questions correctly (28.4%). 
In the second survey, the percent age of correctly answered questions rose to 
just 43.1%, and this despite the majority of the questions being repetitions 
of first round questions. Similarly, our subjects cannot be easily described as 
"news junkies" or political conversationalists. Indeed, subjects report con-
suming news on the radio, TV, internet and newspaper less than two days per 
week. The average subject would only report discussing news with family and 
friends somewhere between rarely and sometimes. Finally, when we examine 
the other political activities of our subjects, we do not find strong evidence of 
political engagement. Just one in twenty subjects have ever written a news-
paper or contacted a television or radio program regarding a political issue. 
Only half of subjects report ever having signed a written or email petition. 
/ 
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We do not have general population statistics with which to compare these 
scores. However, we are inclined to believe that our sample does not grossI y 
over-represent political sophisticates. lndeed, the growth in knowledge be-
tween the first and second rounds of the survey suggests that subjects were 
capable of learning more over the course of an election. And subjects could 
certainly increase their media consumption and political discussion if so in-
clined .. In sum, this is a reasonable sample on which to test the proposition 
that compulsory voting encourages greater political engagement, as growth 
in these measures over the course of the campaign was possible. 
Table 7.1: Sample Profile 
Age 
Female 
First Language French 
First Language English 
First Language Other . 
First Round Knowledge Score 
Second Round Knowledge Score 
First Round News Consumption 
Second Round News Consumption 
First Round Discussion Score 
Second Round Discussion Score 
Contacted a Newspaper 
Called into TV or Radio 
Taken part in a protest 
Signed a petition 
Mean 
18.9 
75.2% 
19.0% 
60.3% 
20.7% 
28.4% 
41.6% 
2.72 
2.27 
0.60 
0.52 
5.0% 
5.7% 
22.5% 
52.1% 
(S.D.) 
(1.36) 
(43.3%) 
(39.3%) 
(49.1 %) 
(40.7%) 
(18.5%) 
(22.7%) 
(1.45) 
(1.33) 
(0.16) 
(0.16) 
(21.8%) 
(23.4%) 
(41.9%) 
(50.1%) 
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7.4 Results 
We find little support in our data for the above hypotheses.8 Table 7.2 
presents differences in Knowledge, Discussion, and Media Usage according 
to treatment. The cells under control and treatment present a mean and 
a standard deviation for each group. The final row provides the results or 
a t-test of mean differences between those who received the treatment and 
those who did not. 
As can be seen, the overall difference in knowledge scores in the second 
round between groups under treatment and control conditions is not signif-
icant. On average, both groups appear to be able to answer approximately 
four of ten political knowledge questions correctly. 
We next consider the possibility that the treatment students did try to 
learn more about politics but were unable to do so. We find no evidence that 
they increased their general engagement with politics through discussion, 
which could have signalled greater effort at learning. Rather, by the end 
of the campaign those in control and treatment both appeared to engage in 
conversation with friends and family somewhere between the "Rarely" and 
"Sometimes" response categories. 
When it cornes to media usage, however, there is sorne indication that 
subjects in the treatment condition consumed more news by the end of the 
8 As we found no significant differences between treatment and control conditions in 
our first round scores, we limit the analysis to second round scores. We have done similar 
analysis using differences between first and second round scores as dèpendent variables. 
Substantive results do not change. 
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campaign than those in the control condition. Media usage does seem to 
increase with treatment, though not at a 95% significance level. The estimate 
suggests that those in the control condition on average reported consuming 
aIl forms of news an average of 2.05 days out of 7, while those in the treatment 
condition reported consuming aIl forms of news 2.43 days out of 7. It is hard 
to know how much significance to attribute to this as we do not know at which 
point greater media consumption begins to bestow knowledge benefits, or at 
which point it signaIs a more engaged electorate. In itself, it is consonant 
with the daims of compulsory voting advocates, but it leaves a new puzzle 
in that it does not manifest itself in any measurable increase in knowledge. 
Table 7.2: Effects of compulsory voting treatment on political knowledge, 
political discussion, and media usage (mean differences) 
Knowledge Score 
Discussion Score 
Media Usage 
N 
Control (S.D) 
0.40 (0.21) 
0.52 (0.16) 
2.05 (1.15) 
55 
Treatment (S.D.) 
0.43 (0.24) 
0.52 (0.17) 
2.43 (1.45) 
66 
p, Trt>Ctrl 
0.25 
0.48 
0.07 
Aside from our media usage finding, we have not found support for the 
hypotheses that financiaIly compelling individuals to vote causes them to 
become more politically attentive and knowledgeable citizens. It is possible 
that this is because our treatment was sim ply not strong enough. lndeed, in 
the case of sorne subjects, our monetary incentive was not enough to compel 
them to vote. This reasonably leads to the question of whether we can expect 
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to find second-order effects where no first-order effects are present. A more 
fair test of Lijphart's hypotheses would be to exclude those in the treatment 
condition who did not vote, and to look for effects particularly among those 
who did not intend to vote at the outset of the study but were assigned the 
treatment and voted. We test this proposition in Table 7.3. We limit our 
analysis to those in the control condition who completed both surveys and 
those in the treatment condition who completed both surveys and voted. 9 
Our approach is to use an OLS regression with the following form: 
y (K nowledge) = a + ,81 * TTeatment + ,82 * Exp Vote + ,83 * 
ExpVote *TTeatment +,84 * Allo+,85 * FTench +,86 * Female+ E 
where: 
TTeatment indicates the subject was in the treatment condition; 
Exp Vote indicates the subject initially reported that they expected to 
vote; 
Exp Vote *TTeatment is an interaction between TTeatment and Exp Vote; 
Allo indicates an Allophone respondent; 
FTench indicates a French respondent; and, 
9This regression do es not include those in the treatment group who we have identified 
as non-voting. But, it does include IlOll-voters in the control group. The reason for the 
exclusion is that we want to isolate effects among those for whom the experiment worked 
(i.e. those who voted) and then compare them to what our "electorate" would look like 
without compulsory voting (i.e. one which included vot ers and non-voters). 
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Female indicates a female respondent; 
If we wish to isolate the effect of treatment (treatment= l) on initial non-
voters (voter=O), we are left with the following equation: 
y (Knowledge) = a + ,61 * Treatment +,64 * Allo + ,65 * French + 
,66 * Female + E 
Accordingly, the specific effect of compulsory voting on the knowledge acqui-
sition (or levels of discussion or media usage) among non-voters is captured 
by the coefficient on Treatment. 10 
We should note that we do not include several other variables which we 
know are related to political knowledge and engagement (see Fournier, 2002). 
Because we are using a randomly assigned experiment, we can assume that 
these factors are equally present in both our control and treatment conditions. 
lncluding them theoretically should not change the estimated effects of the 
compulsory voting treatment. Accordingly, we exclude them and rest with a 
more simple model. 
As Table 7.3 demonstrates, while we find a treatment effect on news con-
sumption for those who intended to vote in the first place, we can find no 
effect of the treatment for those who would otherwise be non-voters. We are 
unable to reject the null hypothesis that compulsory voting do es not increase 
the news consumption of non-voters. Moreover, on both our knowledge vari-
lOThe treatment effect for those who intended to vote and did vote is captured by the 
addition of the Treatment coefficient and the Treatment*Exp Voter interaction coefficient. 
Finally, the effect of expecting to vote in the first place is captured by Expected to Vote. 
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Table 7.3: Effect of treatment on knowledge, news consumption and discus-
sion of politics for voters and non-vot ers (OLS) 
Knowledge t News t Discussion 
Treatment -0.06 -0.54 -0.70 -1.03 -0.07 
Expected to Vote 0.11 1.47 -0.03 -0.07 0.12** 
Treatment*Exp to Vote 0.11 0.94 1.40* 1.91 0.06 
Allophone -0.03 -0.58 -0.10 -0.31 -0.03 
Francophone 0.10* 1.76 -0.30 -0.90 0.01 
Female 0.00 -0.05 -0.43 -1.41 -0.04 
Constant 0.30** 3.74 2.52** 5.35 0.47** 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.10 
N 107 103 107 
* = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.05 
able and discussion variable, we cannot find a significant effect of treatment 
either among those who intended to vote or those who did not. In sum, our 
data do not give us any good basis for rejecting the null hypotheses: to the 
extent that our experiment reproduces a compulsory voting environment, we 
do not find that compulsory voting boosts political knowledge or discussion 
about politics. All that is left is a small effect on media usage among those 
who originally intended to vote. 
7.5 Conel usion 
There is little question about the first-order effects of compulsory voting. 
Countries which have compulsory votingexhibit significantly higher levels 
t 
-1.03 
2.61 
0.77 
-0.81 
0.45 
-1.63 
9.25 
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of voter turnout. This alone may be enough to recommend its implemen-
tation. Its second-order effects, however, are much less established. We 
have attempted to test one mechanism by which second-order effects may be 
generated, namely financial compulsion. 
If a relationship between compulsory voting and greater political engage-
ment exists, it is likely so for a number reasons beyond mere financial com-
pulsion. Political parties in compulsory voting envirohments may exp end 
more effort educating voters. Or, countries with compulsory voting may also 
possess or develop a political culture which encourages greater engagement 
in politics. Or, compulsory voting may compel the media to place a greater 
effort on educating voters. There are, in other words, many plausible mecha-
nisms by which compulsory voting may be associated with increased political 
engagement. However, as we have argued, we cannot easily adjudicate be-
tween these by cross-sectional research alone. An experimental approach can 
fill sorne of this gap. 
We have used such an approach to answer a very specifie question: do 
the financial incentives of a compulsory voting environment increase citizen 
knowledge, discussion, and media consumption. Our results suggest that 
though a sufficient motivator for getting an uninformed voter to the polIs, 
avoiding forgoing money cannot be assumed to be a sufficient motivator for 
getting him or her to learn more about politics. Our results thus place the 
baIl back in the court of the advocates of compulsory voting; especially those 
who suggest that individuals will seek out more information so as to make 
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correct decisions when compelled to vote. This is hardly the end of the story. 
But advocates of compulsory voting will need to provide a more compelling, 
empirically-based micro-story about how it makes for better - or at least 
more informed - citizens. 
8 
Conclusion 
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8.1 Introduction 
This dissertation set out to demonstrate the application of experimentation 
in political science, especially in political behaviour and political psychology. 
It took up a deliberately eclectic set of questions in an attempt to show that 
several different types of experiments can be deployed to answer several out-
standing questions. Taken together, the results suggest that there is mu ch to 
learn from an experimental approach. By extension, the results also suggest 
that the relative paucity of experimentation in political science is likely un-
warranted. Indeed, it is more likely the result of a non-experimental culture 
within empirical political science than of the theoretical or empirical unsuit-
ability of experimentation. There is little which theoretically or practically 
rules out the use of (more) experimentation in most domains of political sci-
ence. Following a summary of my work, l draw out five more implications of 
this work for our discipline. The first three are methodological while the last 
two are substantive. l then suggest future research questions and directions. 
l finish with a final word. 
8.2 Summary 
Chapter 2 presented results from a large online survey exploring the relation-
ship betweenaltruism and preferences for public spending. Using agame 
from behavioural economics (the dictator game) , l induced respondents to 
reveal their levels of altruism or concern for others. Then, using a series of 
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questions about new public spending programs, l determined the maximum 
amount of money that each respondent was willing to pay for new programs. 
In a series of models, l demonstrated that those individuals who reveal a 
higher degree of altruism also express a greater willingness to pay for new 
public spending programs. Whereas previous works have demonstrated a 
link between altruism and support for public spending, this is the first to 
observe altruism in a dictator game experimentand then show its ability to 
predict public spending preferences. As such, it provides clear evidence of a 
non-self-interested basis for public spending preferences. 
Chapter 3 similarly used a dictator game experiment to explain an impor-
tant political puzzle. Political scientists have long-wondered why we see such 
high levels of voter participation when any single voter has infinitesimally low 
odds of affecting the outcome of an election. To explain this paradox of par-
ticipation, l present a formaI explanation closely modeled on those of Fowler 
and Kam (2007) and Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan (2007). My model draws 
attention to two different feelings which partisans can hold. The first is affin-
ity for those who support the same party as them. The second is antipathy 
towards those who support another party. Because election outcomes matter 
for the well-being of the supporters of each party, the model demonstrates 
that those who feel affinity and/or antipathy should be more likely to vote. l 
confirm this empirically by inducing subjects to reveal their levels of affinity 
and antipathy in a dictator game experiment and then demonstrating that 
these two variables both positively predict voter participation. Moreover, 
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they do so in the face of several conventional explanations, such as parti-
san identification, education, age, income, gender, election competitiveness, 
and media attentiveness. This chapter thus uses an experimental game to 
demonstrate the importance of other-regarding orientations for the decision 
to participate in politics. 
Chapter 4 presented results from a field experimental test of the persua-
sive capacities of direct mail in a party leadership race. Workingwith a 
front-running campaign, we tested whether a candidate who communicated 
controversial policy positions could be successful in changing the minds of 
party elites. As such, the work represents several important extensions. It 
pushes field experimentation into Canada and into elite politics. It also ex-
tends this method into the study of the strategic communication of political 
leaders, an important and growing field of research in political science. Our 
findings are equally important. Contrary to the campaign's expectations, 
direct mail failed to persuade delegates. What is more, it appears to have 
made their evaluations of the candidate and his positions more negative. As 
such, our rèsults raise an important caveat for those campaigning among 
elites. The communication of controversial positions risks not only falling on 
deaf ears but also making elites less favourable towards a candidate. 
Chapter 5 presented a statistical method for the analysis of survey exp er-
iments in which two arguments are pitted against one another. The Bradley-
Terry model, typically used in biology and other natural sciences, was shown 
to be more efficient at uncovering the differences in power between argu-
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ments. It was also shown to be more efficient at uncovermg the cause of 
differences in power between arguments. We demonstrated this using a sur-
vey experiment conducted during the 2007 referendum on electoral reform in 
the province of Ontario. As such, we learned important facts about why the 
existing electoral system was retained in that province. To wit, there was a 
general bias for the status quo, but there was also an unambiguous advantage 
for arguments which appealed to local representation. This substantiaIly ad-
vantaged the existing system. More generaIly, this work shows that matching 
the theoretical properties of statistical models with the experiments they are 
analyzing can lead to clearer and more informative results. 
Chapter 6 asked whether sorne partisans in Canada are more altruistic 
than other partisans. This question has not yet been answered in Canada, 
though one can imagine that many opinions abound among partisans as to 
who is the most virtuous! This is likely because altruism is difficult to observe 
unambiguously in real world settings. We overcome this problem by having 
partisans reveal their altruism towards others through a series of dictator 
games. In this controIled environment, we were able to vary the recipient 
of a respondent's altruism. Comparing differences by recipient revealed two 
facts about partisanship and altruism unknown until now. First, aIl partisans 
in Canada are most altruistic towards their co-partisans and least generous 
towards other partisans. Their generosity to those whose partisanship they 
do not know faIls between these two extremes. Sec'ond, New Democratic 
partisans are more altruistic, on average, than Liberal and Conservative par-
230 
tisans. Taken together, these results raise important questions about the 
origins and effects of partisanship. 
Chapter 7 asked whether, as claimed by advocates, compulsory voting is 
effective at increasing the political knowledge, attention, and discussion of 
voters. The answer to this question has thus far remained unclear, due in no 
small part to the difficulty of making causal inferences from cross-national 
survey data. To proffer an answer to this question, we randomly assigned a 
group of voting-age college students to complete sur veys at either end of a 
provincial election in exchange for a monetary reward. We randomly assigned 
a second group to similarly complete two surveys, but also to vote in the 
election, in exchange for the same monetary reward. As the only difference 
between these two groups is the monetary compulsion to vote among the 
second group, any differences in political knowledge, attention, or discussion 
can be attributed to being in a compulsory voting condition. We are un able to 
reject the hypothesis that compùlsory voting has no effect on these variables, 
with the exception of a weak effect on political attention. While this is 
hardly the end of the debate, it does represent the most clear extant empirical 
evidence against the claims of compulsory voting advocates. The strength of 
this claim is, in no small apart, a result of its experimental basis. 
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8.3 Implications 
8.3.1 Methodological Implications 
It may not be obvious that such an eclectic lot of chapters would generate 
clear implications for our discipline. But l suggest that there are, for me at 
least, three clear methodological lessons to be learned from these chapters. 
First, collaboration matters. The efficiencies in collaboration do not come 
from the division of labour, particularly in writing. Indeed, my own expe-
rience is that any such efficiency gains are lost in the conversations which 
precede and follow the writing! But collaboration is clearly beneficial for the 
generation of ideas, for the refining of arguments, and for the execution of 
experiments. As l was not randomly assigned to these papers and these col-
laborators, l cannot say what the resulting work would have been like had l 
toiled alone. However, it is my own experience that in the case of this work, 
it was made better by collaboration. The larger data from our discipline 
would suggest that experimental work is more collaborative and also exerts 
a larger influence on our discipline. l would suggest that these elements are 
aIl related, and l recommend them strongly going forward. 
Second, while experiments may appear prohibitively expensive and prac-
tically difficult, they need not be in practice. The unrivalled clarityof the 
insights offered by experiments makes them appealing not only to academics 
but also to practitioners. Each experiment presented in this dissertation 
represented a partnership between the author(s) and sorne implementing or-
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ganization, whether a political campaign, a commercial polling firm, or a 
government body 'and policy think tank. By asking clear questions and gen-
erating clear answers of value to practitioners, political scientists can develop 
experimental studies which others 'are willing to aid in implementing. We 
should not, then, be put off by the initial apparent difficulty in funding and 
implementing experiments. 
Third, experimental political science presents many opportunities for ar-
bitrage, which in turn allows experimentalists to have an impact on many 
questions of interest. Because experimental methods can offer clarity where 
previous observational approaches have provided confiicting accounts, exp er-
imentalists can make a contribution to existing questions at a lower cost than 
their observationalist counterparts. Consider the example of the second-order 
effects of compulsory voting. Rather than relying on potentially incompa-
rable survey questions in a number of countries, and rather thari waiting 
on some country to change from compulsory to non-compulsory voting, or 
vice-versa, we were able to quickly and efficiently provide key evidence in 
this debate. Similarly, taking the example of altruism and public spend-
mg, by embedding an experimental game in an online survey, l was able 
to provide the most clear evidence to date of the importance of altruism 
for public spending preferences. Rather than searching for another survey 
through which this could be demonstrated with some marginally different 
question on altruism, or searching for yet another opaque estimation tech-
nique, l simply observed the revealed altruism ofrespondents and measured 
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their preferences. In more colloquial terms, l was able to get in and get out 
with minimal bleeding. Because so few questions in political science have 
received an experimental treatment, experimentalists can have a dispropor-
tionate impact. Given the simplicity of experimentation and the ease with 
which experimental results can be interpreted, this should appeal to political 
scientists of all vintages. 
Taken together, then, this work suggests that experimentation has im-
portant methodological role to play in political science. It is a role which is 
collaborative, practical, and efficient in the generation of knowledge. 
8.3.2 Substantive Implications 
As outlined in the summaries, each of these chapt ers has made a contribution 
to the questions which they set out to answer. Despite being a diverse lot, 
two larger substantive implications can be drawn from these findings. The 
first substantive implication is that citizen politics are characterized by an 
imbalance in power between persuasion attempts in favour of a status quo 
and those in favour of a change in direction. l presented field experimen-
tal evidence of the difficulty one front-running leadership campaign had in 
persuading party elites to adopt positions - and by extension a candidacy -
outside of the party's mainstream. What is notable about this is not only 
did the persuasion attempt set the candidate backwards, but it arguably set 
the party backwards as well. That is, party elites rejected a proposed change 
which may have made the party better off in the long-term. One explana-
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tion for this resistance to change is that party elites were biased against any 
change from the party's median position, des pite its appeal to the broader 
electorate. We similarly noted in our Bradley-Terry experiment on electoral 
reform that a constant advantage was enjoyed by arguments for the status 
quo. This advantage was not a result of the virtues or features of the exist-
ing system. Instead, the advantage appeared shared by aU arguments for the 
status quo. For scholars of public opinion and political psychology especially, 
these results add to our existing knowledge about the difficulty in persuading 
citizens to change their minds (see, e.g. Lodge and Taber, 2005). They also 
carry implications for those theorists who desire a more deliberative politics 
in which arguments me et on equal footing (see, e.g. Elster, 1998). 
The second substantive implication of this research is that the political be-
haviour of individuals is insufficiently explained by egoist and self-interested 
considerations. Instead, l have shown in three different chapters the other-
regarding orientations of citizens matter for how they choose to participate 
in poli tics and how they form their preferences. In the case of two chapters, l 
showed that such considerations work as effective explanators of preferences 
and behaviour. In a third chapter, l showed that such considerations, in this 
case altruism, act as indicators which in turn give us important insights into 
the differences betweenpartisans in Canada. We need not abandon method-
ological individualism to account for non-egoist and non-self-interested con-
siderations in political behaviour. We merely need to recognize that the 
well-being of others plays an important part for sorne citizens in their own 
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utility calculations. To disregard this is to risk specifying incomplete models 
of political behaviour. To embrace this (or at least to begrudgingly try it 
on for a period of time) is tb potentially better explain important aspects of 
political behaviour and political psychology. 
8.4 Future Research 
l have argued that this dissertation has demonstrated that experimentation 
can be widely-applied in political science. l have also argued that this work 
has demonstrated important substantive insights for our understanding of 
politics, particularly in highlighting the importance of cognitive or preferen-
tial biases and the importance of other-regarding orientations. 
Going forward, l envision a research program which extends the embed-
ding of games-based experiments in surveys and takes seriously the two sub-
stantive insights highlighted above. l When these insights are combined with 
the observation that there is an increasing interest in the genetic basis of 
other-regarding behaviour generally (Rushton, 2004; Scourfield et al., 2004; 
de Quervain et al., 2004; Knafo et al., 2008; Cesarini et al., 2008) and political 
behaviour in particular (Dawes and Fowler, 2008; Settle, Dawes and Fowler, 
2008) an exciting set of questions emerge. l outline three such examples 
below. 
First, a series of experiments could explore whether we can explain indi-
llndeed, the first two questions which follow are those 1 proposed to take up in the 
most recent round of postdoctoral applications and for which 1 have received funding. 
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viduals' differences in rates of political and community participation accord-
ing to their revealed levels of trust. A large body of literature on "social 
capital" has argued that this connection exists. However, it typically relies 
on expressed levels of generalized trust in others. What is lacking is a be-
havioural measure of trust in which an individual's propensity to cooperate 
and to trust others is observed. By embedding in a survey a multiple-round 
ultimatum game in which utility maximization depends on cooperation, we 
could induce survey respondents to reveal their levels of basic trust. By then 
correlating this trust with respondents' reported levels of participation, we 
can gain insight into the extent to which basic social trust is necessary for 
collective action. 
Second, a series of experiments could be conducted to examine whether 
individuals' differences in vote choice can be explained by the variance ob-
served in their willingness to punish others in ultimatum games. Ultimatum 
games can reveal a voter's preference for fair outcomes or egalitarianism 
(Dawes et al., 2007) and their willingness to bear a cost for more fair out-
cornes. Such preferences have been used to explain vote'choice for left-wing 
political parties (e.g. Deth and Scarbrough, 1995). However, left-wing vote 
choice has have never been shown to be related to observed individual pref-
erence for egalitarianism. By correlating individual behaviour in a series of 
ultimatum games and reported vote choice in several elections, we can de-
termine if preferences for egalitarianism effectively explain vote choice for 
left-wing parties. 
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Third, we could explore the degree to which preferences for the status quo 
and biases against change are genetically structured. For example, by com-
bining a series of loss-aversion experiments (see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979a) in an online study with a DNA sample of respondents, or alternately 
a twins study, we could estimate both the heritability of loss aversion and 
the relationship between loss aversion and preferences for the status quo in 
questions of public opinion and vote choice. Such a research program may 
seem costly and prohibitively complex. However, 1 would argue that the ben-
efits of understanding how both our genes and our environments structure 
fundamental political behaviours necessitates ambitious research programs, 
even if the initial climb seems steep. Indeed, the growing field of genetics 
and politics has mu ch to teach us about what we observe in the social world 
of politics. We should not shy away from this possibility and we should rec-
ognize that experimentation provides a useful tool for forays into this field. 
Finally, 1 note that such research likely has several interested partners who 
could be convinced to share in the costs. 
Taken together, the combination of experimentation and a substantive 
interest in other-regarding preferences and preferential biases points to an 
interesting research program growing forward. It is one which would not have 
been clear to me had 1 not first undertaken the proceeding experiments. 
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8.5 The Sound Down the Hall 
A final word. Much of the task of writing this dissertation has happened at 
night. As the night gets on and the time between the buses home grows, l 
have found it easier to push on for a few more hours. It is in the quiet of the 
night that l've understood best what it is l have tried to accomplish in this 
dissertation. 
But as l have entered the watch that ends the night, l think l've often 
heard a knocking around the corner. It is not the security guard with the 
keys who passes by around midnight. Nor is it the cleaning lady who ghosts 
around a few hours after him, with her Spanish music playing on her stereo. 
It is not just the wind and l am certain it is not Lionel Groulx. No, it is 
\ 
either the clacking tongue of another inferential monster ready to offer up 
an alternative explanation for my data or it is the sound of Warren Miller's 
cowboy boots coming down the hall. Either way, l welcome them in my 
office. 
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Annexe A: Criterion Validity of 
Dictator Game as a Measure of 
Altruism 
In this annexe, l provide further evidence of the dictator game as an indi-
cator of altruism. Table A.1 shows the relationship between dictator game 
behavior and self-reported charitable donations in the last two years. l mea-
sure altruism dichotomously, as in Model 3 in Tables 2.2-2.5, and usè an 
ordered logit. Charitable giving was measured with the following question: 
"Thinking about the past 2 years, what was the total amount of aU your 
charitable donations together?" Respondents could choose from one of eight 
categories: 
• Did not give to charity over past 2 years 
• Under $500 
• $500 to $999 
• $1000 to $4999 
• $5000 to $9999 
XXVll 
• $10000 to $49999 
• $50000 to $99999 
• More than $100000 
• Prefer not to say 
l exclude those who did not dis close their glVmg (2.93% of the total 
sam pIe ). l note that disclosure is unrelated to altruism in a bivariate logits 
using each of the three specifications of altruism. 
As can be seen in Table A.1, altruistic behavior in a dictator game is pos-
itively and significantly related to self-reported charitable giving. According 
to the estimates, those who gave away any money in a dictator game had 
odds of being in the highest donation category 38% greater than those who 
gave away nothing in the dictator game. 
Table A.2 shows the relationship between altruistic behavior and dis-
agreement with two statements. The first statement is: "It is difficult for me 
to contain my feelings when l see people in distress." The second statement 
is "1 have little compassion for people in need who are unwilling to take the 
first step to heip themselves." Respondents were allowed to indicate that 
they strongly agree (1), somewhat agree (2), somewhat disagree (3), and 
strongly disagree (4) with the statements. Altruistic behavior in a dictator 
game should negatively predict disagreement with the first statement and 
positively predict disagreement with the second. Tables A.2 and A.3 sug-
gests this is just the case. In the case of responding to those in distress, 
xxviii 
those who gave away money in the dictator game have odds of answering 
strongly disagree over all other categories only 78% as large than those who 
give away nothing. Similarly, the odds of those who give away money in the 
dictator game have strongly disagreeing with the second statement are only 
38% larger than those who give away nothing. Taken together, these three 
results increase the content validity of the dictator game as an indicator of 
an altruistic orientation. 
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Table A.l: Altruism and Self-Reported Charitable Giving (Ordered Logistic 
Age 9.19 2.64 .00 
Income 3.14 0.39 .00 
Education 2.43 0.30 .00 
French 0.36 0.05 .00 
Female 0.95 0.08 .52 
Employed 0.82 0.19 .38 
Unemployed 0.37 0.12 .00 
Self-Employed 1.20 0.20 .28 
Student 0.60 0.17 .07 
Homemaker 0.86 0.20 .52 
Pu blic Sect or 1.18 0.23 .40 
Making Ends Meet 0.72 0.04 .00 
Job Loss Worry 0.88 0.04 .01 
NDPID 0.72 0.14 .10 
Conservative ID 1.49 0.23 .01 
Liberal ID 0.86 . 0.13 .36 
BQ ID 0.61 0.16 .07 
Cut 1 1.29 
Cut 2 1.60 
Cut 3 2.69 
Cut 4 4.58 
Cut 5 5.50 
Cut 6 7.51 
Cut 7 8.06 
Cut 8 8.40 
LR x2 712.02 
LR x2 >rv Altruism Model 0.00 
N=2160 
xxx 
Table A.2: Altruism and Response to those in Distress (Ordered Logistic 
Regression) 
~--------------------~~~~-=~----
Age 0.22 0.07 .00 
Income 1.19 0.15 .15 
Education 1.18 0.14 .17 
French 1.59 0.21 .00 
0.54 0.05 .00 
Employed 0.62 0.15 .05 
Unemployed 0.83 0.27 .56 
Self-Em ployed 0.73 0.12 .06 
Student 0.86 0.24 .57 
Homemaker 0.75 0.16 .18 
Public Sector 1.74 0.35 .01 
Making Ends Meet 0.90 0.05 .07 
Job Loss \iVorry 0.85 0.04 .00 
NDPID 0.62 0.12 .02 
Conservative ID 1.17 0.18 .31 
Liberal ID 0.65 0.10 .01 
ID 0.70 0.18 .17 
Cut 2 -0.43 
Cut 3 1.71 
LR x2 215.01 
LR x2 >i"V Altruism Model 0.00 
N=2183 
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Table A.3: Altruism and Willingness to Help Those Who Don't Help Them-
selves First (Ordered Logistic Regression) 
Altruism 
Age 
Income 
Education 
French 
Female 
Employed 
Unemployed 
Self-Employed 
Student 
Homemaker 
Public Sector 
Making Ends Meet 
Job Loss Worry 
NDPID 
Conservative ID 
Liberal ID 
BQ ID 
Cut 2 
Cut 3 
LR x2 
LR x2 >rv Altruism Model 
N=2185 
Model3 S.E. p 
1.38 
2.44 
1.03 
1.83 
1.16 
1.74 
1.90 
2.47 
1.41 
1.52 
2.11 
0.61 
1.04 
0.99 
5.08 
0.52 
1.56 
2.36 
2.19 
3.63 
261.80 
0.00 
0.11 .00 
0.68 .00 
0.12 .79 
0.21 .00 
0.15 .25 
0.15 
0.44 
0.77 
0.23 
0.40 
0.44 
0.12 
0.06 
0.05 
0.98 
0.08 
.00 
.01 
.00 
.04 
.12 
.00 
.01 . 
.41 
.78 
.00 
.00 
0.24 .00 
0.59 .00 
Annexe B: Dictator Gan'le 
Instructions 
The complete text of the dictator game experiment is as follows: 
In addition to our normal $500 cash prize for completing the survey, we 
will be drawing four other prizes at the end of this survey. One person in 
this study will be randomly chosen to receive each prize. 
In each draw, the prize is $100. Should you win any of the draws, your 
answer to the questions below will determine the amount of each prize that 
you receive. Remember that your answer is completely anonymous. 
(1) Below, you will see two boxes. In' the first box, enter how much of a 
$100 prize you would keep if you won one of the additional draws. In the 
other box, indicate how much you'd like to give away to an anonymous in-
dividual who will also be randomly chosen. Vou know nothing about this 
anonymous individual. 
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Vou must choose how to divide the $100 between yourself and the anonymous 
individu al. Vou may keep aIl, none, or sorne of the money - the decision is 
up to you and will be completely anonymous. The total of the two boxes 
must add up to $100. Once you have made your decision, please hit next. 
(2) Below, you will see two boxes. In the first box, enter how much of a 
$100 prize you would keep if you won one of the additional draws. In the 
other box, indicate how mu ch you'd like to give away to an anonymous in-
dividual who will also be randomly chosen. Vou know nothing about this 
anonymous individual except that they support the Conservative .Party. 
Vou must choose how to div ide the $100 between yourself and the anonymous 
individual. Vou may keep aIl, none, or sorne of the money - the decision is 
up to you and will be completely anonymous. The total of the two boxes 
must add up to $100. Once you have made your decision, please hit next. 
(3) Below, you will see two boxes. In the first box, enter how much of a $100 
prize you would keep if you won one of the additional draws. In the other 
box, indicate how much you'd like to give away to an anonymous individual 
who will also be randomly chosen. Vou know nothing about this anonymous 
individual except that they support the Liberal Party 
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Vou must choose how to divide the $100 between yourself and the anonymous 
individual. Vou may keep aIl, none, or sorne of the money - the decision is 
up to you and will be completely anonymous. The total of the two boxes 
must add up to $100. Once you have made your decision, please hit next. 
(4) Below, you will see two boxes. In the first box, enter how mu ch of a 
$100 prize you would keep if you won one of the additional draws. In the 
other box, indieate how mu ch you'd like to give away to an anonymous in-
dividual who will also be randomly chosen. Vou know nothing about this 
anonymous individual except that they support the New Democratie Party 
Vou must choose how to divide the $100 between yourself and the anonymous 
individual. Vou may keep aIl, none, or sorne of the money - the decision is 
up to you and will be completely anonymous. The total of the two boxes 
must add up to $100. Once you have made your decision, please hit next. 
The arder- of questions 1-4 was randomized. 
Annexe C: Question Wording 
and Variables for Dictators and 
Purses 
Altruisrn is the amount of money given away to the completely anonymous 
individual in the dictator game. The amount ranges from $0 to $100. In 
Model 1, Altruism is rescaled from 0 to 1. In Model 2, Altruism is trans-
formed to 0 for those who give away nothing, 1 for those who give away 
something less than or equal to the median ($20), and 2 for those who give 
awày more than the median. In Model 3, Altruism reads 1 for those who 
gave away something and 0 for those who give away nothing. 
Age is a six category variable measuring age group. It is rescaled to 1. 
Values are 18-24 (0), 25-34 (1/6), 35-44 (2/6), 45-54 (3/6), 45-54 (4/6), 55-
64 (5/6), 65 and older (1). 
Incorne is a four category variable measuring household income in the last 
year. It is rescaled from 0 to 1. Values are <$40000 (0), $40000 to $60000 
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(1/3), $60000 to $80000 (2/3) and >$80000 (1). 
Education is a three category variable measuring highest level of educa-
tion. It is rescaled from 0 to 1. Values are high school or (0), at least 
sorne college (1/2), and aUeast sorne university (1). 
French is a dummy variable reading 1 if a respondent completed the survey 
in French and 0 otherwise. 
Female is a dummy variable reading 1 if a respondent is a female and 0 
otherwise. 
Employed, Unemployed, Self-Employed, Student, Homemaker, and 
Public Sector Employee are aH dummy variable reading 1 if a respon-
dent is indicates the occupation and 0 otherwise. The question wording is 
"Which of the following best describes your current job status." Response 
categories are "working on your own business within your home," "working 
on your own business outside of your home," "working at an employer's busi-
ness full-time/part-time," "currently unemployed," "full-time student," "full 
time student, working part time," "part time student, working full time," 
"homemaker," and "retired." 
Making Ends Meet measures a respondent's agreement with the state-
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ment "Thinking about your monthly bills, how difficult is it for you and your 
family to make ends meet." Responses are "Not difficult at aIl" (0), "Not 
very difficult" (1/3), "Somewhat difficult" (2/3), "Very difficult" (1). 
Future Job Loss measures the response to the question "How concerned are 
you that either you or the main household earner might become unemployed 
in the next six months?" Responses are "Not at aIl concerned" (0), "Not 
very concerned" (1/3), "Somewhat concerned" (2/3), "Very concerned" (1). 
Partisan identification - Liberal ID, Conservative ID, NDP ID, and 
BQ ID are aIl variables reading 1 wh en a respondent identifies as a strong 
identifier of a party, 1/2 when they identify as a moderate identifier, and 0 
otherwise. Identification is determined with the question "Thinking about 
federal politics in Canada, generaIly speaking, do you usuaIly think of your-
self as Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P, or none of these?" Those who identified 
a party then received the standard foIlow-up: "And, generaIly speaking, how 
strongly do you think of yourself as a (party)?" 
Annexe D: Question Wording 
and Variables for Affinity, 
Antipathy, and Political 
Participation 
Max-Min is the maximum allocation to a partisan less the minimum allo-
cation. The variable is rescaled from 0 to 1. 
Max-Mean is the maximum allocation to a partisan less the mean of allo-
cations to other partisans. The variable is rescaled from 0 to 1. 
Affinity is the maximum allocation to a partisan less the allocation to a 
completely anonymous individual. Negative values are censored at O. The 
variable is rescaled 0 to 1. 
Antipathy is the allocation to a completely anonymous individual less the 
minimum allocation. Negative values are censored at O. The variable is 
rescaled 0 to 1. 
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Partisan identification - is a variable reading 1 when a respondent iden-
tifies as a strong identifier of a party, 1/2 when then identify as a rnoderate 
identifier, and 0 otherwise. Identification is deterrnined with the question 
"Thinking about federal poli tics in Canada, generally speaking, do you usu-
ally think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative, N.D.P, or none of these7" 
Those who identified a party then received the standard follow-up: "And, 
generally speaking, how strongly do you think of yourself as a (party) 7" 
Incorne is a four category variable rneasuring household incorne in the last 
year. It is rescaled frorn 0 to 1. Values are <$40000 (0), $40000 to $60000 
(1/3), $60000 to $80000 (2/3) and >$80000 (1). 
Age is a six category variable rneasuring age group. It is rescaled to 1. 
Values are 18-24 (0), 25-34 (1/6), 35-44 (2/6), 45-54 (3/6), 45-54 (4/6), 55-
64 (5/6), 65 and older (1). 
Education is a three category variable rneasuring highest level of educa-
tion. It is rescaled frorn 0 to 1. Values are high school or less (0), at least 
sorne college (1/2), and at least sorne university (1). 
Fernale is a durnrny variable reading 1 if a respondent is a fernale and 0 
otherwise. 
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Unemployed is a dummy variable reading 1 if a respondent is currently 
unemployed and 0 otherwise. 
Voting is a dummy variable reading 1 when respondents indicate having 
voted in response to the question: "In talking to people about elections, we 
find that they are sometimes not able to vote because theyre not registered, 
they dont have the time, or they have difficulty getting to the polls. Did you 
happen to vote in the last federal election?" 
Annexe E: Treatmel1.t 
Assignment for For Want of a 
Nail 
Our treatment assignment procedure occurred in three steps: 
• An official list of delegates was provided to campaigns by the Liberal 
Party of Canada foUowing delegate selection meetings. We first ex-
cluded aU those who did not have a proper address and then excluded 
those from three provinces: Quebec, Manitoba and British Columbia. 
Delegates from Quebec were excluded as they were subject to a different 
ad campaign by the Ignatieff campaign. Those in Manitoba and British 
Columbia were excluded because delegate lists were not finalized at the 
time of treatment assignment due to disputes over the eligibility of sev-
eral delegates. Using the random number generator function in Excel, 
we assigned each delegate a random number and then ranked delegates 
from largest to smallest number. The first 800 delegates were selected 
for the study. We originally included delegates pledged to support Ig-
natieff in our first sample because we expected a second campaign to 
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participate in the experiment. We included Ignatieff delegates to allow 
us to test the effectiveness of the second campaign's direct mail on dele-
gates committed to other candidates. Ultimately, the second campaign 
did not participate, but not before we had sent a treatment schedule 
to the Ignatieff campaign. 
• Among the 800 selected delegates, we identified and excluded aH those 
who were not pledged to support Michael Ignatieff. The leadership 
selection process of the Liberal party requires those who stand as del-
egate candidates to formally declare their allegiance prior to delegate 
selection .meetings. This information is retained in the official party 
list. This left 567 delegates. 
• Among the remaining delegates, we assigned them a second random 
number and ranked them from largest to smallest number. The first 100 
delegates were assigned to receive two pieces of mail from the Ignatieff 
campaign. The next 200 delegates were assigned to receive one pie ce of 
mail. The remaining delegates (267), were assigned to receive no mail 
for the period of the study. 
In the course of receiving completed surveys we identified as many as 
four individuals in our control condition who may have been treated by the 
campaign. Because the campaign eventually mailed every delegate, those 
from whom we received completed surveys after November 27th may have 
received mail from the campaign. However, our statistical and substantive 
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results do not change when we rerun our analyses with these individuals 
excluded. 
Annexe F: Sample and Subject 
Profile for Bradley-Terry 
Experiment 
Our subjects were drawn from an internet panel containing a list of approx-
imately 15000 specifically named individuals. The panel is managed by a 
commercial polling firm. Though the panel is national, our experiment was 
provincial. At the time of the sur vey the panel had 3575 registered panelists 
in the province of Ontario. Respondents either self-select into the panel 
through the surveying firm's website, or they are recruited through solici-
tation by phone and email. Upon registration in the panel respondents are 
assigned a number between 1 and 31. In each subsequent month they are 
invited to complete the survey in one of four weeks according to this number. 
Our experiment occurred in the last week of the referendum campaign 
(October 2 to 9, 2007) and was limited to those living in the province of 
Ontario. Of 3575 Ontarians registered in the ,panel, 844 were invited to 
complete the survey during this week. 565 agreed to complete the survey. Of 
those 565, 520 agreed to participate in the Bradley-Terry experiment. This 
us a response rate of 61.6%. 
Table F.1 presents a profile of the experirnental subjects. 
Table F .1: Sarnple Demographies and Political Characteris-
tics 
Variable 
Age 
Fernale 
Household Incorne 
Education 
N 
19-24 
25-34 
35-44 
55-64 
65+ 
<$40000 
$40000 to $60000 
$60000 to $80000 
>$80000 
Refused 
High School or Jess 
Sorne College 
Sorne University 
520 
% 
1.7% 
9.6% 
16.5% 
26.5% 
31.7% 
13.9% 
52.6% 
12.89% 
16.15% 
17.12% 
38.65% 
15.19% 
8.85% 
28.46% 
62.69% 
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Annexe G: Additional Logit 
Results for Bradley-Terry 
Experiment 
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Table G.I: Logistic Regression of Argument Power with Argument Match-
ings 
Model1 Model2 
Variable Coef SE p-value Coef SE p-value 
FPTP2/MMP1 -0.59 0.78 0.45 -0.69 0.79 0.39 
FPTP3/MMP1 0.52 0.84 0.54 0.39 0.86 0.65 
FPTP4/MMP1 -0.22 0.81 0.78 -0.31 0.82 0.71 
FPTP5/MMP1 0.32 0.80 0.69 0.16 0.81 0.85 
FPTP6/MMP1 0.69 0.95 0.47 0.65 0.96 0.50 
FPTP1/MMP2 -0.29 0.83 0.73 -0.42 0.84 0.62 
FPTP2/MMP2 0.29 0.76 0.71 0.36 0.77 0.65 
FPTP3/MMP2 -0.83 0.84 0.32 -1.03 0.86 0.23 
FPTP4/MMP2 -0.04 0.77 0.96 -0.35 0.79 0.66 
FPTP5/MMP2 -0.00 0.74 1.00 -0.13 0.76 0.87 
FPTP6/MMP2 0.59 0.80 0.46 0.45 0.82 0.59 
FPTP1/MMP3 -0.51 0.86 0.55 -0.62 0.88 0.49 
FPTP2/MMP3 0.43 0.79 0.58 0.33 0.81 0.68 
FPTP3/MMP3 -0.04 0.90 0.96 -0.12 0.92 0.90 
FPTP4/MMP3 0.06 0.78 0.93 -0.02 0.79 0.98 
FPTP5/MMP3 0.36 0.86 0.67 0.20 0.87 0.82 
FPTP6/MMP3 0.69 0.95 0.47 0.71 0.97 0.46 
FPTP1/MMP4 -0.11 0.75 0.89 -0.23 0.76 0.76 
FPTP2/MMP4 0.05 0.80 0.95 0.10 0.82 0.90 
, FPTP3/MMP4 -1.07 1.00 0.29 -1.15 1.01 0.26 
FPTP4/MMP4 0.10 0.74 0.90 -0.07 0.75 0.92 
FPTP5/MMP4 -1.00 0.83 0.23 -1.22 0.86 0.15 
FPTP6/MMP4 0.36 0.86 0.67 0.31 0.87 0.72 
FPTP1/MMP5 0.43 0.79 0.58 0.34 0.80 0.67 
FPTP2/MMP5 -1.68 0.97 0.08 -1.82 0.98 0.06 
FPTP3/MMP5 0.54 0.78 0.49 0.41 0.80 0.61 
FPTP4/MMP5 0.18 0.93 0.85 0.09 0.94 0.92 
FPTP5/MMP5 0.34 0.82 0.69 0.14 0.84 0.87 
FPTP6/MMP5 0.43 0.79 0.58 0.41 0.80 0.61 
FPTP1/MMP6 0.06 0.78 0.93 0.04 0.79 0.96 
FPTP2/MMP6 0.05 0.80 0.95 -0.16 0.81 0.84 
FPTP3/MMP6 0.36 0.86' 0,67 0.14 0,87 0,88 
FPTP4/MMP6 -0,04 0,90 0,96 -0,04 0.92 0,97 
FPTP5/MMP6 0,77 0,82 0,35 0,50 0.84 0,55 
FPTP6/MMP6 0,18 0,77 0.81 -0.02 0.79 0.98 
Female 0.45 0,19 0.02 
Age -0,24 0.08 0.00 
Constant -0.18 0,61 0.76 0.24 0,80 0.76 
N 520 520 
Pseudo R2 0,04 0.07 
Annexe H: Predicted 
Probabilities of FPTP 
dominance in Structured versus 
U nstructured Bradley-Terry 
Models 
Given structured and unstructured results, the question remains about which 
researchers should prefer. vVe believe this is a matter of what questions a 
researcher wishes to answer. If we wished to understand the power of exact 
arguments in the referendum, we would be well-served to consider the un-
structured results, as these arguments closely match those made during the 
campaign. However, if we were looking forward to another campaign and 
wished to develop new arguments, we could learn mOre from the structured 
results. lndeed, these would allow us to design optimal arguments which 
combined effective components and avoided less effective ones. Fortunately, 
despite these models giving us different types of information on power, the 
predictions which result from them are very similar. Table H.1 demonstrates 
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the absolute difference in predicted probabilities of FPTP dominance accord-
ing to our unstructured and structured models. The me an absolute difference 
between the model predictions is just 0.0196. 2 This suggests that researchers 
could choose a structured or unstructured model according to their own an-
alytical needs without concern for making inferences greatly different from 
those they would make with the other model. 
Table H.1: Absolute difference in predicted probabilities of FPTP dominance 
by structured and unstructured models a 
FPTP Argument=> 
MMP ArgumentJ). 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 
3 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 
4 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.00 
5 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
6 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
a The mean absolute difference is 0.0196. 
2We ca\culate this by taking the average of the absolute difference between the predicted 
probabilities from the structured and unstructured models. 
Annexe 1: Question Wording 
and Variables for Partisanship 
and Altruism 
Allocation to Anonymous Individuals is the amount of money given 
away to the completely anonymous individual in the dictator game. The 
amount ranges from $0 to $100. 
Allocation to Other Partisans is the average of the amount given away to 
partisan recipients who do not support the identifier's party, i.e. the average 
of allocations to Liberal and Conservative supporters for New Democratie 
identifiers. The amount ranges from $0 to $100. 
Allocation to Co-Partisans is the amount of money given away to the 
partisan recipient who supports the identifier's party, i.e. the allocation to a 
New Democrat by New Democratie identifiers. The amount ranges from $0 
to $100. 
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Pooled Allocation is the amount of money given away to aIl recipients. 
The amount ranges from $0 to $100. 
Other Partisan is a dummy variable indicating that a Pooled Allocation 
was to the partisan of a different party than the respondent. 
Co-Partisan is a dummy variable indicating that a Pooled Allocation was 
to a partisan of the same party as the respondent. 
Partisan identification - Liberal, Conservative, and New Dernocrat 
are aIl dummy variables reading 1 when a respondent identifies as a mod-
erate or strong identifier of a party and 0 otherwise. Identification is deter-
mined with the question "Thinking about federal politics in Canada, gen-
eraIly speaking, do you' usually think of yourself as Liberal, Conservative; 
N.D.P, or none of these?" Those who identified a party then received the 
standard foIlow-up: "And, generally speaking, how strongly do you think of 
yourself as a (party)?" Those who indicated a very strongly or fairly strongly 
were retained. 
Incorne is a four category variable measuring household income in the last 
year. It is rescaled from 0 to 1. Values are <$40000 (0), $40000 to 860000 
(1/3), $60000 to 880000 (2/3) and >880000 (1). 
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Age is a six category variable measuring age group. It is rescaled to l. 
Values are 18-24 (0), 25-34 (1/6), 35-44 (2/6), 45-54 (3/6), 45-54 (4/6), 55-
64 (5/6), 65 and older (1). 
Education is a three category variable measuring highest level of educa-
tion. It is rescaled from 0 to 1. Values are high school or less (0), at least 
sorne college (0.5), and at least sorne university (1). 
Female is a dummy variable reading 1 if a respondent is a female and 0 
otherwise. 
Unemployed is a dummy variable reading 1 if a respondent lS currently 
unemployed and 0 otherwise. 
Empathy is an interval-level variable measuring the average agreement with 
eight questions measuring empathie capacity. Respondents who score 0 have 
the lowest empathie capacity; those scoring 1 have the highest capacity. For 
each question, respondents receive a score of 0, 1, or 2 based on their re-
sponse of total, somewhat, or no agreement (or disagreement in the case of 
negatively-keyed questions). The total summed score is then divided by 16. 
The questions are as follows (negative-keyed questions are italicized): "1 find 
it easy to put myself in somebody elses shoes." "1 am good at predicting 
how someone will feel." "1 am quickto spot when someone in a group is 
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feeling awkward or uncomfortable." "Other people tell me l am good at 
understanding how they are feeling and what they are thinking." "1 find it 
hard to know what to do in a social situation." "1 ojten find it hard to judge 
if somethin,g is rude or polite." "It is hard for me to see why some things 
upset people so much." "Other people ojten say that l am insensitive, though 
l dont always see why." 
Annexe J: Supplementary 
Tables for Partisanship and 
Altruism 
Table J.l: Dictator Garne Allocations to Anonyrnous Individuals Law 
ucation (OLS) 
~~~~==~~~====~~~~== Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal 
Conservative 
Incorne 
Education 
Fernale 
Age Group 
Unernployed 
Ernpathy 
Intercept 
-3.356 
-1.186 
1.550 
5.417 
5.084** 
3.891 
-3.858 
-0.119 
18.812** 
802 
0.017 
1.73 
(2.541) 
(2.484) 
(2.370) 
(3.854) 
(1.867) 
(3.722) 
(4.128) 
(4.286) 
(4.487) 
Significance levels: t: 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
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Table J.2: Dictator Carne Allocations to Other Partisans - Low Education 
(OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -6.342** (2.073) 
Conservative -8.168** (2.027) 
Incorne -1.330 (1.934) 
Education 0.668 (3.145) 
Fernale 3.146* (1.523) 
Age Croup -2.962 (3.037) 
Unernployed -1.486 (3.368) 
Ernpathy 1.491 (3.498) 
, Intercept 22.997** (3.661) 
N 802 
R2 0.036 
F (8,793) 3.656 
Significance levels : t : 10% *: 5% ** : 1% 
Table J.3: Dictator Carne Allocations to Co-Partisans - Low Education 
(OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -8.476** (2.514) 
Conservative -7.025** (2.457) 
Incorne -2.775 (2.344) 
Education 0.492 (3.812) 
Fernale 1.074 (1.847) 
Age Croup 2.508 (3.682) 
U nernployed -1.398 ( 4.083) 
Ernpathy 7.069t ( 4.240) 
Intercept 27.138** ( 4.439) 
N 802 
R2 0.025 
F (8,793) 2.572 
Significance levels : t: 10% *: 5% ** : 1% 
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Table J.4: Dictator Game Allocations to Anonymous Individuals High 
Education (OLS) 
~~~~==~~~====~~~~== Variable Coefficient 
Liberal -1.522 
Conservative -5.027* 
Income -1.308 
Female 1.378 
Group 1.675 
Dnemployed -4.695 
Empathy 15.511 ** 
14.302** 
Significance levels : t: 10% 
(Std. Err.) 
1156 
0.031 
(1.979) 
(2.120) 
(2.052) 
(1.599) 
(2.747) 
(5.435) 
(3.509) 
**: 1% 
Table J .5: Dictator Game Allocations to Other Partisans - High Education 
(OLS) 
Variable Coefficient 
............... (Std. Err.) 
Liberal -5.799** (l.562) 
Conservative -10.509** (1.673) 
Income -2.271 (l.619) 
Female 2.006 (l.262) 
Age Group 194 (2.168) 
Unemployed -5.763 (4.289) 
Empathy 1l.360** (2.769) 
Intercept 17.004** (2.677) 
0.073 
Significance levels : t: 10% ** : 1% 
) 
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Table J.6: Dictator Game Allocations to Co-Partisans - High Education 
(OLS) 
Conservative -7.066** (2.123) 
Income -1.649 (2.055) 
Female 0.773 (1.601) 
Age Group 1.754 (2.750) 
Unemployed -4.312 (5.442) 
Empathy 17.475** (3.514) 
19.663** 
0.04 
Significance levels: t: 10% ** : 1% 
Table J.7: Pooled Dictator Game Allocations Low Education (OLS) 
Conservative -5.460** (2.010) 
Other Partisan -7.320** (0.693) 
Co-Partisan 1.495* (0.723) 
Female 3.101 * (1.553) 
Age 1.146 (3.169) 
Income -0.852 (2.043) 
Education 2.192 (3.100) 
Unemployed -2.247 (3.483) 
Empathy 2.813 (3.657) 
24.924** 
0.043 
Significance levels : t: 10% ** : 1% 
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Table J.8: Pooled Dictator Garne Allocations - High Education (OLS) 
Variable Coefficient (Rob. Std. Err.) 
Liberal -4.529** (1.685) 
Conservative -7.534** (1.775) 
Other Partisan -6.982** (0.515) 
Co-Partisan 3.323** (0.573) 
Fern ale 1.385 (1.316) 
Age 0.078 (2.193) 
Incorne -1.743 (1.653) 
Education 0.000 (0.000) 
Unernployed -4.923 (3.814) 
Ernpathy 14.782** (2.850) 
Intercept 18.209** (2.789) 
N 
R2 
F (9,1155) 
3468 
0.071 
52.241 
Significance levels: t: 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Annexe K: Treatment 
Assignment for Compulsory 
Voting Experiment 
The randomizationof participants proceeded in three steps. First, we identi-
fied aIl subjects (119) who indicated on the initial recruitment form that they 
did not expect to vote or were unsure. Using a random number generator, 
we assigned each of these subjects a number and then ranked them accord-
ing to this number. The top half were assigned to the treatment condition 
and the bottom half to the control condition. Second, we then assigned a 
random number to aIl potential participants who indicated they were likely 
to vote. We selected the top 86 of these participants. The top half of the 
selected group was assigned to the treatment condition and the bottom half 
was assigned to the control condition. Third, to exp and our sample using an 
online survey we invited the remaining 255 eligible participants to take part 
in the study. We assigned subjects to treatment and control prior to contact 
using the method of random number assignment and then ranking described 
above. However, in this instance 70 percent were assigned to treatment and 
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the remaining 30 percent were assigned to control. 
We have checked our randomization procedure across several key vari-
ables, and found only one significant difference between conditions in the 
first round, suggesting that our randomization worked. In each case, we test 
balance using a X2 test of the relationship between treatment and the variable 
in question. Our treatment was balanced according to gender (X2 = 0.82, 
p < .37), with female participants making up 73% of the treatment group 
and 67% of the control group. Internet usage was also insignificantly related 
to treatment assignment (X2 = 5.84, p < .44). Most importantly, there was 
no difference in the average knowledge scores on the first wave of the survey 
between the two groups (X2 = 7.06, p < .63). The same is true political 
discussion and media news consumption. 
We did encounter one possible problem in our randomization. Specifically, 
considering all those we invited to participate, those who were assigned to 
the control group chose to participate in larger numbers (66%) than those 
in the treatment group (54%). This is a significant difference (X2 = 6.50, 
p < .03) and raises the possibility of a difference between those who were 
assigned to the treatment condition and then chose to participate compared 
to those in the control condition who chose to participate. Because the treat-
ment condition requires more effort than the control condition (i.e. voting), 
those who chose to participate under the treatment regime may be more 
motivated in general. This general level of motivation may also make them 
more likely to seek out poli tic al information. If these groups are unbalanced, 
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any growth found in political knowledge amorig the treatment group could 
be attributed to their general levels of motivation (which could differ from 
the control group) rather than the incentive to learn imposed by mandatory 
voting. Nevertheless, other factors led us to lay aside this concern. In our 
first round of invitations, which invited potential participants to a room but 
did not tell them the details of the experiment, we had 31 participants in 
the control condition and 22 in the treatment. No participants who showed 
up declined to fill out the sur vey. Despite being randomly assigned, we had 
about 50% more participants in the control conditions show up than those 
in the treatment. But as this is due to chance, there is no unobserved effect 
among our first set of participants. When we consider subjects from both 
rounds of invitations, the possible motivation effect disappears and the dif-
ference between the two groups likelihood of participating in the experiment 
is no longer significant. Taken together, aH of these tests suggest that our 
randomization procedure did not lead to any unobserved differences between 
the groups which could also be expected to affect knowledge acquisition or 
political engagement. 
Annexe L: Question Wording 
and Variables for Compulsory 
Voting Experiment 
First Round Knowledge Score: The first round knowledge score is the 
percentage of the following questions answered correctly. Response categories 
are given in parenthesis with the correct answer in boldo 
• Between the Parti Qubcois and the LiberaIs, which wouid you say is 
further to the right (i.e. more conservative) than the other? (Parti 
Québécois, LiberaIs) 
• In this country, what is the maximum number of years between elections 
allowed by Iaw? (3,4, 5, 6, DK).* 
• Which of the following best describes who is entitied to vote in Quebec 
elections? (Resident of Quebec, Taxpayer in Quebec, Landed Immi-
grant in Quebec, Canadian citizen living in Quebec, DK) 
• Which party was in power in Quebec when the Quebec election was 
called? (Parti Québécois, LiberaIs, Parti conservateur, ADQ, DK). * 
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• When the election was called, which party had the second largest num-
ber of seats in the Assemblée Nationale? (Parti Québécois, LiberaIs, 
Parti conservateur, ADQ, DK).* 
• Which party leader has raised questions about Quebec's approach of 
"reasonable accomodation" of minorities? (André Boisclair, Mario 
Dumont, Gilles Duceppe, Stéphane Dion, DK). * 
• The date of the Quebec election is the (15 March, 26 March, 15 April, 
26 April, DK). * 
• Which party wants to maintain the freeze on university tuition fees? 
(Parti Québécois, LiberaIs, ADQ, DK).* 
• Which party leader advocates paying mothers who stay home with the 
children? (André Boisclair, Mario Dumont, Francoise David, Jean 
Charest, DK).* 
• The Charest government has proposed selling off part of a provincial 
park. In which region have they proposed this? (Mont Tremblant, 
Orford, St. Maurice, Charlevoix, DK). * 
• Which party leader is taking credit for Quebec having made progress 
on eliminating the fiscal imbalance with Ottawa? (André Boisclair, 
Mario Dumont, Francoise David, Jean Charest, DK).* 
Second Round Knowiedge Score: The second round knowledge score is 
the percent age correctly answered of the following questions plus first round 
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questions marked with an asterisk. Response categories are'given in paren-
thesis with the correct answer in boldo 
• The leader of the Quebec Liberal Party is (please write in, Jean Charest). 
• The leader of the Parti Québécois is (please write in, André Bois-
clair). 
• The leader of the ADQ (Action démocratique) is (please write in, 
Mario Dumont). 
• Of the three main parties, which is the most federalist? (Parti Québécois, 
LiberaIs, ADQ, DK). 
• During the campaign, an important moment came with decisions an-
nounced by Jim Flaherty on March 19th. What is his position? (Federal 
Finance Minister, Quebec Finance Minister, Premier of Ontario, Pre-
mier of Alberta.) 
• How many party leaders participated in the March 13th debate? (One, 
Two, Three, Four, Five, DK.) 
• Which party leader appeared confused at one point about whether 
Quebec was divisible or indivisible? (André Boisclair, Mario Dumont, 
Francoise David, Jean Charest, DK). 
• Which party leader was criticized at one point for using the term 
"slanted eyes"? (André Boisclair, Mario Dumont, Francoise David, 
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Jean Charest, DK). 
• The polls show how many parties have the support of at least one-
quarter of the voters? (One, Two, Three, Four, DK.) 
First and Second Round Political Discussion are calculated as the 
average response to three questions in the first round, and four in the second 
round. The response category indicating the least frequency is set to 0 and 
the most frequency is set to 1. The second round questions were as follows, 
with those from the first round indicated by an asterisk: 
• Sorne people seern to follow what's going on in governrnent and public 
affairs most of the time. Others aren't that interested. Do you follow 
what's going on in government and public affairs rnost of the time, 
sorne of the time, rarely or never? 
• Sorne people seem to follow what's going on in the Quebec election 
campaign most of the time. Others aren't that interested. Have you 
been following what's going on in the Quebec election campaign most 
of the time, sorne of the time, rarely or never?* 
• How often do you talk about current events or things you have heard 
about in the news with your FAMILY very often, sometimes, rarelyor 
never?* 
• How often do you talk about current events or things you have heard 
about in the news with your FRIENDS very often, sometimes, rarely 
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or never?* 
First and Second Round Media Usage are ca1culated as the average 
response of the following four questions. The questions were in both the first 
and second survey, and are preceded by the following preamble: "Here are 
some ways that people get news and information. Over the last 7 days, please 
estimate on how many days you have done each of the following. (please circle 
the number of days)" . 
• Read a newspaper. (0-7). 
• \Vatch the news on TV. (0-7). 
• Listen to the news on the radio. (0-7). 
• Read news on the internet. (0-7). 
Political activities are determ1ned by four questions in the first round 
survey, aH preceded by the prearnble is à quick list of things that 
sorne people have done to express their views. For each one, please indicate 
whether you have ever do ne it ornot.": 
• Contacted a newspaper or magazine to express your opinion on an 
issue. 
• Called in to a radio or television talk show to express your opinion on 
a political issue, even if you did not get on the air. 
• Taken part in a protest, march or demonstration. 
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• Signed an e-mail or a written petition about a social or political issue. 
\ 
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